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ABSTRACT
• This thesis aims to dispel the prevalent Western notion of a 
monolithic dissident movement within the Soviet Union. Doctrinal 
dispute among individual dissenters reveals an entire philosophical 
spectrum within the movement itself.
To prove that the dissident movement is variegated, we have 
compared the political thought of three prominent Soviet dissenters—  
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Andrei Sakharov, and Andrei Amalrik. Writings 
of each thinker have been examined to reveal a lively debate over 
subjects such as the viability of socialism, the future of Russia, and 
the wisdom of detente.
Solzhenitsyn emerges as a Christian ideologist in the 19th 
century Russophile vein. Sakharov starts from a neo-Marxist perspec­
tive in the late 1960's, only to discard the socialist label in 1975 
in favor of liberalism and internationalism. Amalrik serves as a 
prophet who foretells Russia's doom. He is less analytical, more 
visceral In his dissent than Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. These men 
sustain a political dialogue which engages other dissidents such as 
Roy Medvedev and Vladmiir Bukovsky. Despite their differences, 
however, the dissidents are united in their support of basic human 
rights.
The thesis ends by suggesting that an emasculated political 
movement is the price dissidents pay for fidelity to their ideals. 
Espousing toleration and free discussion in the face of Party decree, 
the dissidents practice these same qualities among themselves and 
undermine their movement's unity. An emerging dissident movement may 
hint at growing pluralism within Soviet society. Discord among dis­
sidents reveals much pluralism within the movement itself, thus laying 
to rest one Western misconception.
DISCORD AND UNITY: 
SOVIET DISSIDENT THOUGHT
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Context and Relevance
Let ns start from the premise that no government ever commands
the unanimous support of its citizenry. Dissent is ubiquitous, not in
the sense that some regimes govern entirely disloyal populations, but
rather in the sense that some opposition can be found within any 
1state. One would not expect even the most dictatorial regime to be 
free of disaffected elements, however miniscule or concealed. Given 
the soundness of this premise, the study of political dissent in the 
Soviet Union is clearly justified. This is not to say that if dissent 
■was rare, then studying it in the Soviet Union would be an illegitimate 
endeavor. But if dissent was merely a sporadic phenomenon, the Soviet 
Union would be the last place where we would expect to find it.
Since the short-lived, cultural thaw following Stalin's death 
in 1953y the Soviet leadership has reacted to political dissent in an 
indecisive manner. Steering a course between Stalinist terror and 
unrestrained liberalization has been the awkward task of the Georgian's 
successors. Even Nikita Khrushchev, who initially repudiated Stalin’s 
harshness, retracted the policy of cultural toleration once he saw the 
excesses committed in the name of the thaw. Stalin’s answer to 
opposition had been simple. Few were in the voices that bullets,
2
3-
beatings3 and prisons could not silence. Yet such policies* though
decisive in their time^ were rejected by Khrushchev in 1956. When
Khrushchev later wished to rein in the forces he had unleashed* no
alternate course was readily available. In the late 1950's and early
1960's., Soviet intellectuals were in the uncomfortable position of not
knowing just how much they could complain without inviting reprisals.
Khrushchev’s heirs offered a partial answer in early 1966. Two
writers, Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel* were convicted of violating
2
Article 70 of the Soviet Constitution. Specifically* Daniel and 
Sinyavsky were accused of having pseudonymous ly written anti-Soviet 
articles which later appeared in Western bourgeois publications. For 
this crime* the men were sentenced to labor camps for five to seven
3 •
years. A few prominent intellectuals objected to the trials fearing
that it presaged a return to Stalinist intolerance. Sympathetic
writers issued protest letters., formed defense committees3 and secretly
Ij.
circulated the trial’s transcript. All of this may now seem mild* but 
in Stalin’s time such insolence was suicidal. Many observers now 
believe the trial heralded the first steps of cultural de-Khrushchev- 
ization undertaken by the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership. Above all* the 
post-1966 era has witnessed the development in Russia of what may be 
called a dissident movement.
For numerous reasons one may justifiably refer to a dissident 
movement. Ideologically * this ’’political counterculture” embraces'many 
common causes. Except for a few underground neo-Stalinist and fascist 
groups* nearly all dissidents esteem spiritual and moral values3 oppose 
injustice and conformity., and desire a larger measure of legality in
government action. But this point should not be overdrawn* as it
often has been in the West* to say that there are no major differences
among dissidents's ideas. Many prominent scientists* artists* and
writers are aware of the radical nature of their views. Members of the
dissident community are attentive to each other' s thoughts and are
7
accustomed to informally discussing taboo subjects. If political 
theory consists of reasoned discourse through time* then dissent 
occupies its own niche within the study of political philosophy. 
Unsanctioned political discourse has surfaced in the Soviet Union. All 
three thinkers analyzed herein— Alexander Solzhenitsyn* Andrei 
Sakharov* and Andrei Amalrik— engage in political dialogue. Even 
before his exile* Solzhenitsyn maintained a lively correspondence with 
Sakharov. Sakharov has critiqued Solzhenitsyn's ideas* and the 
novelist has responded in kind. Sakharov has organized a Human Rights 
Committee which has as its aim the protection of fellow dissidents. 
Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov are co-editors of Kontinent * an emigre 
journal of East-West relations. Amalrik has protested at political 
trials* and has appraised the views of other dissidents. By means of 
circulated letters* petitions* samizdat (secretly self-published 
writings)* and informal contacts* the dissident movement has formed 
and has maintained a remarkable degree of cohesion. Still* one must 
remember that such cohesion falls short of unanimity.
Increased publicity has thus produced In the 1970’s a 
situation where the importance of the dissident movement transcends 
the domestic realm. The existence of a dissident current beneath the 
ideological mainstream now has international political ramifications.
5.
Western nations have developed a keener interest in human rights in the 
Soviet Union. For example, the 19 7 U Jackson Amendment to the Trade 
Reform Act conditioned favorable trade terms on increased Soviet 
toleration of emigration requests. Adherence to the 1975 Helsinki 
Agreement on European Security would presumably result in greater
Q
freedom of expression within the USSR. Private groups such as Amnesty
International monitor the observance of basic human rights within the
Soviet Union. Valentin Turchin, the director of Amnesty International's
Moscow chapter, believes that his findings help determine Western .
9policies toward the Soviet Union. Attempts to cow dissidents
jeopardize the entire detente relationship between the US and the USSR.
Recent diplomatic skirmishes over Soviet threats to Andrei Sakharov
dramatize the fact that toleration of dissent is now key to gauging
10
the status of East-West relations.
Additionally, much evidence shows that dissidents articulate
views held by many other people within Russia. Though Khrushchev was a
patron of Solzhenitsyn until 19&2, it is doubtful that the
Brezhnev-Kosygin regime favors any innovative writer. Nonconformists
seem to have only a marginal influence on the Kremlin's decision-making
process. Yet dissidents probably reflect the opinions of a larger
number of citizens, and these renegades may thus "represent and enhance
11
an important, but suppressed potential for political change." For
instance, evidence indicates that most talented Soviet writers support
12Solzhenitsyn's attacks on censorship. Many Soviet scientists secretly
1 3applaud Sakharov's liberalism. British journalist Henry Fairlie notes
that Soviet dissidents are no longer ’’treated as individuals with a 
personal case against their governments, but as representatives of a 
wider caus e.”^ ■
Analyzing the political thought of modern Soviet dissidents 
may thus complement innumerable studies of political elites. Tapping 
this subterranean current of political thought may lend clues 
concerning the direction of and prospects for change in the Soviet 
Union. Given the absence of opinion polls conducted among Soviet 
citizens, studying dissident thought offers a way to gauge roughly the 
content of political attitudes below the elite level.
Anyone interested in both Soviet studies and political theory 
has usually concentrated on the official ideology of Marxism-Leninism. 
Until 1960’s, this preoccupation was understandable since bold 
dissidents were silenced before their pleas reached Western ears. 
Interest in the official ideology siphoned off energy that might have 
been directed toward dissident studies. With the emergence of an 
opposition movement in the 1960’s, however, the conventional view of a 
monolithic Soviet society became outdated. Open dissent may portend 
the emergence of pluralism within Soviet society. No longer does all 
political action and thought answer to the state’s beck and call. Our 
aim is to evidence these faint signs of pluralism and also to dispel 
another conventional view of a monolithic dissident movement. To this 
end, the thesis may offer insights to the emerging, but heretofore 
relatively untouched, field of dissident studies•
Divisions between domestic and foreign affairs are increasingly 
blurred in an age of economic interdependence and instantaneous
communication. This development offers a wider audience to dissidents 
and removes their cause from the sole realm of internal politics.
Few will deny that domestic opposition to the Soviet regime has 
become more vocal, dissent more publicized, and toleration a more 
important determinant of East-West relations. But if a study of 
political opposition is to be purposeful, one should analyze the 
meaning of the term "dissident.”
Components of Dissidence 
Like many other concepts, dissidence is a culturally-determined 
phenomenon. What constitutes a radical critique for one government or 
society may be relatively mild for another. When a state claims a 
monopoly over all political thought, any criticism of the status quo by 
the political "outs” constitutes dissent. Dissent is not an indefinable 
concept. General criteria of dissidence are available and common themes 
emerge from dissident writings. Yet one must begin a study of political 
dissent by acknowledging that there is no foolproof standard for 
identifying such discourse. Conclusions regarding the components of 
dissidence are impressionistic. Again, this is not to argue that terms 
such as "dissent" and "dissidence" are devoid of meaning or are totally 
relativistic. Classification admits a degree of subjectivity and room 
for reasonable dispute. To recognize dissidence, one must identify 
certain norms established by a particular government. Since in many 
societies these standards are veiled and only implicit in government 
policy, absolute precision in defining such norms is elusive.
When a government explicitly and continually endorses certain 
values, however, phrases such as "political dissent" become less
slippery. Identifying dissent is easier -when a government reiterates
the norms upon -which it is based and upon -which it professes to act.
This is the approach available to the student of Soviet political
dissent. The Soviet regime claims to adhere to the thoughts and
16writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Soviet institutions and
policies are supposedly modeled on this ideology. A few generalizations
regarding Soviet political dissent may now be hazarded.
First, one may say that, in the Soviet Union, dissent includes
a rejection of Marxism and Leninism. The writings of these thinkers are
the purported basis of the Soviet state and constitute one standard by
which governmental policies are judged. Acceptance, or at least the
toleration, of this ideology represents an obvious norm. Criticism of
this ideological foundation is no trivial matter to the powers that be,
for it strikes at the heart of the regime's raison d' 'etre. This may
not hold for East Europe, where some communist states tolerate
"revisions" or reinterpretations of the Marxist creed. But while a
revisionist tradition runs through the recent political history of East
Europe, the term "revisionist" remains a label of opprobrium in the
Soviet Union. As such, divergence from this state-supported norm
constitutes political dissent. All states assert a monopoly over
legitimate violence, but the Soviet leaders covet a monopoly over
17
acceptable social thought as well. Ideological currents other than 
Marxism-Leninism— religion, avant-garde art, local nationalism— -are 
tolerated only insofar as they do not in the slightest way challenge 
the regime's interpretation of the official creed. No contending 
thoughts are granted enough autonomy to question this ideology. Persons
or groups seeking such a degree of independence are properly called 
dissidents. Any deviation from the Party line (presumably the 
embodiment of Marxism-Leninism) is thought to be dangerous. Trans­
lated literally, the Russian word for "dissident" (inakomyslyashchie) 
means "one who thinks differently," giving some indication of the 
pressure for conformity.^
Secondly, those who openly object only to the regime's 
policies, without attacking the theoretical underpinnings, may also 
be called dissidents. One cannot criticize particular governmental 
actions without questioning the legitimacy of the entire regime. In 
communist thought, theory and practice are necessarily connected.
Poor theories must lead to incorrect actions. Hence much emphasis is
placed on ideological purity. Conversely, unsuccessful policies
19
presumably indicate incorrect ideas. In the leadership's eyes, one 
cannot protest the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, the jailing of 
dissidents, or the feud with China without, by implication, ques­
tioning the theoretical basis of the Soviet order. Critics of 
particular policies must be stifled before the focus of questioning
turns toward the state's legitimacy. As Valentin Moroz, a Ukrainian
»
dissident e:xplains: "It is very important to silence the man who first
20
cries out, 'the King is naked,' before others pick up the cry."
Criticism of Stalinism might be an exception to this
principle, but even this has been checked as Khiushchev's successors
21
have subtly rehabilitated the old vozhd. One may thus apply the term 
"dissident" to anyone who criticizes specific Kremlin policies.
Though each successive ruling group has recently denounced its
10.
predecessor for betraying Marxism-Leninsm, this type of criticism 
toward an existing regime is unthinkable. Khrushchev's criticism cf 
Stalin and Brezhnev's rebukes toward Khrushchev cannot therefore be 
classified as dissent. Whoever rules claims that his predecessor 
misapplied Marxism, but he never admits the possibility that he him­
self might repeat the mistake. The illogic inherent in this reasoning 
was one reason why many communist leaders thought Khrushchev's "secret 
speech" to be a blunder.
Official statements of the regime offer a third way to decide 
who is or is not a dissident. In this respect the Kremlin is helpful 
to the student. Those who criticize either the regime's ideology or 
policies are called traitors, reactionaries, hooligans, and a host of 
other epithets. Individuals attempting to weather criticism by not 
recanting their views are vilified in Pravda and Izyestia, the 
Party- and state-controlled newspapers. Both publications are 
available to Westerners. Subversive persons are often sent to work 
camps, deported, confined in psychiatric prisons, or are harassed.
Code words thus appear in the Soviet press and serve as signs to 
identify dissents.
Fourth, admissions of those who dissent supplement official 
pronouncements. Not only does the Soviet press consider certain persons 
to be dissidents, but these same people often acknowledge the radical 
nature of their views. That an individual considers himself a 
dissident is of no small significance, given the high price of such 
candor. Dissenters need not remain in the Soviet Union in order to 
retain their role. Indeed, two of the dissidents analyzed herein are
1 1.
now r^nigr^ s whose deportation signifies their troublesomeness to the
regime. Exile merely renders the dissident less subject to reprisal.
The dialogue continues, albeit outside the Soviet Union. Exiled Czech
dissident Ludek Pachman insists that banished intellectuals are not
22
powerless since "their weapon is truth."
The dissident is conscious of his status and of the role he
plays. Russian dissidents, Solzhenitsyn notes, do not oppose power
23
with force, but rather combat injustice with reason. Solzhenitsyn
places himself in the midst of the struggle. Similarly, Sakharov
admits that his opinions are controversial but he accepts this as the
price of frank discussion.^ Historian Andrei Amalrik contests the
notion of gradual progress, debunking one of the regime's most 
2^cherished myths. By the personal admission of each thinker, the 
term "dissident" is applicable. Though the bases for dissent 
frequently differ, personal admissions offer a fourth criterion of 
dissidence.
Insistence on ideological conformity is not limited to
politics. Gogol's lament that "everything is politics here" still holds
true. Certain literary norms, the violation of which indicates
dissidence, are espoused by the Soviet regime and enforced by its
literary vicars. Writers must adhere to the canons of socialist
realism. Developed by Maxim Gorky in the 1930's and codified by
Andrei Zhdanov in the 19U0's, socialist realism aims to describe the
"New Soviet Man" produced by the socialist order. Avoiding "decadent"
Western themes, socialist realism aims to describe man not only as he is
26
now, "but also as he must be— and will be— tomorrow." Literature is
12.
judged by a utilitarian, rather than aesthetic standard. The notion of
"art for art’s sake" is rejected as a vestige of bourgeois mentality.
Accordingly, literary characters must express socialist values and,
for instance, extol production quotas.
Creative unions are charged -with the task of maintaining 
27literary conformity. Renegade writers soon discover that their works
are either excluded from or criticized in Literaturnaya Gazeta, the
official organ of the Soviet Writers’s Union. Another literary journal,
Novy Mir, while traditionally a bit more liberal, must also accept the
official norms. Most important of all is the judgement of Glavlit, the
state’s censorship watchdog. Writers quickly learn that certain
subjects are taboo: anything presenting Czarism or the West in a
favorable light; criticisms of the Party line or official versions of
2 8
history; and works on disgraced personalities. Uoncompliance usually
results in expulsion from the Union of Soviet Writers. Publishing then
becomes difficult and risky. Anyone writing samizdat material may thus
29be classified as a dissident. The fact that each man discussed herein 
has produced samizdat writings reinforces their dissident status.
The scientific realm is no different. Independent scientists 
who incur official ire invite various reprisals. Expulsion from the 
USSR Academy of Sciences is a constant threat. Dissident scientists 
are denied access to classified information, prevented from attending 
foreign scientific conferences, and are barred from travelling abroad 
for any reason. Publishing privileges are also revoked.
Public attitudes offer a sixth way to determine who is or is 
not a dissident. To most Westerners, the phrase "Soviet dissident"
13.
30brings to mind the names of Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. Undoubtedly, 
the notoriety of these two men has been enhanced by Western press 
coverage and by their reception of various Nobel Prizes. Sakharov has 
long been known as nthe father of the Soviet H-bomb.M Amalrikf s exile 
in 1976 received thorough press coverage in the West. Public per­
ception is certainly not a foolproof standard. To the extent is 
corroborates other indications of dissidence, however, public 
perception is a useful measure. There are now probably few, if any, 
vocal dissidents who are unknown in the West. Since the writers 
discussed herein are considered by those both within and outside of the 
Soviet Union to be nonconformists, one may call these men dissidents.
Each thinker to be considered meets all of the preceding six 
criteria i Each man shares a questioning attitude toward Marxism-Lenin­
ism. Each man has criticized certain government policies, and each has 
been accordingly vilified. None of these men deny that they are dissi­
dents and few observers would deny them this status.
Aims and Methods 
This thesis’s purpose is to compare, contrast and critique the 
political thought of three modern Soviet dissidents. Essentially a 
study in comparative political thought, this thesis will not try to 
identify a representative dissenter, for no one case is typical. Our 
purpose is to distill from writings, speeches, and interviews various 
political philosophies and to examine doctrinal differences among the 
dissidents. Analysis is limited to these three men since they are 
prolific, articulate, and well-known. These thinkers directly or 
indirectly speak to each other by addressing common themes. More than
1U*
any other dissidents, these men engage in a genuine political dialogue. 
Perhaps other dissidents could be examined in addition to or in place 
of the ones studied herein. Selection inevitably invites charges of 
arbitrariness. Reasonable choices must be made nevertheless, in the 
interests of intelligibility and manageability.
The political writings of the relevant authors will serve as 
the primary sources for this study. Most of these works were orig­
inally pieces of samizdat. Other volumes, such as Solzhenitsyn’s 
Warning; to the West, encompass dissenting views which exile has not 
silenced. Most of the writings of Sakharov and Amalrik directly 
address political themes.
Solzhenitsyn, of course, is a prolific novelist as well.
This presents no major problem since particular fictional works may 
shed light on Solzhenitsyn's political thought. This task is not 
accomplished by matching a fictional character to an author’s 
presumed sentiment. Taken in their entirety, Solzhenitsyn's novels 
and plays supplement the political themes offered in his more 
polemical works.- Instead of trying to guess which character speaks 
for the author, the serious student can find in Solzhenitsyn’s 
fiction many themes relevant to political thought: the problem of 
moral choice; the proper aims of government; and the role of ideology 
and values, for example
Solzhenitsyn encourages attempts to seek political insights 
in his literature. In a 196? interview with the Czech correspondent 
Pavel Licko, Solzhenitsyn stated that
. . . b y  intuition and by his singular vision of
15.
the world, a writer, is able to discover far earlier 
than other people aspects of social life and can 
often see them from an -unexpected angle. . .
It is incumbent upon the writer to inform society 
of all that he is able to perceive and especially 
all that is unhealthy and cause for anxiety.31
Nearly a decade later, this view is unchanged.
To fight against untruth and falsehood, to 
fight against an ideology which is hostile to man­
kind, to fight for our memory of what things were 
like— that is the task of the artist.3^
Harvard’s Adam Ulam argues that many of the ideas expressed in 
Solzhenitsyn’s political tracts are developed thematically in the 
dissident’s literature as well.
Most Westerners indiscriminantly lump all Soviet dissidents 
together, ignoring important differences between them.3^ This con­
ventional view is unrealistic, as this thesis will try to prove. The 
early 1970’s were unique for Soviet society as various dissidents began 
to debate about their country’s future. But Solzhenitsyn’s sudden 
exile probably overshadowed the significance of this dialogue. Herein 
lies one cause of the popular misconception regarding a monolithic 
dissident movement. Uncovering (but not exaggerating) points of 
dissonance within the dissident movement is this thesis’s aim.
Hypotheses and Categories
We may now consider some bases for comparison between 
dissident political theories. Intellectual freedom is an obvious 
starting point. Predictably, a dissident will desire an increased 
amount of intellectual license and expression. One is justified in 
questioning the reasons underlying this view. How do dissidents 
analyze the tension between the one and the many in a political
16.
society? Are dissidents willing to limit the claims of either? 'What 
assumptions undergird this desire for personal freedom? Can the present 
role of the Coirmrunist Party be reconciled with more artistic autonomy? 
What exactly is meant by the phrase, ”intellectual freedom”? The 
topic of personal .liberty must be discussed if the concept of dissidence • 
has any meaning.
A related topic worthy of treatment is the legitimacy of the 
Soviet regime. As has been noted, opposition to the official ideology 
is a key component of dissidence. Presumably, each dissident harbors 
views which vary from the Party line. Why do these men object to the 
Soviet political system? Does their criticism reveal its own ideo­
logical perspective? Are objections rooted in particular policies or 
do they extend to an abhorrence of the regime1s ideology? Are these 
men evolutionists, reformers, or revolutionaries? Is a multiparty 
political system desirable? Do dissidents distinguish between Russian 
and Soviet national attributes? Answers to these questions will be 
examined and critiqued.
In his essay on man in revolt, Albert Camus argued that
35)rebellion necessarily involves both negation and affirmation. The^  
rebel says ”no” to the old order and ”yes” to a new vision. Thus, if 
one discovers dissension within Soviet society, one must also seek some 
alternative to the past. Criticism of the Soviet regime is thus 
inseparable from the issue of Russia’s future. What would dissidents 
put in the place of the present Soviet structure? Do they even offer 
an alternate vision? Are such visions realistic or utopian? Do these 
models have any substantive faults of their own? What might be some
17-
practical consequences of these schemes? Does Russia bear a special 
mission among the family of nations?
The Stalin era also deserves special attention. "Stalinism1 
refers to the brand of Soviet communism practiced during Stalin’s rule 
from 1928 to 1953- Features characterizing this rule include 
agricultural collectivization, an emphasis on heavy industry, extensive 
use of terror to achieve political ends, and authoritarian and 
personalized rule. All of the dissidents to be analyzed lived through 
some part of the Stalin period. In many cases, the experience was 
nothing short of traumatic. An indication of Stalinism’s importance 
to dissidents is the amount of energy they devote to its discussion.
One may thus justifiably examine the dialogue surrounding Stalin.
Does Stalin merit the suffix "ism”.? Why do dissidents single out 
Stalin’s rule for special criticism? Is Stalinism a perversion of 
humane Marxism or the predictable product of an intolerant and 
hate-filled ideology? Does Stalinism offer any legacy? Does the end 
of Stalinism portend any liberalization of domestic policies?
Equally pertinent is the role of the intelligentsia in the 
Soviet Union. Modern Russian history has produced a series of intel­
lectuals possessing a special sense of noblesse oblige. Dating from 
the abortive ’’back to the people’’ or Narodnik movement of the late 19th 
century, the Russian intellectual has tried to represent the conscience 
of the masses. A deep sense of commitment to the common people has
characterized this class’s thinking. The intelligentsia’s tradition
37is thus closely linked to the theme of Russian populism. Intel­
lectuals have sensed for themselves a special mission of responsibility.
18.
l/\Jhile Lenin envisioned the Party as serving as the vanguard of the pro­
letariat, the intelligentsia historically has seen itself as the 
vanguard of all the common folk, not just the industrial workers. 
Membership in the intelligentsia is largely a matter of self-identifi-
O
cation. The term usually includes scholars, artists, and students.
One may thus ask whether modem dissidents, ostensible members of the 
intelligentsia, envisage any special role for themselves in reforming 
the status quo.
In turn, one may examine how these dissidents view the West.
Russian political thought has traditionally exhibited a love-hate
attitude toward the West. Periodic swings between an admiration for
and an aversion toward the West reflect this almost schizophrenic 
39trait. Some Russians have viewed the West as a progressive society, 
the standard by which Russian endeavors are measured. Other Russian 
thinkers have equated the West with decadence and disorder. In the 
late 19th century, the tension between these perspectives polarized 
the intelligentsia into factions representing Slavophilism and Western­
ization. The dissident’s views of the West are important, for they 
sustain a prominent theme in Russian intellectual history. How do the 
dissidents view the West? Is the West a model, a mirror-image, or a 
warning to Russia? Does the West play any role in dissident schemes for 
Soviet liberalization? Do the dissidents fall into the classic molds 
of Slavophilism and Westernization? Since two of the dissidents are now 
emigres living in the West, the changes in their views regarding the 
occidental world are also notable.
Additionally, the issue of East-West relations is important
since these relations have global, not merely regional repercussions. 
Certain questions must be asked. What do these dissidents see as the 
optimal relationship between the Soviet Union and the Western world?
Do they suggest returning to a more confrontationist or Cold War 
policy? Do dissidents favor the policy of detente? Do they support a 
more comprehensive partnership, or entente, with the "West? Is Russia’s 
salvation to be found in introspection or in greater involvement with 
the world community? What bearing does the West’s future have on 
Russian political development? Do any historical or natural ties link 
the Soviet Union and the United States? How might the Sino-Soviet rift 
affect Russia’s future?
Perhaps other categories will develop in the course of research. 
Wo effort will be made to force a thinker into a pre-existing category 
if such a classification is unwarranted. Examples of political 
opposition in the Soviet Union have been so rare that the modern 
dissident dialogue bears Importance that transcends the contemporary.
The dialogue represents a reoccurring phenomenon in Russian intel­
lectual history. One may now question Dahl's classification of the 
Soviet Union as a ’’pure hegemony”^  and accept Barghoorn’s references 
to a ’’subversive opposition.”^  A political countertradition survives, 
often at its own peril, within the Soviet Union. The dissident move­
ment is much more variegated than most Westerners care to admit. United 
by some common values, Soviet dissidents nevertheless exhibit some 
doctrinal discord within their own ranks. It is thus appropriate to 
begin our study with" perhaps the most controversial and seminal 
dissident— Alexander Isaevich Solzhenitsyn.
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CHAPTER II
SOLZHENITSIN: POLITICS OF 
SUFFERING AND LIMITATION
Frequently praised, selectively read, Alexander Solzhenitsyn
remains an enigma to many Westerners. Self-styled conservatives hail
him as a symbol of freedom. Fashionable liberals view him merely as an
anachronism or a primitive reactionary. Without doubt, the West has
tended to suppress those political ideas of Solzhenitsyn deemed embar-
1rassing to conventional thought. Thus have his political views been 
dismissed as the rantings of an unbalanced anti-communist or as the 
nostrums of a gifted author but naive political analyst. Yet these 
claims are as dangerous as they are false. Instead, our thesis is that 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, as a Soviet dissident and Russian emigre, is a 
profound political theorist. Our aim is not to pigeonhole Solzhenitsyn 
into some ideological niche, but to identify, 'discuss, and evaluate 
the most prominent political themes in his writings. No one chapter, 
thesis, or book could exhaustively represent the breadth of his vision. 
Nor does any definitive interpretation of his philosophy exist. Serious 
consideration of Solzhenitsyn the political thinker is long overdue and 
is the task undertaken in the following pages. In his writings, 
Solzhenitsyn offers a political vision that is both timeless and timely.
Support for our view that Solzhenitsyn is a profound political 
thinker in his own right lies in analyzing his speeches and writings.
25
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Let us begin, therefore, by discussing the subject that is 
Solzhenitsyn1s interest, life and,, if you will, obsession.
Soviet Tyranny
Solzhenitsyn examines the Soviet political system at many levels, 
starting with its theoretical basis.
Marxism
Though he was once a devout Marxist, Solzhenitsyn now has 
nothing but contempt for this philosophy. He believes that Marxism, 
as a predictive tool, is useless. Contrary to Marx's prophecies, 
those nations that are most -underdeveloped are most susceptible to 
upheaval. Highly developed societies, presumably the most fertile 
grounds for revolution, have been largely free of proletarian unrest. 
Moreover, in those underdeveloped nations that have experienced 
revolution, the crises have not been caused by worker grievances. The 
Russian Bolshevik coup was led, not by the alienated industrial 
laborers, but by selected members of the intelligentsia and the 
petit-bourgoisie. Industrial workers played virtually no role in Mao's 
peasant revolution. Marx’s prediction has been stood on its head, has 
failed the test of historical experience, yet the ideology still in­
sists on somehow being "scientific.”
Aside from this, Solzhenitsyn sees Marxism as a reductionist
theory which purports to explain the complexity of human life using
2the one factor of economics. But not everything in life is deter­
mined by material conditions or by the relationship between labor and 
ownership. Impulse, irrationality, ideals— these elements are as
27.
important as economic causes in shaping history. Marxism claims to 
offer the one and only definitive analysis of history. Solzhenitsyn 
punctures this pretension. In Cancer Ward, Solzhenitsyn's alter ego,
Oleg Kostoglotov says that "nothing is decided once and for all, for
3
life ■would then cease." This is a rebuff, not just to the pretensions 
of the Russian Revolution, but to the "definitive" presumptions of 
Marxist thought.^
Marx's analysis of society in terms of economic classes also 
draws fire from Solzhenitsyn. Persons from certain backgrounds are 
"objectively" bourgeois. Corruption is a vestige of bourgeois men­
tality. Not only is this an absurd generalization, Solzhenitsyn 
thinks, but it smacks of racism as well. The dictatorship of the 
proletariat must liquidate whole classes, even if they offer no 
apparent threat, because they are "objectively" hostile. Like the 
Christian theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, Solzhenitsyn argues that evil 
is not distributed along class lines. Again in Cancer Ward,
Kostoglotov tells a young communist that "there were greedy people 
before the bourgeoisie and there'll be greedy people after the 
bourgeoisie."
In the Marxist scheme, the capitalist worker is alienated and 
exploited because he does not own the means of production. Alienation 
includes a feeling of purposelessness in work, an inability to see any 
meaning in labor, the feeling of being a tiny cog in a vast machine.
But in his navels, Solzhenitsyn implies that worker alienation does not 
result from a lack of ownership. For instance, in One Day in the Life 
Ivan Denisovich (hereafter referred to as One Day), Shukov and Kilgas
28.
take pride in and find meaning in their work. Both men are prisoners; 
one is a carpenter, the other a bricklayer. Neither one owns his tools 
or receives the fruits of his labor. But together, these men give 
their work much value and esteem skill in labor for its own sake.
Even when workers theoretically own the means of production, as they 
are told in the Soviet Union, alienation abounds. In his short story 
For the G-ood of the Cause, Solzhenitsyn explains how builders con­
structing a research institute could not care less about the quality 
of their work. Man must impart his own meaning to work, for such 
meaning does not magically appear once the proletariat owns the means 
of production. Alienation, Solzhenitsyn implies, is less a function 
of ownership than of self-esteem.
But Marxism's fundamental flaw, according to Solzhenitsyn, is 
that it is anti-human. Marxism is based on hate, hate for any class that 
is "objectively" harmful. Whole classes are forced to bear the guilt 
of a few individuals. Thus does Solzhenitsyn disdain the word
"anti-communist," since to be against Marxism or communism (to him they
are synonymous) is to be for humanity. To reject this creed- is only to 
be human. In Solzhenitsyn's view, Marxism approves of any act, as long 
as it is "for the good of the cause." Marx rejects capitalism, not 
because it violates some transcendant value of justice or virtue, but 
simply because the majority is the exploited and not the exploitative 
class. In its endorsement of majority tyranny, Marxism is a pernicious 
dogma, Solzhenitsyn believes
Solzhenitsyn also thinks that Marxism is a closed system. It
sees all, knows all, explains all. Arguments do not affect it since it
29.
has decided in advance that anyone rejecting the creed is a reactionary 
and should therefore not be heard. In prison trucks, Solzhenitsyn de­
bated with some imprisoned but true-believing Marxists. Each one, he 
recalls, advanced the same argument in the same words at the very same 
point. Solzhenitsyn kept his sanity only by reminding himself that it
was just a game and that he stood no chance of changing the dogmat- 
7
ists's minds. As an ideology, Marxism is hermetically sealed against 
all contending thought. Marxist reasoning, Solzhenitsyn believes, is 
impenetrable and the Marxist convert imperturable.
It is no coincidence to Solzhenitsyn that the world's largest 
police state claims Marxism as its foundation. Forget all the talk 
about "Marxism with a human face," Solzhenitsyn'urges, for no such 
thing exists. Did not Marx and Engels refer to the dictatorship of the 
proletariat?' Under this new dictatorship (a dictatorship sanctified 
since it is one of the majority over the minority), how could one
g
possibly dispense with an army, a secret police, or a prison system?
The roots of the Gulag are easily traced back to Marx, Solzhenitsyn
argues. For example, in his Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx
concludes that under the proletarian dictatorship (Marx's phrase),
prisoners should not be deprived "of their only means of improvement,
10
productive labor." This same rationale was later used by Soviet 
authorities to establish slave labor camps in Siberia snd the Arctic 
Circle. Even the classless society is evidently not without its co­
ercive organs.
This may be a misreading of Marx on Solzhenitsyn's part, but 
no interpreter of Marx holds a monopoly over truth. Like the
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Scriptures, Marx can often be quoted against himself. Too often the 
debate surrounding Marx has pitted dogmatist against dogmatist— those 
who see only humaneness in the man versus those who see In Marx only 
the budding flowers of evil. Solzhenitsyn's interpretation of Marx may
be mistaken, but it is not without some support. Consider, for
instance, the view of R. N. Carew Hunt, one who is familiar with all of 
Marx's works and who has no axe to grind.
The "one-party system," which is certainly alien to
Western democratic thought, follows [[from Marxism] as a
corollary. For Marxists argue that opposing political 
parties derive from the conflict between different eco­
nomic classes, and that once their cause is removed they 
will cease to exist. It is no more necessary that there 
should be two political parties than that a man should 
have two heads.^
Certainly no writer can be held responsible for every crime 
that his writings are posthumously used to justify. But in Marx's 
case this has not been a sporadic occurrence. Beyond a certain point, 
one must ask why Marxism is the frequent justification for so-called 
"peoples democracies." Is it really coincidental that leftist police 
states clothe their actions in Marxist garb? Why always Marxism? Why 
have most of the humane Marxist visions remained on paper only?
No, Solzhenitsyn prefers to judge Marxism on its practice, not 
on its theory, on its track record, not on its more scholarly exegesis. 
He has little patience with the scores of Marxian scholars who, like 
ancient augurs divining Truth from bird entrails, claim to know the 
real Marx. Perhaps he is so embittered by the cruelty he has suffered 
from his own countiy that he is blind to the real possibility of hu­
mane socialism. Ironically, while many Marxian scholars are sure that 
humane socialism is quite possible despite its rarity in practice,
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'they refuse to consider the possibility of capitalism with a human 
face. Again, Solzhenitsyn may be mistaken in his view of Marxism, but 
it will take more than a "Prague Spring" or the existence of a second 
party in South Yemen to prove him wrong.
To Solzhenitsyn, Soviet tyranny is not a perverted interpre­
tation of an essentially humane body of thought. Rather, the Soviet 
system is the predictable product of an intolerant, value-free, and
hate-filled ideology. Marxist ideology is the "fetid root" of this 
12
tyranny. As Raymond Aron notes, Solzhenitsyn views Marxism as 
"the root of all ill, the source of all falsehood, the principle of 
evil.1,1 3
Lenin's Legacy
To those who remember Lenin's rule as being relatively benign, 
Solzhenitsyn offers harsh words. For him, Lenin only produced an even 
more intolerant and hateful interpretation of Marxism. Neo-Leninists 
who criticize Stalin's harshness thus defend an untenable argument. In 
his reconstruction of Lenin's emigre years, Solzhenitsyn explores other 
sources of Soviet intolerance. We learn from Lenin in Zurich that 
"Vladimir Illych never forgave mistakes, never countenanced any oppo­
sition, and always judged individuals as tools to further his own
1 Jt|
cause. Lenin was contemptuous of most people: "The majority is
1always stupid, and we cannot wait for it." Nor was Lenin's brand 
of communism much more compassionate than his successor's. Solzhe­
nitsyn points to Lenin's 1908 tract, The Lessons of the Paris Commune. 
Lenin believed that the abortive commune made two major errors: first,
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it did not seize the hanks; and second, it was too lenient. "Instead
of shooting the hostile classes wholesale, it spared their lives, imagi-
16ning it could re-educate them." If Stalin is the main evil in Cancer
Ward and The First Circle, Lenin is portrayed as the chief villian in
/
The Gulag Archipelago. If Stalin's atrocities dwarfed Lenin's, this 
was only because Lenin died before he could consolidate the already 
growing system of terror.
In passing, it should be noted that Solzhenitsyn's view of 
Lenin and Stalin is a minority opinion, one which many scholars (along 
with this writer) would dispute. We will deal with Solzhenitsyn's 
argument more thoroughly in the next chapter, when we compare his view 
with Sakharov's.
The Stalinist Myth 
There never was any such thing as Stalinism, Solzhenitsyn be­
lieves. Stalin was a faithful disciple of Lenin in all important 
respects. Stalin only implemented on a grand scale what Lenin intended 
all along. Leninism, Stalinism— to Solzhenitsyn there is no difference. 
Stalin collectivized land and murdered peasants? Lenin, by way of the 
1922 Land Code, started this process. Stalin oppressed nationalities 
and enslaved other peoples? Lenin used the Red Army to crush national 
resistance in the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and the Baltic states. 
Stalin instituted forced labor, the secret police, and religious 
oppression? Lenin started the first work camps5 created the Cheka (the 
first secret police), and plundered the Church. Stalin seized private 
property? Lenin did the same thing in Tambov and Siberia. Stalin
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sacrificed everything to heavy industry? It was Lenin who urged rapid-
17industrialization and who starved light industry.
As a distinctive style of rule, Stalinism never existed.
Solzhenitsyn thinks the myth of Stalinism is a ploy created by
Khrushchevites to legitimize their own rule and by pseudo-dissidents
(he places the historian Roy Medvedev in this group) to soothe their 
1 8own consciences. Stalin.1 s cruelty, which made Ivan the Terrible look
19like a merry old soul, was Lenin's brainchild. Stalin was no freak. 
His crimes cannot be passed off as some "cult of the individual" or as 
"violations of socialist legality." Stalinism is a system which pre­
ceded and survived the life of its namesake. As we learn in One Day,
the slave camps were not isolated phenomena, but were microcosms of
20
Soviet society as a whole. Hot surprisingly, those who now praise
Stalin (occasionally the Chinese, frequently the Albanians) are those
21who felt his knout the least.
The Soviet System
It would be mistaken to see in Solzhenitsyn's works an 
22
exaltation of Czarism. Yet comparisons between the old order and
the Soviet system abound. In comparing the two systems, Solzhenitsyn
believes that the new order finishes a poor second. Compared to Soviet
rule, Czarism was infinitely humane. The number of men in Czarist
prisons is dwarfed by the millions who languish in the Gulag. Soviet
prisons make the Czarist facilities look like resort areas. The
lowest serf in the Czarist hierarchy had much more freedom than the
23modern Soviet citizen. in many ways, Solzhenitsyn favorably com­
pares the ancien regime to the new order.
3k.
Of course, in terms of material wealth, Solzhenitsyn recognizes 
Soviet superiority. But he is quick to ask: 1 At what cost?” The fact 
is that material abundance is built on a foundation of exploitation. 
Soviet society has paid for its affluence with unparalleled human
. 2h
suffering. Ironically, the prisoners in One Day are busy con­
structing a Socialist Community Development. Barbed wire rings 
the complex to thwart escape. To build socialism, entire classes are 
liquidated, not because they are in fact guilty of any crime, but 
because they are "objective class enemies." Ivan Denisovich is a
25>criminal because he escaped from the Germans during World War II.
Tyurin, another prisoner, is punished for being the son of a kulak
26(a prosperous peasant). Others are imprisoned because they are
Christian (evidence of ideological subversion) or because they are
Estonian (evidence of bourgeois nationalism). Citing the figures of
Ivan Kurganov, an emigre statistics expert, Solzhenitsyn claims that
from 1917 to 19^9, internal repression cost 66 million Soviet citizens 
27their lives.
The system's real crime, according to Solzhenitsyn, is that it
enslaves men’s minds. Citizens grow so accustomed to conformity that
they lose their taste for freedom. In One Day, prison conditions are
often better than life "outside." In prison, one can say things that
28
are forbidden in "freedom." The police state atmosphere transcends
the prison, engulfing all of society. Ivan Denisovich had been in
prison for so long that "he didn’t know any longer himself whether he
29wanted freedom or not." 7 Constant pressure for conformity thus 
produces mass apathy, enslaving men’s energies and minds.
35.
Myth contrasts starkly -with reality. Under the rule of the
proletariat, workers cannot protest low wages or squalid living 
30.
conditions. * "While the interest of the collective is supposedly
predominant, self-interest remains the guiding force in the lives of
all. Corruption and deceit make the system work. Industrial
production soars, but production figures are padded.Automation
32progresses, but manual labor and inefficiency is common. Official
propaganda extols the People, but the system cannot stand real people.
-*-n Cancer Ward, Pavel Rusanov, a Party bureaucrat, loves people only in
the abstract.
The Rusanovs loved the People, their great People.
They served the People and were ready to give their 
lives for the People. But as the years went by they 
found themselves .less able to tolerate actual human 
beings, those obstinate creatures who are always re­
sistant, refusing to do what they are told . . . ^
Such a contrast between myth and reality gives rise to the Big
Lie. The system requires active participation in the Big Lie. If a
colleague is arrested, one must denounce him and renounce friendship.
If production quotas are to be met, output must be falsified. To avoid
personal suspicion, one must become an informer. And if there is
)
nothing to report, one must invent charges. The Big Lie becomes a
35daily habit, for few can survive without it. In Soviet society, 
millions must be enslaved for the sake of freedom, privileges must be 
established for the sake of equality, and lies must be told in order to 
preserve truth. Such is the essence of ideology, Solzhenitsyn argues. 
Physical enslavement is one of the least onerous aspects of the system. 
Participation in the Big Lie is mandatory. Herein lies the modern 
tragedy.
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Nor is any voluntary liberalization likely. Securely 
entrenched at all levels of society are "little Stalins "— petty bureau­
crats -who love to play the role of the tyrant. In the story, For the 
Good of the Cause, Knorozov remains a proponent of the "strong-willed 
school of leadership" long after Stalin's death. That darling of 
socialist realism., the New Soviet Man, cuts a pathetic figure. As a
New Man, Rusanov in Cancer Ward trembles at the thought of facing old
37political foes. Without the state's backing, he is a coward. Solzhe­
nitsyn recalls that in the Gulag, imprisoned Party loyalists called 
themselves revolutionaries, but were the first ones to submit to 
authority. As Thor stein Veblen satirized the 19th century leisure 
class, supposedly the "fittest" of society, so does Solzhenitsyn ridi­
cule the-myth of the New Soviet Man.
Instead of a New Man, all that is really produced is a new 
class. Where once the private capitalists exploited 'the masses, now 
this is done by the state and Party. In one case the exploitation is 
unjustified, in the other it is exalted. As Milovan Bjilas explained in 
his book, The New Class, the toiling masses have merely traded in one 
type of master for another. State capitalism now exploits where 
private capitalism once flourished. A new and privileged class has 
arisen and it is this class, not the worker, which controls the means 
of production. In Cancer Ward, Rusanov is emblematic of the new class,
oo
enjoying special housing and consumption privileges. No one 
remembers the egalitarian ideals which inspired the October Revolution 
and which were expressed in Lenin's April Theses. From the ancien 
regime to the present, little has changed. Before, exploitation was
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called exploitation. Now., it is called "the progressive will of the 
masses.” Under capitalism, man exploits man. Under Soviet socialism, 
it is the other way around. Granted, Marx too inveighed against state 
capitalism. But this disclaimer can hardly be reconciled with the 
idea of a proletarian dictatorship, the transitional period of social­
ism in which a strong state remains.
Solzhenitsyn holds out little hope for voluntary internal re­
form. The Soviet system is intolerant, closed to criticism, and 
inflexible. Mistakes are not admitted, and hence problems are veiled 
but never solved. As long as any disagreement is treated as ideologi­
cal subversion, Solzhenitsyn maintains, the Soviet system will not
39adapt to new problems and changing conditions. To borrow a concept 
from Marxist thought, the Soviet system will succumb to its own in­
ternal contradictions. Inflexibility is rooted in the official 
ideology, itself a closed and intolerant creed. Solzhenitsyn views the 
Soviet system with a mixture of bitterness and pity. He has no 
illusions of easily changing the system, but he has not abandoned all 
hope of reform.
If Vladimir Petrov was correct in 1962 in asserting that 
”Solzhenitsyn remained a loyal and patriotic Soviet citizen, this 
verdict was clearly outdated by 1970. Perhaps as Solzhenitsyn grew 
increasingly pessimistic regarding the prospects for Soviet reform, 
his literature became more daring. But there is another way to view 
this development. Importantly, The Gulag Archipelago reflects not only 
Solzhenitsyn’s present bitterness but conclusions that he reached al­
most 30 years ago in prison. Perhaps Solzhenitsyn was never really a
"loyal and patriotic Soviet citizen” but rather used each successive 
literary work to test the water, to see how much he could get by with. 
With each work, he perhaps felt less compelled to mask his true 
beliefs. With One Day, he learns that he may express oblique criti­
cisms. With Cancer Ward, he ventures some near-heresies. The Gulag 
Archipelago represents the final blasphemy which has been fermenting 
for many years but which only now finds open expression. Thus, while 
Petrov may have been correct in 1962, insights offered by The Gulag 
Archipelago undermine his view. In any event, Solzhenitsyn does not 
view the Soviet problem in historical isolation. Rather, he sees the 
Soviet tragedy as one manifestation of a larger and more pernicious 
force which shapes our age.
Ideology
One might think that in a century that produced Dachau, 
Auschwitz, and the Gulag, the following discussion would be superflu­
ous. Yet for Solzhenitsyn, the topic of ideology occupies a central 
area of political thought. Though Solzhenitsyn offers no specific 
definition of ideology, it is clear what he has in mind. To him, an 
ideology is a set of beliefs that claims to explain reality and to pre­
scribe a way to transform man and society toward some goal.
Solzhenitsyn claims to be skeptical of all ideologies, not just 
} 1
Marxism. Our century has seen unparalleled suffering, he believes, 
precisely because of ideology. Ideological wars (he includes religious 
crusades here) have consistently been the cruellest. Ideology is a 
vestige of man's bestial origins. Primitive emotions such as envy, 
greed, and hate now surface in the guise of the class, mass and race
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struggle. -^2 with i^3 grandiose vision of re-making man and society 
for the sake of an indefinite but utopian future, ideology justifies 
all injustice. To Solzhenitsyn, ideology has consistently excused evil 
and dehumanization. Ideology is fancy rationalization. It is a pro- 
crustean bed, destroying all those who do not fit into its plans. Men 
are readily sacrificed for the sake of lofty goals. Thus, ideology 
must treat man as an.instrument, not as an end in himself. Ideology 
detaches men from moral responsibility, giving the criminal a clear 
conscience. It is ideology which not only crushes man, but demands 
that he embrace and praise his tormentors.
The nature of man is fortunately such that he must 
seek a justification for his actions.
Macbeth's justifications were feeble and his con­
science tormented him. Iago too was a mere lamb. The 
imagination and resources of Shakespeare’s villians 
did not carry them beyond the first dozen corpses. For 
they lacked Ideology.
Ideology! This is what gives the evil deed its 
sought-for justification and the villain the lasting 
callousness he needs. This is the social theory which 
helps him vindicate his deeds in his own eyes and those 
of others, to hear not reproaches and curses, but 
praise and honor. This did the inquisitors draw strength 
from Christianity, the conquerers from the exaltation of 
the motherland, the colonizers from civilization, the 
Nazis from race, the Jacobins (both early and late) from 
equality, fraternity and the happiness of future genera­
tions .
Thanks to Ideology it was given to the twentieth » _ 
century to experience atrocity to the millionth power. ^
Ideology thus obscures the human costs of political action, asking men 
to ignore all restraints for the sake of a hazy and future nirvana.
The growth of ideology reflects, in part, the growing politic­
ization of life. "When societal problems arise, men first look to 
governments for solutions. Solzhenitsyn inveighs against this ten­
dency. Though religion is on the defensive in a secular and cynical
ho.
age, ideology allows men to function with a religious intensity. But 
politics is not religion, Solzhenitsyn reminds us, and there is much 
to life that politics alone cannot transform. Ideology, Solzhenitsyn 
argues, assumes an unrealistically high degree of human and societal 
malleability. This obsession with political solutions is, in the long 
run, an unhealthy sign. Ideology thus rests on an illusion, the illu­
sion that man and society can be changed at a single stroke.
Ideology becomes most pernicious when it combines with absolute 
power. Then, oppression reaches its peak. But for Solzhenitsyn, 
authoritarianism per se is not reprehensible. As long as the system 
does not demand adherence to some ideology, Solzhenitsyn approves of 
authoritarianismAs long as there is some sense of limitation in 
politics, tyranny is unlikely. By renouncing limits, by applauding 
any act that advances the cause, modem ideology sweeps away those 
restraints previously imposed by morals and laws.
Ends and means thus beecme inextricable. Ideology tries to 
separate them, arguing that future perfection (be it the Third Reich or 
the classless society) sanctifies all means. In rejecting ideology, 
Solzhenitsyn is not saying that there is nothing more precious than life. 
Rather, he believes that it is senseless to die for some indeterminate 
future utopia which may never materialize. Ends and means are insepara­
ble. In the First Circle, Sologdin engages Lev Rubin, an imprisoned 
communist, in a philosophical debate. Naturally, Rubin argues that the 
progressive march of history justifies any action, that concepts such as 
good and evil are thoroughly bourgeois. Sologdin retorts that nthe 
higher the ends, the higher must be the means! Dishonest means destroy
la­
the ends themselves.11^  In other words* the means must ennoble the 
ends. Unjust means tend to acquire a momentum of their own, becoming 
entrenched and obscuring the original humane aims. There is no reason 
why ends and means should be judged by entirely different ethical 
standards. In judging political action* therefore* intentions are only 
marginally relevant. One must also consider the consequences of method. 
Solzhenitsyn summarizes in the second volume of The Gulag Archipelago 
the lesson prison taught him:
It is not the result that counts! It is not the 
result— but the spirit! Not what— but how. Not what 
has been attained— -but at what price .Uy
There are many worthwhile values* Solzhenitsyn implies* only one of
which is utopia. To Solzhenitsyn* the ideologue is the monomaniac*
eager to trample on many other cherished values in his rush toward
future perfection. This is not a call for conservatism* but rather
an ethical standard of political prudence. Though Solzhenitsyn opposes
ideology* he certainly does not resist all change.
The Problem of Change
Revolution as Illusion
Solzhenitsyn is skeptical* not of all change* but of all
revolutions. To him* revolutions seldom accomplish much good and nearly
always do much evil. Revolutions destroy only the most obvious symptoms 
* • . a.. bQox injustice. Often* in passion and haste* revolutions destroy insti­
tutions worth preserving. Once violence is sanctioned* it knows few 
limits. Revolutions rarely improve societies. In obliterating old
!±9forms of injustice* revolutions often spawn their own unjust policies.
The Bolshevik Revolution is a prime example in Solzhenitsyn’s argument. 
The subsequent variations are predictable: A disciplined group seizes 
power in a bloody struggle; the People’s Republic is proclaimed; old 
enemies are killed or Imprisoned* contending parties banned* land re­
distributed* industries nationalized* and conformity enforced; everyone 
settles in to await the withering away of the state* which somehow 
never occurs.
By establishing a precedent of violence* revolutions usually 
fulfil few of their aims and thereby give birth to insecure regimes. 
Solzhenitsyn does not call for a revolution against Soviet tyranny. He 
embraces no ideology. He does not want to add yet another ”ism” to 
the growing list. Within societies* however* the problem of change 
must he handled at an individual level. Each man must look withim him­
self* establish his values* and resist dehumanization. Introspec­
tion* not revolution* is the sane course9 Solzhenitsyn believes. It 
does not guarantee bliss* but the history of most revolutions is a 
tale of shattered hopes. Some values* and not just any values* must 
underly change. These values may be found* not through mobilizing the 
masses* but through individual contemplation.
Suffering and Denial
Since few men undertake such contemplation voluntarily* some 
external force usually prompts the process. In Solzhenitsyn’s case* 
this external force was arrest and imprisonment. Suffering forces one 
to re-examine one’s life and to recover a sense of ethical responsi­
bility. Only with the aid of ’’external violence” will man forgo his
1*3 *
50egocentric habits. Suffering is a catharsis which purifies the soul 
and instills values. What slavery was to Cervantes and hard labor was 
to Dostoevsky, the Gulag travail was to Solzhenitsyn. In retrospect, 
Solzhenitsyn believes that prison was a beneficial experience. Even
5lnow he can write, "Bless you, prison!” In his play Candle in the
Wind3 Alex expresses the same sentiment after serving a nine-year term
52in a fictitious Desert Caledonia. To Solzhenitsyn, for both indi­
viduals and nations, there is an inverse relationship between affluence 
and spiritual development. Alex, in the above-mentioned play, claims 
that "suffering is a lever for the growth of the soul. A contented 
person always has an inpoverished soul."
Just as suffering is often beneficial for individuals, so are 
defeats good for entire nations. Successes cause nations to seek 
empires. Defeats force introspection and spiritual growth. Russia's 
victory over Napoleon, Solzhenitsyn argues, forestalled internal re­
form for at least 25 years. Defeats in the Crimean War, the Russo-
511.Japanese Whr and the First World War prompted Russian liberalization. 
National complacency breeds moral nihilism and a preoccupation with 
comfort over all else. Thus is material wealth purchased at the cost 
of human values. Juxtaposed with affluence, Solzhenitsyn advocates 
asceticism.
Own nothing! Possess nothing! Buddha and Christ 
taught us this, and the Stoics and Cynics. Greedy 
though we are, why can's we seem to grasp that simple 
teaching? Can't we understand that with property we 
destroy our soul?5£
Possessions only subject one to the state's leverage. He who owns
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little is beyond the state's grasp. Beneficial change will not
result from some glorious revolution, but rather from a renunciation of 
materialism in favor of spiritual improvement.
The Intelligentsia
In Solzhenitsyn1s political thought, the intelligentsia serves
as a vehicle for change. But he strives to clarify the term!s meaning.
In the Soviet Union, the word "intelligentsia” has become so debased as
to include any and all white collar workers— bureaucrats , bookkeepers 
5>7and clerks. The term is now applied to so many people that it has 
lost all meaning. Posited against this usage, Solzhenitsyn offers a 
different definition. For him, an intellectual is not defined by class, 
occupation, or family background. Instead, an intellectual is one who
S8is preoccupied with the ethical and spiritual aspects of life. 
Interestingly, Solzhenitsyn never mentions intelligence, ho matter how 
brilliant or articulate, a person who eschews value judgments is not an 
intellectual in Solzhenitsyn!s lexicon. Moreover, the true intellectual 
does not hesitate to flout convention for the sake of his values. The 
intelligent, for Solzhenitsyn, is inner-directed and non-imitative in 
thought.
At one time, Solzhenitsyn had high hopes for the intelligent­
sia^ ability to reform society. He is less sanguine now, believing 
that there are certain things one must experience in order to learn.
But neither is Solzhenitsyn totally without hope. He still views the 
intelligentsia as the conscience (not so much the intellect) of 
society. In this respect he resembles the 19th century Russian intel­
lectual. Comparisons should not be overdrawn, however, since
us.
Solzhenitsyn criticizes this group for having an over-romanticized 
view of the common people. Though he is no elitist. Solzhenitsyn 
dismisses the unrealistic populism he detects in Gogol and Herzen. 
Solzhenitsyn is nevertheless obsessed with a special sense of mission. 
He is the collective memory of those who have suffered. If only all 
Soviet citizens could read his Gulag Archipelago, they would renounce
59communism. His mission is to speak the truth, even if it is un­
welcome, embarrassing, and unfashionable. Solzhenitsyn occassionally 
exhibits a classic liberal faith in the power of education (in this 
case a moral education) to improve man and society. Central to his 
thought, therefore, is the idea that change and growth are not pri­
marily political problems.
The Limits of Politics 
The Transcendence of Politics 
"When Solzhenitsyn thinks of politics, he thinks of political 
parties. Though he would not ban political parties, he does believe 
they are very dispensable. By their nature, parties place their own 
interests above the common good.- In a competitive situation, a party 
must rejoice in the ruling faction’s defeats and bemoan their successes, 
even if these respective results frustrate or advance the common good. 
For this reason Solzhenitsyn does not advocate a multiparty parlia­
mentary system for Russia. Rather, he seeks an ’’extraparty” or 
"nonparty” system where a consensus regarding the common good tran­
scends partisanship.^0 On this point he differs with Andrei Sakharov.
Neither is freedom mainly a political problem. Men can be given
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all types of freedom; indeed, the Soviet Constitution grants nearly
every imaginable kind of freedom. Xet as long as men grow submissive
and lose their zest for freedom, codifying rights will be all for naught.
Resistance to conformity is a matter of individual integrity, and no law
can impart this quality. The obsession with political freedom— voting
rights, ability to form parties, freedom of expression— is harmful to
the extent to distracts men from the central task: committing oneself
against the Big lie, regardless of the consequences.
Similarly, equality is a moral, not political, problem. Only
when men abandon materialism and the lust for comfort will true equality 
62be possible. Until that time, no matter how much income governments 
try to redistribute, an elite stratum will remain. In such a way does 
Solzhenitsyn’s call for asceticism highlight his belief in the limi­
tation of political solutions. He recognizes that government is a 
blunt instrument, but that most people still look toward government 
action as a panacea. The state’s structure-authoritarian or demo- 
cratic— is of only secondary importance to Solzhenitsyn. What matters 
most is that a nation posses moral strength. Solzhenitsyn thus stresses 
the primacy of individual commitment over mass political action.
The Ethics of Accountability 
Not everyone need endure prison in order to recover a sense of 
values. Each nation and each citizen bears same responsibility for the 
injustice committed in their names. No one is guiltless and moral 
neutrality is a facade for collaboration. In a society dominated by the 
Big Lie, each man is a potential tyrant.^ The secret police informer 
is no monster; he appears to be a normal human being. Even Solzhe­
nitsyn just barely avoided enlisting in the ranks of the secret police.
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Solzhenitsyn echoes Hannah Arendt's views on f,the banality of evil.” 
Each person who refuses to stand up to unjust authority contributes in 
some small way to the web of repression. Those who torture, slander, 
and spy are not ghouls, but seemingly ordinary people who would rather 
obey than think. With accountability goes responsibility. Aware of the 
ubiquity of guilt, man in the oppressive state must avoid the roles of 
victim and executioner. But if one is forced to choose between the two, 
Solzhenitsyn recommends the former role. For him, life itself is not 
the highest good and he is thus willing to die for certain principles. 
We have often mentioned Solzhenitsyn’s moralism. Perhaps it is now 
appropriate to discuss this subject in detail.
The Return to Values 
One of the political and social evils of our time, Solzhenitsyn 
believes, is the notion of moral relativism. Simply expressed, this is 
the idea that there are no absolute standards of right and wrong and 
that, given a suitable set of circumstances, any act may be justified. 
Solzhenitsyn recognizes and bemoans the fact that modern man is embar­
rassed to use terms such as right and wrong. Merely endorsing certain 
values invites charges of being presumptuous. The word "moralistic” 
now assumes a pejorative connotation. In a pseudo-sophisiticated age, 
good and evil fall sway to ”situational ethics.”
But Solzhenitsyn rejects this tendency, arguing that there are 
some definite standards of good and evil. For him, moral relativism is 
a fancy way to describe an abdication of responsibility. Dostoevsky 
wrote that ”if there is no God, then nothing is forbidden.” Similarly,
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Solzhenitsyn claims that if all values are relative, then everything is
permitted. In Candle in the Wind, Alex scorns
. . . that infernal pretext of the relativity of morality!
You can justify any villainy by the relativity of morality!
But raping a girl is always bad, in any society! Or beating 
up a child! Or driving a mother out of her home! Or slander­
ing others! Or breaking a promise! Or abusing someone's 
trust.
We now have some idea of those acts Solzhenitsyn considers to be wrong 
in any situation. But aside from this, what standard would he have men 
follow? What does he offer in place of moral relativism? Conscience, 
for Solzhenitsyn, is the source of values. He believes that inwardly, 
each person knows that some acts are always reprehensible. Not every­
one follows the dictates of conscience, but this hardly proves that 
conscience does not exist. By virtue of being human, certain ethical 
imperatives are instinctive. But most msi, he believes, choose to ignore 
these feelings, passing them off as "bourgeois" or as sentimentalism.
Modem man, Solzhenitsyn believes, has carried a commendable 
quality— skepticism— to an almost nihilistic extreme. Skepticism can 
only take one so far. Gleb Nerzhin, a prisoner in The First Circle,
argues that while skepticism is needed to fight dogmatism, it "can
68never provide firm ground under a man's feet." When skepticism be­
comes a guise for moral relativism, any political act— genocide, 
torture, deceit— can be rationalized. One must transcend skepticism 
by affirming something, whether it be certain values or a love for man­
kind. Pragmatism must not exclude morality. Solzhenitsyn notes that 
Western opposition to the Nazis was morally as well as strategically 
motivated. Pragmatism is not exactly the same as expediency, there-
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fore, and any dichotomy between pragmatism and morality is unfounded.
What is true of individuals also holds for nations.
Solzhenitsyn argues that it is natural and justified to judge nations
by the same moral standards we apply to individuals. ’’Human logic,”
he notes, ’’can show no cause why if we permit value judgments on the
one mutable entity [man] we should forbid them in the case of the
other [the statej in the broad sweep of history, no nation is
guiltless. What men do for their own interest is often criminal;
what men do for the state's interest is somehow heroic. Solzhenitsyn
sees hypocrisy and danger in this tendency of judging individual and
national action by different standards. Contrast this with the view
of Hans Morgenthau, the foremost exponent of ’’political realism.”
. The individual may say to himself: ’’Fiat justitia, 
pereat mundus (let justice be done, even if the world 
perish),” but the state has no right to say so in the 
name of those who are in its care.7^
This, Solzhenitsyn believes, opens the door to all sorts of mischief. 
To him, it is senseless to say that individuals may subordinate ex­
istence to justice but that nations must place survival above all 
71else. No international order can exist without nations acknowl­
edging that certain types of actions are wrong. It is thus useless 
to say that morality is relative.
In his search for values in a harsh and violent world, 
Solzhenitsyn obeys the existentialist impulse of our time. But by in­
sisting on some absolute standards of right and wrong, by refusing to 
sanction any act so long as it is not in ”bad faith," Solzhenitsyn 
dismisses one aspect of existentialism so much in vogue. Conscience 
is the wellspring of values. But for those who ignore the ethical
impulse* the state stands ready to prevent injustice. Since men often 
ignore the urgings of conscience* Solzhenitsyn has no qualms in advo­
cating authoritarianism.
 ^ Freedom as Self-Restraint
Solzhenitsyn distinguishes between inner and outer freedom.
72Inner freedom we possess at birth. It includes a freedom to choose 
between good and evil. Outer freedom is the absence of physical re­
straint. This type of freedom is determined* not by the fact that we 
are human* but by the type of political structure under which we live. 
Most important is inner freedom* for it can be preserved under any 
circumstance. For Solzhenitsyn* what we think of as political rights 
are ephemeral.' One government grants them* another denies them. Po­
litical or intellectual freedom is not an end in itself* but is a
73means for developing the spirit. Unlimited external freedom is use­
less unless it prompts reflection. One must use political freedom for 
something. It is dispensable* while inner or spiritual freedom endures.
Freedom is also distinguished from license in Solzhenitsyn’s 
analysis. like everything else in his thought* freedom has its limits. 
If not kept within bounds* freedom degenerates into libertinism and 
complacency. Similarly* authoritarianism is not reprehensible so long
7)
as it is not arbitrary and deceitful. Intellectual freedom— the 
right to say what one thinks— is of only secondary importance* he be­
lieves. Look at the West* Solzhenitsyn urges. It has all the 
intellectual freedom it needs* yet its will has weakened and it has 
become unprincipled. Political freedom is thus a medium for spirit­
ual development.
£1.
To doubt is to be human* Solzhenitsyn claims • Responsible 
action* not physical pleasure* is life’s aim. Political freedoms 
are not irrelevant* but neither are they sufficient to impart some 
sense of values. Intellectual freedom does have its practical bene­
fits* however. Writers* for example* are often the Cassandras of 
society* forseeing dangers in advance of their time. In the Soviet 
regime’s early years* Solzhenitsyn recalls* authors such as Boris
Pilnyak and Osip Mandelshtam were condemned for noting unhealthy
77traits in Stalin’s character. Only in the 19^0’s was their insight 
vindicated* but by this time untold millions had needlessly suffered.
What Shelley said of poets* that they are the "unacknowledged 
legislators" of society* Solzhenitsyn says of writers in general. 
Writers ■ serve as living reminders to the state. Their message is 
that political action should incorporate some ethical standard. In 
The First Circle* Innokenty Volodin* a young Soviet diplomat* con­
fides to a friend that
. . .  a great writer is* so to speak* a second 
government. That’s why no regime anywhere has ever 
loved its great writers* only its minor o n e s .78
Wien censorship is practiced* international agreements are ignored.
No domestic constituency can protest the violation of treaties* for 
the promises are kept secret. Because of its monopoly over informa­
tion* Solzhenitsyn believes* the Soviet Union can violate a Helsinki
79agreement or a strategic arms pact.
If Solzhenitsyn’s view of freedom entails limits* it also re­
quires responsibility. Freedom Imposes the burden of choice. Moral 
choices are not always so clear-cut and the burden of freedom is
!>2..
shouldered at the price of complacency and happiness. The process of 
cybernetic neurostabilization* used on Alda in Candle in the Wind, re­
sembles the Great Operation of the Well-Doer in Yevgeny Zamiatin’s We. 
The former operation Imparts ’’granite-like mental health*" turning 
one’s nervous system into a "non-deviating vector." The latter process 
relieves men of "fancy." In both anti-utopias* men become automata.
The life of the mind succumbs to the temptation of a lotus-eating ex­
istence. For Solzhenitsyn then* freedom involves a certain amount of 
pain which inheres in the act of choice. He is less concerned that men 
feel happy in a conventional sense— gorged on consumer goods and obliv­
ious to the suffering of others. The Russian author recognizes* along 
with Erich Fromm and others* that freedom can be frightening and total­
itarianism seductive. Choosing the course of freedom* whether on an 
individual or national level* is not only the more principled action* 
but is also what distinguishes man from other animals.
Mother.Russia
Suffering has limits too. Russia has suffered enough* Solzhe­
nitsyn saysj let her now begin anew. Though he hates the Soviet regime* 
Solzhenitsyn loves his homeland. Indeed* he distinguishes between
Soviet and Russian qualities. By the latter he means the pre-revolu-
80tionary experience. Reflecting upon the human agony in his country* 
Solzhenitsyn poses the same question asked by Chernyshevsky and Lenin: 
What is to be done? While Solzhenitsyn rejects the Marxist/communist 
route for his nation* in 197U he presented an alternative in his Letter 
to the Soviet Leaders. Many Westerners* who thought they had seen in
?3*
this author a reflection of Western liberalism, "were aghast.
Since you are already called revisionists by the Chinese,
8l
Solzhenitsyn writes, abandon your burdensome ideology. He does not 
necessarily ask the Politburo to relinquish power, for it is ideology 
and not authority which has tormented the Russian people. Russia 
should also grant genuine self-determination to the Eastern bloc states, 
the scattered nationalities, and should cease striving for illusory 
diplomatic gains. Obscure wars of national liberation are irrelevant 
to Russia’s real needs, be believes.
Instead, Solzhenitsyn exhorts his countrymen to turn inward—  in 
a political, geographical and spiritual sense. Specifically, the vast 
and untamed Northeast expanses of Siberia are Russia’s salvation. Dis­
missing, the notion of progress as a bane to humans and the environment,
Solzhenitsyn seems to concur with the British economist E. F. Schumacher.
82that ’’small is beautiful.” Large cities and rapid industrialization 
are Western ills which Russia should not copy. Citing the Club of 
Rome’s predictions of resource depletion, Solzhenitsyn supports a zero-
growth economy. Russia is one of the few countrys that can make a
fresh start. The Siberian Northeast is the great frontier which symbol-
Oo
izes a spiritual rebirth within the Russian people. Russia could then 
concentrate on its domestic problems and abjure an activist foreign 
policy.’ For Solzhenitsyn, the Northeast is ’’more than just a musical
p)
sound and more than just a geographical concept." Rather, the North­
east symbolizes the recovery of traditional Russian values of piety. 
Imperialism, resource depletion, moral degradation— these problems would 
be solved. The Northeast is Russia’s Promised Land, with Solzhenitsyn 
as its messianic advocate.
5U.
Russia need not adopt a democratic or parliamentary system,
Solzhenitsyn argues. Democracies have been historically rare and
short-lived. Russia has at times thrived under authoritarianism, he
notes. But the Communist Party should no longer monopolize all
thought. Solzhenitsyn personally believes that Christianity is
Russia’s salvation, but he advocates no state religion. He asks only
86that religion be "treated fairly and not suppressed." Democracy,
besides being inappropriate for the Russian tradition, is also
dismissed on practical grounds. War between various nationalities
might result from the establishment of Westem-style freedoms in 
P 7
Russia. Notice, Solzhenitsyn speaks of Russia!s salvation and 
Russia’s virtues. He advocates a "Russia first" policy'in an in­
creasingly interdependent world. But to Solzhenitsyn, this display of 
nationalism is justified by the fact that the Russian people have 
suffered more than anyone else. Since their agony has been most in­
tense, he argues, Russians are excused for placing their national wel-
88fare above that of any other group.
This vision of Russia’s future is pastoral and isolationist. 
Distancing himself from much that the West holds so dear,. Solzhenitsyn 
places himself squarely in the 19th century Russophile (not Slavophile) 
tradition. After reading his Letter to the Soviet Leaders, no one can 
have the slightest doubt that the writer resides in the West only be­
cause he is forced to do so. With this publication, Solzhenitsyn 
ceased to be the darling of Western liberals, a role he neither sought 
nor desired.
Although Solzhenitsyn is contemptuous of Marxism, he does
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support a brand of "ethical socialism." The latter is distinguished 
from its pseudo-scientific impostor by an esteem for human life above 
any ideological nirvana. This type of socialism is based, not on 
material goods or diplomatic gains, but on love. Modem socialism pro­
duces a community based on hate. Community, Solzhenitsyn implies, is 
not necessarily desirable. History tells him that communities fre­
quently coalesce around hate for outsiders. Shulubin, the doleful
Party member in Cancer Ward, reflects that "there's only one true
89socialism, and that's ethical socialism." Such a brand of social-
90ism does not now exist, Solzhenitsyn adds. How ironic it is, he
notes, that modem socialism has produced the most anti-social and
philistine culture in existence! Mutual affection, not surpassing the
West in industrialization or arms, should be socialism's aim.
Solzhenitsyn wants not just any type of community, but one
that is national in scope and devoid of hatred. He believes that com-
91munity is an individual and not a governmental task. Where a 
community does not exist, no government can magically create one. 
Rather, community is built first at an individual or personal level.
The interaction is between persons, not between the government and 
the citizen. As long as men look first to politics for their sal­
vation, the attainment of community will be unlikely. Though he is 
unclear regarding what values can cement a community, it is safe to 
say that Solzhenitsyn endorses the Christian values of love, charity, 
and piety. When so-called Eurocommunists now speak of "socialism 
with a human face," Solzhenitsyn accuses them of redundancy. Human­
istic socialism is, for him, the only true socialism. Other forms
are called socialistic, but this is a veil for despotism.
Critical Evaluation
It is difficult to understand the faith Solzhenitsyn places in 
suffering. In his own writings, he offers telling criticisms of the 
notion that suffering has its meritorious effects. The Gulag, we learn,' 
effaced in most men all that was humane. Compassion and friendship were 
endangered as long as only* the cunning survived the camp ordeal. To be 
sure, Solzhenitsyn did not sink to this level, but his was an except­
ional experience. Most men, he observes, became indifferent to their 
fellow men -when confronted with suffering. Suffering is not necessar­
ily ennobling and is quite often degrading. Were every man a Solzhe­
nitsyn, he could sensibly urge personal calvary as a means of spiritual 
purification•
In some ways, Solzhenitsyn is his own most devastating critic.
He recalls with bitterness that Janos Kadar and Wladyslaw Gomulka,
respective leaders of the Hungarian and Polish Communist Parties, had
at one time been unjustly arrested, tortured, and imprisoned. l,The
whole world sees how much they learned. The whole world has learned
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what they are worth.,T This may be unfair to Kadar, but this con­
cession does not mortally wound Solzhenitsyn's main point. No 
guarantee exists that suffering will have what Solzhenitsyn considers 
to be a beneficial effect on people. If his chronicles prove anything, 
it is that suffering more frequently has harmful effects.
At the national level, mass suffering has only infrequently 
induced the type of change Solzhenitsyn desires. Nations need defeats, 
he argues, for they prompt introspection and liberalization.
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Victorious -war only whets a regime’s appetite for more conquests. Yet,
as Hans Morgenthau and others have noted, lost war is an equally large
93inducement to imperialism. Eager to recoup losses sustained in the 
last exchange, a defeated power may secretly prepare to alter the status 
quo with force. Mass suffering and national defeat contributed to the 
rise of Nazism in post-World War I Germany. Without the setbacks Russia 
received in World War I, the Bolsheviks may have never ascended to 
power. Perhaps it is no coincidence that ideology holds such sway in 
the wake of national defeat. The glorious future described by an 
ideology may compensate for mass feelings of emptiness and humiliation. 
National suffering is thus destructive as well as beneficial in the 
long run. It prompts domestic extremism and foreign Imperialism as 
often as it produces introspection and regeneration.
Authoritarianism is also quickly accepted. Democracies are 
rare, authoritarianism the historical rule. Ideology and the Big Lie, 
not authoritarianism, are the real villains. People lived for 
centuries without danocracy and they ’’were not always worse off.” 
Millions of Russians in the past centuries have lived under authoritar­
ianism and they died happy. Autocracies preserved the nation’s health: 
’’obviously, since the nation did not die out.” Yes, and some people 
even survived the plague during the Middle ages. May we therefore con­
clude that the Black Death preserved Europe's well-being?
Solzhenitsyn’s defense of authoritarianism is at times feeble 
and unconvincing. He points to the relatively humane autocracies of 
the past, but perhaps these regimes were more humane only because they 
lacked modern and sophisticated instruments of terror. The modern
police state owes its existence not only to ideology but to technology.
Though he says he cannot imagine a humane ideology, Solzhenitsyn can
endorse benevolent autocracy. But what will keep the rulers benevolent
What checks will limit the arbitrary power that even Solzhenitsyn
abhors? Again, Solzhenitsyn is often his own most incisive critic:
"Unlimited power in the hands of limited people always leads to 
9 iicruelty." And no one is more aware of the prominence of human fail­
ings than this man. Yet a passion for order over freedom persists.
Authoritarianism may maintain a habit of obedience which is 
most susceptible to ideological fervor. Perhaps it is also not acci­
dental that modem authoritarian states often embrace ideologies. 
Visions of a utopian future make submission to authority a tolerable, 
if not welcome, task for the citizen. Ideology is a convenient way to 
exact conformity. Trusting no ideology, Solzhenitsyn attributes to 
authority all sorts of virtues. One gets the uneasy feeling that he 
endorses authoritarianism merely to show that Western institutions do 
not offer the best of all possible worlds.
Nor does he present a persausive case for Russian isolation­
ism. Russia should abandon an active foreign policy and concentrate 
on its own well-being. The rest of the world may choke on its own 
profligacy, but Russia is saved by the Northeast. Here lies plenty of 
food, minerals, and natural gas. It is only just that Russia close 
itself off from the rest of the world, since Russians have suffered 
most of all. Solzhenitsyn’s call for a ’’Russia first’’ policy is rem­
iniscent of the ’’beggar thy neighbor’’ philosophy of the mercantilist 
era. If the surrounding world crumbles, at least Russia will survive.
This is fitting, for Russia has suffered most of all.
But who does Solzhenitsyn blame for these hardships? He blames 
not just the ideology, or Lenin, or Stalin, but the Russian people. 
Russians were eager to cast off freedom and the responsibility that 
goes with it. The Big Lie is perpetuated by mass deceit. Russians
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not only submitted, but they tended their torturers in the old age! 
Russia is culpable for her own troubles. Without her habit of sub­
mission (engendered perhaps by centuries of authoritarianism?), the 
Gulag would not exist. Justifying Russian self-interest over global 
welfare, Solzhenitsyn cites his country's unexceeded agony. Yet 
Solzhenitsyn later shows the pain to be self-inflicted. Wo nation 
is guiltless, he argues. Somehow he is sure that since Russia1 s 
suffering has been the greatest, her welfare should be foremost. But 
Russia!s welfare is not divorced from global existence. Solzhenitsyn 
may try to distance Russia from the worlds problems, but this is not 
a decision solely within his power to make. The world will not allow 
Russia to sit watching cozily in its Northeast while the rest of the 
globe perishes out of warfare or scarcity.
At times, Solzhenitsyn becomes a mirror-image of those things 
he abhors. Consider ideology for instance. Solzhenitsyn rails 
against all ideologies, cataloging the injustice committed in their 
names. When he later discusses Russia's future, Solzhenitsyn advo­
cates, of all things, Christianity— an ideology which he has already 
mentioned among those culpable for mass cruelty! Even without his 
Christian perspective, Solzhenitsyn's thought contains all the in­
gredients of ideology. His neo-Russophilism explains man and society
and tries to transform both. His thought contains its own metaphysic, 
its own ethical code. Occasionally striking a tone of intolerance, 
Solzhenitsyn can give no guarantee that his beliefs would not be used 
posthumously to justify seme atrocity. His own beliefs jell into a 
product resembling his earlier definition of ideology. TOiat Solzhe­
nitsyn offers, therefore, is not an escape from ideology, but rather 
an ideology to end all ideologies. .
Conclusion
This does not pretend to be an exhaustive discussion or 
critique of Solzhenitsynfs ideas. If the dissenting voice now ema­
nates from Cavendish, Vermont instead of the. Moscow suburbs, the 
relevance of the message transcends its geographical source. Special­
ization of knowledge reinforces the tendency to leave politics to “the 
experts.1 Solzhenitsyn does not claim to be an expert. He does not 
claim to be objective. This should not belittle his ideas, however.
His is a fresh, if not always reassuring, message. B o m  of a personal 
suffering beyond most men!s comprehension, Solzhenitsyn^ mission is 
to introduce sanity, compassion, and morality to an age that considers 
itself value-free. Solzhenitsyn represents no movement, no cult. He 
merely represents his own conviction that politics should serve man, not 
man politics. Yet even this conviction is tempered by his belief in 
the limitation of political solutions.
If he cannot answer all questions or meet all objections, this 
is a consequence he accepts. He tries not to offer yet another philo­
sopher^ stone for re-molding society in some magic image. Even if his 
pleas fall on deaf ears, he justifies his own existence by bearing the
message of the millions whose voices will never be heard:
I dedicate this 
to all those who did not live 
to tell it.
And may they please forgive me 
for not having seen it all 
nor remembered it all, 
for not having divined all of it.
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CHAPTER H I
SAKHAROV: THE SCIENTIST 
AS DISSIDENT
He appears to be an unlikely dissident— diminutive, shy, soft- 
spoken. Few would guess Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov to be the leader 
of the democratic movement within the Soviet Union. As a founder of 
the Moscow Human Rights Committee, Sakharov has barely,avoided the 
exile Imposed on two of his colleagues— -Valery Chalidze and Zhores 
Medvedev. Less drastic, but nonetheless annoying, reprisals have been 
aimed at Sakharov. For supporting Jewish emigration rights, he has 
been mugged by police agents disguised as Palestinian terrorists. For 
protesting at political trials, Sakharov’s wife Yelena Bonner has been 
threatened with imprisonment. For issuing manifestoes, Sakharov has 
had the prospect of psychiatric incarceration dangled before him. For 
having such a renegade father, Sakharov’s children have been denied 
jobs and admittance to universities.
The paradox grows. Andrei Sakharov is widely known as "the 
father of the Soviet H-bomb," the youngest man ever to gain full mem­
bership in the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the brilliant protege of the 
eminent physicist, Igor Tamm. Sakharov has received a Stalin Prize, 
a Lenin Prize, and has thrice been distinguished as a Hero of Socialist 
Labor. In the 1960’s, Sakharov belonged to the privileged elite of the 
new technocratic class. Reasons for dissatisfaction seemed nonexistent.
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Whether he lounged in his posh dacha, rode in his chauffeured auto­
mobile, or taught at the prestigious Lebedev Institute of Physics, 
Sakharov awaited a comfortable future. How then has he become "an 
enemy of the people"? How can one nondescript man pose such a threat 
to the Kremlin? What dissonant views does he harbor that make him so 
intolerable to the Soviet regime?
Those studying Sakharov approach a complex man. His beliefs 
have changed over time. They are dynamic, even now in a process of 
evolution. They resist the tidy classifications of which academicians 
are so fond. Nevertheless, a few themes may be useful in understanding 
the development of Sakharov's political thought. Before 1968, Sakharov 
was what one might call a neo-Marxist. That is, he wished to restore 
Soviet society to what he believed to be the humane ideals of Karl 
Marx. Stalin perverted Marxist philosophy, he believed, while Lenin 
captured its essence. Thus, until 1968, Sakharov was a neo-Marxist 
or, if you will, a neo-Leninist. His views he then described as 
"profoundly socialist."
After 1968, however, Sakharov's confidence in socialism wanes. 
He believes that, in theory, socialism built around "scientific princ­
iples" is possible. In practice, he feels, humane socialism has been 
rare. By 1975, Sakharov calls himself a liberal, albeit a nondogmatic 
liberal. An "open society," one that tolerates the free expression of 
all ideologies, seems to be his goal. Running throughout Sakharov's 
thought is the influence of the scientific method upon politics. Only 
through the critical testing of various ideologies will the common 
good emerge.
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Sakharov seeks to transpose the virtues of the scientific 
milieu— open-mindedness, toleration, rigorous testing of hypotheses, 
free discussion— onto the political realm. This view also underlies 
Sakharov's internationalism. He believes that the nation-state is 
an antiquated way to organize society, for reasons we will later ex­
plore. Only a global approach can solve global problems. In 1977, 
therefore, Sakharov is a non-dogmatic liberal and an internationalist. 
No one can confidently claim to know what caused these changes in 
Sakharov's thought, but some explanations are offered in the section, 
"Marxism and Socialism." Let us begin, therefore, by examining 
Sakharov's critique of his own country.
The Soviet System
Soviet society, Sakharov noted in 1968, has departed from the
"scientific principles" inherent in true Marxism. Such principles,
Sakharov believed, included free and open discussion, fair treatment
of divergent ideas, and a willingness to criticize without .fear of 
1
reprisal. It is precisely these qualities that Soviet society lacks. 
Solzhenitsyn judged the Soviet system using his own humanistic and 
personal criteria. Sakharov argues that, even by Marxist standards, 
the Soviet system is faulty. In 1968, these two dissidents evaluated 
Soviet society using two very different perspectives yet still pro­
duced similar verdicts.
When the state controls all aspects of life— economics, poli­
tics, ideology— mass conformity is the result. The monopolization of
2
all facets of life is, to Sakharov, the heart of totalitarianism.
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Dependence on the state is calculated to breed servitude among the 
Soviet citizenry. When men rely on the government to tell them -what 
to think., where to -work, and how to live in general, everyone has a
stake in preserving the status quo. Thus does statism reinforce the
3 •essential conservatism of Soviet society. Despite boasts of having
the best system, the Soviet regime, by restricting travel and emigra­
tion, prevents its citizens from making their own comparisons.
Lacking any standard of comparison, the average Soviet citizen lapses 
into a materialistic quest for consumer goods J* Comsumerism, Sak­
harov believes, is the new opium of the masses. It offers an escape 
from the dreary slogans and the broken promises characterizing the 
regime. Self-reliance is exactly what the regime fears, Sakharov 
argues. For this reason, "the collective" is exalted and the individ­
ual belittled.
Sakharov expresses in more explicit terms than Solzhenitsyn
the idea that Soviet government represents, not communism or socialism,
£
but state capitalism. To Sakharov, Soviet exploitation differs from 
American capitalism only by dint of its greater oppressiveness over all 
walks of life. ^ Again using Marxist terminology, Sakharov notes that 
the Soviet state now extracts all surplus value from the toiling masses. 
In earlier times, the private capitalist performed the same role. Both 
types of exploitation are onerous. In its excessive statism, the Soviet 
system offers no new, ideal, or even beneficial way to organize society, 
Sakharov believes.
Also like Solzhenitsyn and Djilas, Sakharov notes the rise of a 
new class in Soviet society. Ranking Party and state officials, the
nomenklatura, drive their handrtooled Zil limousines, send their dull-
witted children to the best schools, and avoid long lines by shopping
7
at cheap and convenient "hard currency" stores. Like the Inner 
Party in George Orwell’s 1981;, the Soviet elite clings to its privi­
leges. Sakharov'refers to the "ostentatious and inefficient class 
structure" in the Soviet Union, a structure no more egalitarian than
o
the Czarist order. But at least the old system acknowledged its in­
equality, something the Soviet system refuses to do. By placing their 
children in the finest schools, by finding their progeny cushy jobs in 
the Party and state, the new class is becoming a hereditary aristoc­
racy. Advantages in earning and learning are passed from generation to 
generation. Again, this occurs in other societies too. But when it 
does occur, it is often recognized and not masqueraded as the "prog­
ressive will of the laboring masses."
No guarantee exists that the Communist Party will protect the
common interest. Instead, Sakharov predicts that the Party will only
9
protect its own "caste interests." As an oligarchy which claims to 
rule for the good of the many, the Soviet leaders resemble the worst 
despotisms of the ancient world. If would-be kings and tyrants now 
clamored for power, their claims would be met with derisive laughter. 
"Why then should such claims— i.e., ruling in the interest of the 
many— now be accepted just because they come from a group that calls 
itself the Party? At times, Sakharov implies that the Party’s in­
ability to override its own interest will inevitably lead to.the 
dissolution of the one-party system. In such a way does Sakharov im­
pale the Party upon its own Marxist notion of "internal contradict
75.
Unlike Solzhenitsyn,, Sakharov sees the concentration of polit­
ical power as the root of Soviet evil. Excessive statism, not Marxist 
ideology, is the main culprit. Yet Sakharov does not ignore the
ideological factor. Indeed, he inveighs against the ’’ideological
11monism" -which pervades Soviet society. But Sakharov, unlike Solz­
henitsyn, is more -willing to distinguish between this later perversion 
and original Marxist thought. Under this "ideological monism," only 
one interpretation (i.e., the PartyTs) of one ideology (i.e., Marxism)
is allowed. Party decree is law. The messianic pretensions of Soviet
12society are alien, Sakharov claims, to the ideal society. Divergent 
thoughts should be tolerated, lest society stultify and decay. Pres­
sures for conformity require the Soviet citizen to lead a double life. 
At work, he pays lip service to Party slogans. In private, he sneers 
at the Party line. Since professional advancement more often results 
from ideological conformity than from expertise, those who rise to the
top of their field are usually "hypocrites and timeservers," Sakharov 
1 3believes. "When Party guidelines govern promotion, society is run. by 
a ruling "mediocracy."
The Soviet citizen must thus practice his own brand of double­
think, assuming the trappings of conformity to hide a foundation of 
weary cynicism. Dependent on the state for his livelihood, information, 
promotions, and even entertainment, the Soviet citizen is a product of 
Soviet totalitarianism. Like Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov notes that the 
system forces each person to participate in the Big Lie. Publicly, 
citizens extol the regime and support oppression. Privately, they are 
apathetic.
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Perhaps such psychological tricks offer the only way to cope 
with an intolerant government. The contrast between myth and reality 
is so stark that this two-track way of thinking is understandable.
Daily propaganda publicizes the state ls love of peace, yet society is 
militarized to an unprecedented degree. Since most resources are sac­
rificed at the altar of heavy industry, Soviet society does not even
"i iifaintly approach the worldfs highest living standard. Sakharov as­
serts that Soviet "supermilitarism" causes high defense budgets 
worldwide. ^ As Roman mothers frightened their children by screaming 
"Hannibal ad portas!M so do the Soviet rulers parade the Chinese bogey­
man to bolster the garrison state at home. Eradicating this 
"barrack-square" mentality is impossible, Sakharov believes, without 
domestic political reform.
Though the Soviet worker is bombarded with the news that he is 
the master of his country, he knows that "the real masters are those
who, morning and evening, speed through the deserted, closed-off streets
"16in their armed limousines.11 Proclaiming itself the worldTs most
democratic state, the regime holds between 2,000 and 10,000 political 
1 7prisoners. To ensure that the myth of Soviet superiority is not de-
18flated, morbid secrecy enshrouds the country. Despite claims of
supporting "progressive elements11 in foreign countries, Soviet diplom-
19acy is characterized by a "pragmatic lack of principle." Thus does 
the regime, under the guise of aiding ’tars of national liberation," 
support the genocide of Ibos in Nigeria and Kurds in Iraq. On the pre­
text of aiding "enlightened factions," Soviet leaders arms the
20
corpulent dictator Amin in Uganda and the mercurial Qaddafi in Libya.
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Despite the rhetoric, Sakharov concludes, Soviet diplomacy embraces
Machtpolitik so cynically that even a Bismarck would be impressed.
Sakharov’s critique of the Soviet system has changed through 
the years. For example, in his 1968 treatise Progress, Coexistence and 
Intellectual Freedom (hereafter referred to as Progress), Sakharov 
claimed that in economic performance, socialism and capitalism had
on
"played to a tie.” From 1968 to 197U, however, he grew more con­
vinced of the inferiority of the Soviet socialist alternative with 
its attendant poverty, inefficiency, and shoddiness.
In 1968, Sakharov seems almost Sinophobic in condemning Maoism.
The specter of Asian hordes seemed to loom large as he wrote that "our
22chief foreign policy problems is our relations with China." In this 
respect, the Sakharov of 1968 is similar to Solzhenitsyn and Amalrik, 
both of whom warn darkly of an impending Sino-Soviet war. Yet in the 
early 1970’s, Sakharov abandons his inordinate concern over the Chinese 
menace. Again, as in 198U Oceana alternately fights Eurasia and 
Eastasia as an excuse for militarizing society, so do Soviet rulers 
alternately use the capitalist and Maoist "threats" to legitimize 
their own rule.
On balance, Soviet society has more faults than virtues, 
Sakharov believes.^ In 1968, he seemed to view these faults as 
temporary aberrations. After nine years of vain struggle to re­
form the system, Sakharov is more convinced that the problems are 
deeply rooted. Like Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov calls for a regeneration 
among the Russian people.^ His regeneration would differ from Solzhe­
nitsyn’s however, by being less patriarchal, less nationalistic. Sak­
harov calls for a spiritual renewal that will avoid the twin extremes
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of asceticism and materialism. He seeks reform* not to recover a 
sense of Mother Russia” or to retreat into the past -wearing sackcloth 
and ashes* but to realign Russia and the world along "democratic 
scientific" principles. Sakharov believes that Solzhenitsyn condemns 
one anachronism (i.e.* Soviet tyranny) while replacing it with 
another anachronism (i.e.* Great Russian chauvinism). Instead* Sak­
harov attempts to synthesize the most ennobling socialist ideals with 
the most modem scientific techniques.
Marxism and Socialism 
Like his view of the Soviet state* Sakharov's attitude to­
ward socialism has changed since 1968. In Progress 3 he laces his 
arguments -with Marxist jargon* referring to the class struggle* 
progressive forces* and the scientific approach to politics. He is
deferential to Marx and Lenin. To temper his criticisms* Sakharov
2d
states in 1968 that his views are "profoundly socialist." In 1968* 
Sakharov argues that despite its flaws* the Soviet system had "demon­
strated the vitality of the socialist course" and "like no other
26
system* has glorified the moral significance of labor." Criti­
cizing society from a Marxist perspective* Sakharov recalls that
Marx and Lenin distinguished between bureaucratic and democratic
27
systems of socialism. The latter is Sakharov's ideal; the former 
represents the Soviet state. Note* Solzhenitsyn sees Soviet state 
capitalism as a predictable product of Marxist thought. Sakharov* 
however* sees it as the perversion of an essentially humane ideology.
Unlike Solzhenitsyn* Sakharov argues that the term "Leninist"
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is meaningful and urges that Lenin’s ideals be recovered. He associ­
ates Lenin with humaneness* toleration* and self-determination. At 
least in 1968* Sakharov believes that Lenin’s successors have be-- 
trayed the spirit of 1917* Lenin’s nationality policy Sakharov 
judges to be particularly enlightened. Leninism was a distinctive 
style of rule* Sakharov argues. One cannot accept Peter Dornan’s
view* therefore* that ’’the term ’Leninist’ has no real meaning for 
29
Sakharov.” On the contrary* the fact that the term is fraught with
meaning is probably the main reason for Sakharov’s early dissent.
Yet Sakharov offers his own revisions of the Marxist creed in
1968. For instance* he argues that dogmatic anti-capitalism is just
30as unwarranted (perhaps less so) as rabid anti-communism. Joseph 
McCarthy's ruthlessness was lukewarm compared to Soviet paranoia 
concerning ’’bourgois influences.” Sakharov calls for an undogmatic 
Marxism* one that recognizes and incorporates positive features from 
capitalism.
The Marxist concept of dialectic receives special considera­
tion. Though the capitalist world gave birth to the socialist system* 
this does not mean that the two systems are irreconcilable. That 
socialism follows capitalism in Marx’s view of history does not prove 
either the superiority of socialism or the inferiority of capitalism. 
Sequence does not necessarily impart value. "Without an Igor Tamm* the 
scientific breakthroughs of Andrei Sakharov might have been impossible; 
but no one condemns Tamm because his views paved the way for Sakharov’s 
accomplishments. To do so would be to jump from time to value* a log­
ically unwarranted leap. Especially in a nuclear age* the antagonistic
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notion of the dialectic is suicidal and stupid, Sakharov argues.
Between 1968 and 1975* Sakharov sours toward socialism in 
general. Heretofore, he argues, all socialist states have been re­
pressive. Sakharov refers to the "ordeals which, so far, no communist
country has been spared: cultural revolutions, massive repressions,
32
and the dominance of the bureaucracy." In My Country and the World
(hereafter referred to as My Country), he argues that socialism has
thus far always meant a one-party state, bureaucratic tyranny, secret
police terror, expropriation of nearly all private property, and worker 
33exploitation. Religious persecution is a "frightful tradition" in
"3)
all socialist states, he argues. Soviet society is not alone in its 
excesses. Totalitarian socialism is all that the world has seen here­
tofore. Ideal socialism would leave some private property intact, 
tolerate competing political parties, and allow free expression of 
ideas.
Existing totalitarian socialism (Sakharov also calls it 
"pseudosocialism") is an historical dead end. Sakharov refers to the 
late Arkady Belinkov, another dissident, who once wrote that "social­
ism is the kind of thing that is easy to sample but hard to spit 
35out."  ^ Indeed, there are many examples of countries which have 
passed from feudalism or capitalism into socialism, but there are few 
instances of socialism evolving into a capitalist structure. His 
criticism is not merely that socialism has never voluntarily evolved 
into a capitalist or democratic structure. Sakharov’s point is rather 
that socialism has never evolved into any different system, period.
This is why Sakharov tends (he seems undecided on the issue) to view 
present socialism as an historical cul de sac.
81.
Totalitarian socialism is an impostor for true Marxism. Demo­
cratic socialism is Sakharov’s preferred alternative, but he claims 
that presently it does not exist. Obviously Sakharov has not 
abandoned all hope of evolution toward progressive principles in the 
Soviet Union. But he believes that some external force, such as 
Western pressure, must facilitate the process. Sakharov is gloomy, 
not about evolution per se, but about voluntary liberalization.
Sakharov had come a long way from his ’’profound socialism” of
1968. In a 1972 interview with Jay Axelbahk of Newsweek, Sakharov 
explained:
Similarly, in an October 1973 interview with the Swedish journalist 
Olle Stenholm, Sakharov declared,
I am skeptical about socialism in general. I don’t 
see that socialism offers some kind of new theoretical 
plan, so to speak, for the better organization of 
society. . . We have the same kinds of problems as the 
capitalist world: criminality and alienation. The 
difference is that our society is an extreme case, with 
maximum lack of freedom, maximum ideological rigidity, 
and— this is the most typical— with maximum pretensions 
the best society, although it is certainly
At this point, one might be tempted to conclude that Sakharov em­
braces Solzhenitsyn’s blanket rejection of socialism. This would 
be a mistake, however. Later in the Stenholm interview, Sakharov 
argues that socialism does not require an absence of competing 
parties, implying that present forms of socialism exhibit flaws not
When
I wrote from wnau you caj_L a position or aosrrac- 
tion . . .  I called myself a socialist then, but I 
have now modified my beliefs . . .  I would no longer 
label myself a socialist, I am not a Marxist-Leninist,--------    j _ — --- — ---- - -- _■
a communist. I would call myself a liberal.-51
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endemic to Marxism. Solzhenitsyn refuses to concede this point. In
197$j Sakharov believes that a different kind of socialism— ’’social-
39ism with a human face”— is possible even if it is now rare. To be 
sure, Sakharov conpares Soviet communism to Western capitalism. To 
be sure, neither structure conforms exactly to Sakharov’s liberalism. 
Still, it is clear that he believes Western capitalism to be closer to 
the ’’scientific— democratic” ideal than its Soviet socialist counter­
part.
What may account for the changes in Sakharov’s thought? Soon 
after Sakharov completed his 1968 treatise, Soviet tanks rumbled 
into Czechoslovakia to squelch the democratic reforms of IhibcSek’s 
’’Prague Spring.” Sakharov was deeply shaken by this action, fearing 
that it. heralded a return to Stalinism. Perhaps at this point he 
grew more bitter toward the regime and everything associated with it. 
Additionally, Sakharov had campaigned for a limitation on nuclear 
testing ever since Khrushchev’s reign. Toward the end of the 1960’s, 
the futility of Sakharov’s pleas became apparent. With an ever-in- 
creasing megatonnage, nuclear testing continued. The Soviet arsenal 
grew. Perhaps Sakharov then decided to discard his faith in social­
ism and become a more strident critic.
More disillusionment followed. For publishing his unorthodox 
ideas in Progress, Sakharov was dropped from the Soviet nuclear 
program. He was denied access to classified information. The official 
press began to hound him. He became a persona non grata among his 
scientific colleagues. Realizing the enormity of the reformer’s task, 
Sakharov may have decided to revise his mild-mannered musings of 1968.
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Meanwhile, many of his dissident friends were harassed. Vlad­
imir Bukovsky was sent to a psychiatric prison. Solzhenitsyn,
Chalidze, and Zhores Medvedev were exiled. Sakharov’s family seemed 
endangered. As his circle of acquaintances grew, Sakharov’s knowledge 
of the outside world increased correspondingly. Perhaps the flaws 
were more deep-seated than he had originally thought. Having more 
time to reflect and more opportunities to compare systems, Sakharov’s 
assumptions regarding socialism were revised.
Stalinism
Stalinism was the supreme bastardization of Marxism, Sakharov 
believes. The 'Stalinist system displayed the worst excesses of total­
itarian socialism. Stalinism, not socialism, has been the main source 
of Soviet tyranny.^ Though Stalin has been dead for nearly a quarter 
of a century, neo-Stalinists remain lodged in the ruling organs.
Vestiges of Stalin’s mentality— intolerance, paranoia, cunning— these 
linger long after Khrushchev’s so-called denunciation of the dead 
vozhd. Accordingly, neo-Stalinists should be purged from the govern­
ment’s ranks. Only a thoroughgoing expose of Stalin’s crimes can lay 
the foundation for a regeneration and democratization of Soviet so­
ciety. Archives of the secret police should be opened for public 
inspection, political victims rehabilitated, and ’’little Stalins” rooted 
out of their positions.^" Though in 1970 Sakharov is less confident 
regarding the possibility of democratic socialism, in 1968 he passes
Stalinism off as ”a tragic accident, a serious, though not inevitable,
I l2disease.” This conviction is shaken in the 1970’s as he learns of
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many other police states which clothe their repression in Marxist 
garb.
In any case, Sakharov rejects Solzhenitsyn’s facile view that 
there is no such thing as Stalinism. Most observers agree with Sak­
harov. The latter contrasts Lenin’s lenient nationality policy with 
Stalin’s harshness. Indeed, Lenin complained of Stalin’s ruthlessness 
when the Georgian was the Commissar of Nationalities. Lenin may have 
been no gentle lamb, but the contrast between him and Stalin is never­
theless vivid. No matter how fiercely Lenin hated a fellow Comrade, 
he never had him killed but instead preferred ’’rehabilitation.” Lenin 
scrupulously observed the principle of leadership collegiality and, 
unlike Stalin, refused to concentrate all power in his own hands. 
Posited against Stalin’s narcissism is Lenin’s self-effacement. Sig­
nificantly, the ’’cult of Lenin” grew only after the leader’s death. 
Stalin, on the other hand, craved idolatry while he was still alive.
Absent in Lenin was Stalin’s morbid paranoia. Shortly before 
he died, Lenin warned Kamenev and Zinoviev about Stalin’s rudeness and 
arrogance. A Stalinist-style purge would have been out of character 
for Lenin. Anyway, Stalin felt threatened by Lenin loyalists, the old 
Bolshevik ’’class of 1917.” Who could have possibly aroused such fear 
in Lenin? And no doubt Lenin favored collectivization, but never at 
such a crushing pace and at the cost of "liquidating the kulaks as a 
class.” The reforms of the New Economic Policy of the early 1920’s 
attest to Lenin’s gradualism as opposed to Stalin’s impatience for 
industrialization. Notwithstanding the historical reconstructions of 
Lenin in Zurich (is it a novel? An historical novel? An authentic
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documentary?), Sakharov cannot accept Solzhenitsyn’s simplistic view 
of Stalinist evil.
The Problem of Change 
Gradualism
Like Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov rejects revolution as a means for 
societal change. His reasons for this opposition are also similar to 
Solzhenitsyn’s. For Sakharov., revolutions spell violence, destruction 
of worthwhile economic and legal institutions, ’mass sufferings, law­
lessness, and h o r r o r s A s i d e  from these general risks, Russia has 
experienced so much turmoil that another revolution would irreparably 
rip society apart. Sakharov echoes the 19th century Fabian socialist 
view regarding the ’’inevitability of gradualness. ” Positive reform 
will more likely result from working within the system— forming groups, 
petitioning the government, and appealling to world public opinion. 
While Solzhenitsyn believes that meaningful change will start only at 
the individual level and is skeptical toward mass movements in general, 
Sakharov thinks that group action is the answer to the problem of 
reform. Solzhenitsyn is largely contemptuous of political panaceas, 
preferring individual commitment. Sakharov prefers broad-based action 
reminiscent of vintage 19th century Russian populism.
Concerted action is necessary because the Soviet system will 
not reform itself, Sakharov believes.^- Sakharov shares Solzhenitsyn’s 
concern that reform be based on certain values. First, reform should 
be sought with a ’’scientific” spirit. By "scientific,” Sakharov means 
"a method based on deep analysis of facts, theories, and views,
presupposing unprejudiced, unfearing open discussion and conclu­
sions.’^  This rigorous approach excludes the ideological monism of 
Soviet society. Second, reform should aim at nthe systematic defense 
of human rights. Sakharov judges all action by whether or not it 
advances the cause of human rights. Such rights forbid torture, geno­
cide, censorship, and travel restrictions. Third and more generally, 
reform must aim at democratizing Soviet society. Interestingly (perhaps 
naively), Sakharov believes that democratization can be implemented 
"with the direction of the CPSU" and that such a process is fully com­
patible with the Party’s ’’leading role" in economic, political and
j  ^rj
cultural life. But democratization must be well-planned and gradual. 
Sakharov labors under no timetable even though, as we shall see later, 
he does have general target dates.
In 1968, Sakharov displays his own brand of dogmatism. Arg­
uing for peaceful coexistence in general, Sakharov rejects any
"ideological collaboration" with "ideologies cf Fascist, racist, mili-
I4.8
taristic, and Maoist demagogy." Mow we know with what groups
Sakharov will work. China and her 800 million are removed from the 
picture. Since he laments the plight of the black American, Sakharov 
must thus exclude "racist" America from his plans. And as for mili­
taristic countries, Sakharov has just excluded his own regime! Surely 
this is unintended, but Sakharov’s refusal to even talk with those 
systems he deems to be beyond the pale renders his proposals banal.
He patiently explains how Soviet society is oppressive and militaristic, 
yet he is willing to work within and compromise with his system. Some­
how, in an astonishingly inconsistent vein, he cannot bring himself to
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recognize other extremist governments. Yet strict adherence to this
principle -would prevent Sakharov from reforming his own society. Were
Sakharov not an internationalist* this inconsistency would not severly
damage his proposals. But since SakharovTs is a global vision* he
clearly cannot change the world the same way one manages a country
club— admitting only those whose views he finds palatable.
Sakharov also exhibits a classic liberal faith in education as
a means of improving society. Whether he convenes a meeting in his
Moscow apartment* writes to foreign heads of state* or circulates
samizdat at home* Sakharov aims his appeal not only at Russia but at 
ho
the world. He is more of an internationalist than Solzhenitsyn.
Their different perspectives are attributable to their divergent ver­
dicts regarding the West rs ability to induce Soviet reform. Confident 
that applying reason or "scientific principles" to problems will 
improve society* Sakharov shares the Enlightenment’s esteem for ration­
ality. In the Enlightenment* Sakharov sees the cure for Russia’s 
torpor. In the Enlightenment* Solzhenitsyn sees the secularization of 
society and the seeds of moral relativism. To one thinker* Enlight­
enment values are the answer; to the other* they constitute the problem.
The Intelligentsia 
When he speaks of the intelligentsia* Sakharov generally means 
the scientific and artistic elite of Soviet society. His view is much 
more all-encompassing than Solzhenitsyn's* which demands of the intel­
ligent more character than intellect. Because of the demands of 
modernization* the new technocracy constitutes "the most socially 
conscious and influential segment of society." Sakharov believes
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51that the intelligentsia reflect the true interests of the masses 
He seems to imply that the new experts are so vital to the regimefs 
modernization schemes that their demands for democratization will have
to be met. The artistic elite now seem to be left behind, since their
/
skills are not needed for industrialization. Sakharov believes that
52secretly, most of the intelligentsia desire democratic reform. But 
owing to low pay, an atmosphere of anti-intellectualism, and ideologi­
cal rigidity, the intelligentsia has been cowed into submission.
The state needs the scientific intelligentsia, but distrusts 
it. Dangling the carrot of special privileges, brandishing the threat 
of unemployment or worse, the Soviet rulers have intimidated the 
scientific elite. The result is a "narrow professionalism" wherein 
scientists are too timid to pursue innovative projects lest they be-
53come controversial. . More than anyone else, the intellectual must 
lead a dual life, gaining through private discussions the intellectual 
gratification denied him by his job.
Between Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, therefore, we see two 
vastly different ideas regarding the intelligentsia. To Sakharov, 
the intellectual symbolizes rationality. To Solzhenitsyn, he embodies 
moral rectitude. The difference is one of emphasis between the smart 
man and the good man, between logos and ethos. In Sakharov^ plan 
for reform, the intellectual proselytizes. In Solzhenitsyn1 s vision, 
the intellectual serves as an inspiring example only. During 1976 
interview with Michael Charlton of the British Broadcasting Company, 
Solzhenitsyn stated,
Once I used to hope that experience of life could be 
handed on from nation to nation, and from one person to
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another, but now I am beginning to have my doubts 
about this. Perhaps everyone is fated to live 
through every experience himself in order to un­
derstand.^
The argument strikes right at the heart of Sakharov’s assumption con­
cerning the transmittability of human experience. The Enlightenment 
faith in education requires one to reject Solzhenitsyn7s view.
Starting from two different epistemological premises, Sakharov and 
Solzhenitsyn predictably reach different conclusions regarding the 
intelligentsia, its role in reform, and the efficacy of mass move­
ments in general.
Intellectual freedom 
Like Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov values intellectual freedom as a 
means to an end, an instrumental good. Freedom of thought is the
55only antidote to mass myths, untruths, and demagogy. With his 
notion of a ’marketplace of ideas,” Sakharov resembles the liberal 
British philosopher John Stuart M U .  Given a chance to compete 
against Soviet ideology, democratic values would quickly spread, Sak­
harov implies. Free thought is thus a precondition for democratization.
Short of far-reaching reforms, however, freedom of thought is
56needed in order for society to grow and flourish. Sakharov has an 
organic view of society: that which does not grow, dies. With censor­
ship comes entropy. Free exchange of ideas is society’s lifeblood. 
Without such freedom, genuine society does not exist. Instead, people 
merely live close to one another in an atmosphere of intellectual 
sterility.
Government regulation causes the arts to stultify. Sakharov 
claims that ’’incompetent fmy italics] censorship destroys the living
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57soul of Soviet literature.” Innovative ideas which could improve 
society are thus nipped in the bud. Sakharov implies that some 
censorship— i.e., competent censorship— is legitimate, but he never 
explains this nuance in his reasoning. No doubt Glavlit, the state’s 
literary watchdog, considers itself a competent censor. But just 
what is a competent censor? And how can Sakharov ensure that the con­
cept of ’’competence” will not be perverted to stifle free thought?
And as long as there is some limit on free expression in Russia, will 
not people still be deterred from speaking their minds? Sakharov 
leaves these questions unanswered.
Intellectual freedom humanizes society, rooting out dogmatism- 
and mediocrity. Progress necessitates intellectual freedom. Such 
liberty will also presumably curb Soviet adventurism abroad. Domes­
tic democratic pressure will produce a more peaceful foreign policy. 
Thus does Sakharov, the consummate liberal, embrace a Wilsonian view 
of foreign policy: democratic states are peace-loving; autocracies
are usually militaristic. Finally, intellectual freedom is the sine
58qua non of a ’scientific democratic” approach to politics. Through 
appeals and patient explanation to the Politburo, Academican Sakharov 
will presumably persuade the leaders to recognize the folly of their 
oppressive ways, and a hundred flowers will bloom. Having reformed 
Soviet society, Sakharov and his coterie will proceed with the larger 
task of perfecting the world.
Ethics and Values 
Certain values must underly reform. One source of these
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values is the human conscience. In referring to "man’s moral yearning
for the good," Sakharov echoes Solzhenitsyn’s belief in conscience as
<9
the wellspring of values. Man has an instinctive sense of right and 
wrong, Sakharov implies, but this sense has become distorted in the 
surrealistic atmosphere which prevails in the Soviet Union.
Beyond this, Sakharov believes that man is b o m  with certain 
natural rights. These include freedom of thought, religion, and 
travel. Defense of these rights is the state’s raison d f etre, Sak­
harov argues Unlike a theorist such as John Locke, however, 
Sakharov does not agree that a state’s violation of these rights jus­
tifies revolution. Since revolution usually begets only greater 
injustice, he argu.es, reform is the saner option. Sakharov’s con­
victions regarding human rights do not rest soley upon the pangs of 
conscience, therefore, but on the notion of natural law as well.
These convictions also rest upon Sakharov’s faith in science. Re­
spect for human rights will facilitate the ”scientific-democratic” 
approach to politics. Free discussion, for instance, will encourage 
competition among ideas, the best of which will presumably emerge as 
polity.
Even if prospects for reform are bleak, the struggle against 
inhumanity must continue. By trying to mold society around the con­
cepts of natural rights and scientific principles, the dissident 
reaffirms his own humanity in the face of overwhelming odds •
If a man does not keep silent it does not mean that he 
hopes necessarily to achieve something. . . He may hope for 
nothing but nonetheless speak because he cannot, simply 
cannot remain silent. There is a need to create ideals 
even when you can’t see any route by which to achieve - 
them, because if there are no ideals then there can be no 
hope.°l
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Dissent is thus an existential imperative for the dissatisfied man.
Self-determination should he one value underlying reform, 
Sakharov believes. Just as each nation has a right to choose its 
own form of government, individuals have the right to choose the so­
ciety in •which they wish to live. Freedom of emigration is thus 
62essential. Travel restrictions and the prevalence of Jewish refuse- 
niks attest to the Soviet violation of this principle. Nor is such 
oppression experienced by individuals only. Ethnic groups, such as 
the displaced Crimean Tatars, should also be accorded self-determina­
tion and returned to their homeland. It is unclear whether by 
self-determination Sakharov means limited autonomy or full statehood. 
Tiny groups, such as the Mezhki Turks, receive special sympathy. But 
it is not apparent that Sakharov would support secession on the part 
of a larger Union Republic.
Additionally, Sakharov calls for a more acute awareness re-
6)1
garding the effect of science on human values. In an age of genetic 
research and nuclear weapons, Sakharov rs plea finds much resonance. 
Like the American physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, Sakharov!s personal 
experience. in weapons development lends urgency to his appeal. The 
Soviet scientist believes that education and pleas will make his col­
leagues more mindful of their responsibility for human welfare above 
all else. Solzhenitsyn dismisses Sakharovfs idea as unrealistic:
"In all the history of science, has scientific foresight ever saved 
us from anything? If it has, we normally know nothing of it."
l
Undaunted, Sakharov still hopes that other scientists will follow his 
lead in opposing the arms race and the suppression of dissent.
The New Enlightenment 
For his own country, Sakharov advocates many democratic reforms. So­
viet citizens should be able to elect their own officials, choosing
66between many different candidates from various parties. Though 
Sakharov concedes that a multiparty system is not always necessary, 
he never fails to advocate such an arrangement whenever he speaks of 
reform. Party officials should also fill elective positions. Larger 
amounts of private ownership should be allowed. With independent 
newspapers and a purge of neo-Stalinists, Soviet society will recover 
its original creativity and dynamism. All aspects of life will 
flourish and ’full information and competition” will rejuvenate the
£ r ?
intellectual atmosphere.
. On the global level, Sakharov’s plans are more ambitious. He
advocates that UN armed forces be granted the power to quell conflicts,
68
not just between nations but within nations as well. An inter­
national council of jurists and scientists should be formed to advise 
the UN on matters pertaining to human rights and pollution. In order 
to deflate military budgets and to aid poor states, a l£-year tax 
equal to one-fifth the national income should be levied on developed 
nations. Even though countries such as the United States may have to
reduce their standard of living, this will be done voluntarily, Sak-
69harov believes, ’’solely for the sake of lofty and distant goals.”
Though Sakharov labors under no timetable, he does have some 
target dates in his world plan. By 1980, socialist countries should 
reform along the lines of multiparty democracy, peaceful coexistence, 
and economic efficiency. From 1972 to 1985, capitalist states should
9U.
eliminate racism within their borders and should also endorse peace­
ful coexistence. The period from 1972 to 1990 should witness a joint 
Soviet-American effort at disarmament and world economic development. 
Detente will thus become entente. From 1980 to the year 2000, the 
systems will grow to resemble each other or "converge," '’national
contradictions” will subside, a world government will be created, and
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inexhaustible fuel sources (such as fusion; will be harnessed. Sak­
harov emphasizes that these dates are suggestions, not ironclad 
deadlines.
Critical Evaluation 
It would be tempting, though mistaken, to view Solzhenitsyn 
as the dissident utopian and Sakharov as the dissenting realist. For 
instance, Sakharov argues that democratization will be carried out 
under the supervision of the CPSU. Moreover, he claims that demo­
cratization is compatible with the "leading role of the Party” in 
politics, economics, and culture. But is it realistic to expect the 
Party, which has heretofore jealously guarded its authority, to volun­
tarily place itself in a weaker position? Will the Party relinquish 
its hold over all aspects of Soviet life? And since Sakharov believes 
that the Party still embodies some mass myths, how can that same Party 
play a "leading role” in society, given competition among ideas?
He is no realist. Sakharov calls for a tax on'developed 
countries. Without bothering to define the term "developed," he 
proceeds to assert that richer nations will submit to this levy for 
the sake of "lofty and distant goals.” But if such voluntarism ex­
isted, there would now be no problem of a gap between rich and poor
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states. For the sake of lofty goals, affluent nations can now offer 
foreign aid or contribute to the World Bank. Were Sakharov’s assump­
tions regarding voluntary effort valid, the problem he seeks to solve 
would not exist.
To stabilize conflicts, Sakharov urges more frequent UN in­
tervention. Such a policy might only increase international violence, 
however. Clearly, Sakharov favors TUT forces defending the Kurds in 
Iraq and the Ache in Paraguay. But would he also support UN inter­
vention to defend human rights in, say, Alabama or the Ukraine? He 
has already written that injustice is committed in both areas. But 
given the present voting arrangement in the UN Security Council, any 
proposal to intervene in either region would be vetoed. Sakharov 
never proposes to restructure UN voting arrangements j he offers no 
way to de-politicize the issue of UN intervention. He is no more 
realistic than Solzhenitsyn.
Were UN interventions more frequent, the world would be even 
more unstable in many cases. Herein lies one problem of all collec­
tive security arrangements. Through multinational action, local 
conflicts assume global implications• Rarely is the offending nation 
totally alone in the world arena. As the UN internationalizes a 
crises, the dispute turns frcm one between local combatants to one
among many nations • Internal disputes can thus escalate into world 
71wars. Yet Sakharov advances his proposal in the name of peace.
Sakharov’s greatest strength may also be his greatest weak­
ness: an undue faith in rationality and reason. His is an
over-intellectualized approach in assuming that education cures all
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ill. In the view of Walter G. Clemens of Boston University,
Sakharov writes and acts as though most men will, 
in the long run, respond to reasoned argumentation.
He writes as though egotistical drives for wealth and 
power— even for blood-letting— could be eliminated if 
enlightenment spread.'
Sakharov reasons from intellect to ethics. The educated man will 
usually be a good man, in his view. Yet the Albert Speer and the 
Trofim Lysenko show that this is not always the case. There is no 
necessary connection between intellect and rectitude. Modern society 
is probably the most educated of all time and undoubtedly the most 
scientifically advanced. Have these factors spawned the "best" so­
ciety or an enlightened world? If they had, then Sakharov would 
have no reason to dissent. Since he does seek change, the very ex­
istence of his appeal undermines his correlation between knowledge 
and virtue.
Sakharov’s edifice of world government also rests on many 
tenuous claims. Avoidance of nuclear war is the world’s first pri­
ority. Most people, he believes, would prefer anything (including 
the victory of their enemies) to nuclear war. But is the fear of 
nuclear war really the world's most absorbing preoccupation? And, if 
it is not, should it even be the world’s foremost concern?
Neither question can be honestly answered in the affirmative. Like 
many other world state proponents, Sakharov puts himself in the po­
sition of arguing that global existence itself is the highest good.
But nations, like the individuals in them, cherish ideals for which
73they are prepared to fight and, if necessary, die. Importantly, 
the choice is not between a holocaust and world government, but
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between the risk of nuclear war weighed against the perceived injus­
tice of a global sovereign. Most nations would rather joust with the 
threat (usually dimly perceived) of war than to relinguish their
sovereignty and freedom of action. And as long as a single nation-
/
state believes this and resists the new leviathan, Sakharov’s plans 
for genuine peace and world government will be shattered. Given one 
recalcitrant state, Sakharov would either have to resort to conquest 
(an act he condemns) or to a non-global state (a structure he views 
as antiquated).
Nations do not rank peace as an absolute value to be pursued
7)
at all costs. As long as one nation or group perceives the global 
state as illegitimate, imposing the new order on a reluctant world 
would edge manking closer to the nuclear Armageddon that Sakharov 
fears. In the abstract, nearly every country decries nuclear war. 
(Need we recall that 800 million Chinese follow an ideology which 
belittles the horror of nuclear war?) In practice, virtually no one 
thinks the risk is so great as to justify relinguishing sovereignty. 
World government can only follow, it cannot magically create, a 
genuine worldwide community of values. Abhorrence of the mushroom 
cloud is, by itself, an insufficient basis for such consensus. Witb- 
out this consensus, world government will be established by conquest 
only. Sakharov might reply that the convergence process itself 
creates a suitable worldwide community of values. We will consider 
this answer in a moment. ♦
Perhaps this makes too much of Sakharov's ideas regarding 
world government. On the surface, he seems to endorse a plurality of 
values— peace, freedom, private ownership. But without comprehending 
that these values often conflict with one another, Sakharov ends up
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exalting one value— avoidance of nuclear war— above all others. Far 
frcm being all sweetness and light, Sakharov’s analysis has a dark and 
troubling side. Despite his liberal intentions, his call and justi­
fication for world order would produce the most illiberal policies.
The whole notion of convergence is also suspect. Adam Ulam 
has pointed out, for instance, that convergence is found only between 
the societies, and not the governments, of East and West. An in­
dustrial manager in Pittsburgh perhaps faces the same problems and 
offers the same solutions as his counterpart in Smolensk. Nothing in­
dicates that this induces a convergence between the values, procedures, 
or aims of the respective regimes, however. Societal convergence 
should therefore not be mistaken for political identity.
Convergence theorists also overlook the difference in the means 
of industrialization between East and West. In America,-industriali­
zation has been a gradual and decentralized process based on private 
ownership. In Russia, modernization has been accomplished at a forced 
pace directed from the highest Party and state echelons. The converg­
ence theorist (of which Sakharov is a prime example) often fails to 
recognize differing values underlying surface similarities.
Despite increased governmental regulations and burgeoning 
welfare programs, American modernization is still based on private 
ownership. Despite experiments in decentralization and private enter­
prise, Soviet industrialization remains a state-owned endeavor. 
Convergence, such as it is, leaves basic values and organizational
nO
methods unchanged. Nor is it likely that the new technocrats will agi­
tate for reform. Their advancement will still be based as much on Party
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loyalty as on technical competence. The experts are not so indispens­
able that all of their demands for reform will be heeded. Given the 
abundance of the new technical elites, other, more pliable replacements 
can be found for the random renegade. Yes, perhaps the consumer will 
suffer, but since when has consumer preference been the Politburo’s 
prime motivating force? The new breed of specialists may indeed enter 
the political arena, but their access to the door will be controlled 
by the Party and will be on the Party’s terms.
Underlying Sakharov's convergence theory is the assumption 
that ideology is the major source of East-West tension. But even if 
the respective systems renounced their ideologies, clashes of national 
interests even, mutual suspicions, might’still produce tension between 
East and West. Systemic convergence, trade links, and ties of line­
age did not prevent a major European war in 19lU, for instance. Not 
only is convergence a mistaken path toward Soviet democracy, but 
neither is it a guarantee against conflict.
Conclusion
Perhaps in the long run Sakharov will be remembered more for 
what he did than for what he wrote. But as action is rooted in 
thought, one cannot fully understand his dissent without his doctrine. 
Westerners usually show a greater affinity to Sakharov than to Solzhe­
nitsyn. More than the brooding novelist, Sakharov tells the West what 
it wants to hear. With his liberal-democratic perspective, Sakharov 
speaks in a familiar language to the West but in almost unintelligible 
tones to his countiymen.
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It has been said that the first Soviet generation was guided
by ideology, the second by terror, and the third by cynicism. In a
wary age, Sakharov tries to rejuvenate the spirit of the early 1920’s.
He writes and works to remind others that reform is possible. Unlike
Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov leads an organized movement. Having surveyed
Soviet society from a privileged pinnacle, he now tastes the isolation
of the pariah. Friends support him, Presidents write to him, but he
alone directs the struggle. He may be a Russian philosophe. He may
be a dreaming idealist. But his leadership is unquestioned.
He was, as they say, a crystal of morality. . . He 
was devoted to the idea that science should bring peace 
and prosperity to the world, that it should help Pre­
serve and improve the conditions for human life.79
Such accolades Sakharov received, not from a fellow dissident, nor
from a Western supporter, but from one of his critics, Nikita S.
Khrushchev.
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CHAPTER 17
ALMARIK: THE DISSIDENT 
AS SEER
If there was any question that the dissident movement was
heterogeneous* such doubts should be dispelled by the presence of
Andrei Amalrik. An historian by trade* Amalrik has almost as little
in common with other dissidents as he does with the Soviet leaders.
In early 1960’s* Amalrik was expelled from Moscow State Uni-
*
versity for holding un-Marxist views. In 19&3 came his first brush 
with the authorities. Amalrik*s early work* The Norsemen and 
Kievan Russia, contained the decidedly unpopular thesis that the 
eleventh-century Slavic state was founded by Scandanavians. Unable 
to publish this volume* Amalrik entered the Danish embassy in order 
to send his manuscript to an interested professor in Copenhagen. 
Though not strictly illegal* this act aroused official ire and 
marked Amalrik as a possible troublemaker for the regime.
It was not a mistaken verdict. Because of a congenital 
heart infirmity* Amalrik held no steady job. Instead* Amalrik cared 
for his ailing father and* more ominously* socialized with avant- 
garde artists and foreign journalists. On the pretext of 
"parasitism*"— i.e.* living off of the state by not having steady 
work— Amalrik was tried and sentenced to three years of Siberian 
exile in 196$. Even after his conviction was overturned one year
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later* Amalrik refused to be cowed by the authorities.
Four years later* Amalrik was tried for "anti-Soviet be­
havior." His plays and* especially* his 1969 treatise foretelling 
Soviet doom contained too many heresies. To no one’s surprise* 
Amalrik was found guilty and was sped away to prison. Released 
again in 197U* Amalrik continued to associate with foreigners and 
refused to still his pen. By the Summer of 1976* the regime could 
brook no more insolence and it exiled Amalrik along with his Tarter 
wife Guys el. They now live in Utrecht* the Netherlands* and verbally 
support the dissident cause.
Amalrik stands in bold relief to the two thinkers we have 
previously considered. Unlike Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov* Amalrik 
constructs no philosophical system* embraces no ideology* offers 
not a single soothing word regarding Russia’s future. Amalrik is 
the loner* the seer* the soothsayer. Let us begin this discussion^ 
therefore* by exploring those beliefs that make Amalrik a dissident.
The Soviet System
■What we have seen thus far on the part of the dissidents is 
a rather systematic demolition of the Soviet political mythology.
Both Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov offered point after point to show how 
the Soviet system was morally bankrupt. Their reasons were thought- 
out* rational, and methodical. Having once believed in the system* 
these dissidents could trace their growing disillusionment with the 
regime.
Such is not the case with Andrei Amalrik* however. Rather* 
his dissent comes from the heart* not from the head. His dissent is 
more visceral than cerebral. Amalrik feels an "organic revulsion"
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toward the system.'- He cannot stand to hear its litany of lies. 
Pointing to his head, Amalrik states that his-protest lies not here 
but, jabbing a finger at his stomach, there. MI am so opposed to
2
the system that in reaction I -want to do something with my hands."
And he has * In his two books, Will the Soviet Union Survive 
Until 19 8 U? (hereafter referred to as 198U) and Involuntary Journsy 
to Siberia (hereafter referred to as Involuntary Joumey), Amalrik 
paints a picture of despair and doom. Exactly what is it about 
Soviet society that evokes Amalrik!s nausea? To start with, the 
system is based on lies. Pravda lies. Izvestia lies. The radio
lies. The Party lies. Amalrik, through contact with ether free-
spirited dissidents and occasional foreigners, thinks he knows what 
is true and what is not. Soviet propaganda, with its boasts of 
having-the best system, is most emphatically untrue, Amalrik argues.
Secondly, the system treats man as an instrument, not as an 
end in himself. Work in Msocially productive1 areas is the regime's 
sole criterion of human worth, Amalrik laments. Self-interest is 
denounced as the collective is exalted. Soviet citizens are made to 
feel that Individualism is unnatural. Callousness toward man's 
full range of needs renders the Soviet system immoral in Amalrik's 
view. As Sakharov denounced the "barrack-square" mentality of
Soviet society, so does Amalrik rail against the lemming-like
obedience of the masses.
Nihilism is a third flaw that the system exhibits, Amalrik 
argues. The Soviet people have lost all sense of values. Traditional 
morals such as honesty, love, and charity have now been replaced by the
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notion of "class morality." Most Russians care only for themselves, 
Amalrik thinks. The Soviet rulers sustain themselves only because 
they have power, not because they attract the hearts and minds of 
the citizenry. Power is its own sustaining force, the Soviet state’s 
raison d ’etre. And the masses accept this, because they have the 
attitude that "it’s useless to beat one’s head against a wall."
Fourth, and most importantly, Amalrik objects to the Soviet 
system because it holds out absolutely no hope of improving itself. 
What people now see as a gradual liberalization, Amalrik argues, is 
really nothing more than the regime’s growing decrepitude. While 
liberalization is a planned process moving toward clearly defined 
aims, the gradual "thaw" since Stalin’s death has neither been 
thought-out nor officially endorsed.
Amalrik *s rejection of the Soviet system rests on these four 
pillars. Let us discuss in more detail what Amalrik sees as the 
sources of these objectionable qualities. Like Solzhenitsyn, Amalrik 
distinguishes between Russian and Soviet national attributes.
Unlike Solzhenitsyn, Amalrik sees the Russian characteristics as 
contemptible, maybe just as loathsome as Soviet qualities. For in­
stance, Amalrik argues, Russians generally see violence and coercion
3
as the only vehicle for change. Rather than persuading, cajoling, 
or quietly reforming, Russians would prefer to change a mind by 
breaking an arm. The whole notion of peaceful change is thus alien 
to the Russian mind, Amalrik argues.
The Russian national character thus provided fertile soil 
for Soviet tyranny. Russia is "a country without belief, without
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traditions, -without culture and without the ability to do an honest 
job."^ " Nihilism is a persistent strain in Russian thought, Amalrik 
argues. ,TSelf-preservation, damn the moral consequences11— these 
have always been the Russians's watchwords, he feels.
It is also significant, Amalrik notes, that what few beliefs 
Russians have held have cone from Byzantine, not Western, Christ­
ianity. The Eastern Orthodox creed quickly took hold in Russia since 
it was more "rigid and moribund" than its Western counterpart. 
Byzantine thought possessed an enormous appetite for orthodoxy.
This habit of intolerance has ingrained upon the Russian mind all
the now familiar qualities of paranoia and intolerance, Analrik 
$argues.
Russians are also blindly patriotic, willing to* obey 
practically anyone who preys upon their nationalistic sentiments. 
Russians generally approved of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia 
but were incensed when the Chinese started lobbing shells across 
the Ussuri River one year later. How prescient Lenin was when, 
in a rarely noticed quote, he observed, "Scratch a Russian 
Communist and you will find a Russian chauvinist"! And Stalin knew 
what he was doing when, in those first desperate campaigns in World 
War II, he exhorted his people to defend not socialism, nor Stalin, 
but the Motherland.
On the national level, Russia exhibits self-destructive 
impulses, Amalrik argues. The Russian state has always destroyed 
its creators, whether the founders have been Seandanavians, By­
zantines, Tatars, Germans, or Jews. It will destroy the communists
112.
too, this historian argues. Since power is the only force sus­
taining the regime, successive Russian states have lasted only as 
long as a stronger claimant did not appear on the horizon. Amalrik 
sees Machtpolitik as Russia's second nature. Russia, Amalrik argues,
. . . has betrayed all its allies as soon as it 
found the slightest advantage in doing so. It has 
never taken seriously any of its agreements . -And it 
has never had anything in common with anyone.
Amalrik's verdict’on Russia and the Russians is, to put it mildly, 
harsh. When Solzhenitsyn speaks of traditional Russian values, he 
thinks of love, piety, and self-sacrifice.. When Amalrik writes of 
traditional Russian values, he thirds of violence, egotism, narrow­
ness, and duplicity. Solzhenitsyn sees Russian values as a foil to 
Soviet tyranny. Amalrik sees Russian values as the foundation for 
later communist oppression.
In turn, the present regime reinforces these same despicable 
qualities in the Soviet citizenry. Soviet society exhibits a process 
of "unnatural selection" in which only the mediocre survive. The 
result is that citizens are cast in the same molds of suspicion and 
bigotry. Just before the 2£th Party Congress in February 1976,
Amalrik was detained for questioning by the secret police. Bnerging 
from prison, Amalrik became depressed by the sight of the first two 
people he saw.
How depressing it is, after all, I reflected, the 
way the system molds people. Here are two of the first 
Soviet people I've come across and they have the faces 
of genuine stool pigeons.°
Almrik draws his own unflattering caricature of the New 
Soviet Man.
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In any society government employees abound. The conservative,,
bored and dull-witted bureaucrat is a timeless image -which finds
resonance in all cultures. Unlike other societies, however, Russia
forces all of her people to be government employees. Soviet citizens
9
exhibit on a much larger scale these same petty qualities. Soviet 
communism is really state capitalism, Amalrik Implies. (Here he con­
curs with Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov.) The state, not the worker, 
controls the means of production. Since people work for the state and
not for themselves, their work simply becomes a "job." The Soviet
worker finds no fulfillment in his labor. , Alienation is not solely a
problem of capitalist systems, therefore.
Despising his job, bored with the meaninglessness of routine,
the Soviet worker feels Impotent • No wonder vodka consumption is so
high and hooliganism so raiqpant. "Since all of us work for the state,
” 10
we all have the psychology of government workers." The Soviet citi­
zenry is thus simply the typical bureaucracy writ large, with its 
attendant conservatism and mediocrity.
Amalrik and Sakharov both agree that the Soviet citizen is a 
product of Soviet totalitarianism. Amalrik differs with Sakharov, how­
ever, by contending that the Soviet citizen is a cause of Soviet tyranny 
as well. Amalrik describes Homo Sovieticus in much bleaker terms than 
Sakharov. But like Sakharov, Amalrik laments the uniformity and medio­
crity of Soviet society. Careers advance on the basis of Party loyalty, 
not on skill. The toady has replaced the expert. Independent-minded 
persons are weeded out of the advancement process, lest they become in­
tractable • Party promotion criteria validate the Peter Principle in
11)4-
Soviet society: persons rise to their level of incompetence. Unlike the
inept in other societies though, the Soviet bumbler will remain in his
position; it was not skill which put him there in the first place. In
Almarik’s play, Is Uncle Jack a Conformist?, a rebellious youth insight-
11
fully notes that "people with real talent get persecuted these days."
In his plays, Amalrik portrays the apathy of the Soviet citi­
zenry. Resigned to his fate, the Soviet citizen feels impotent with 
regard to his fate, and grows self-centered. In My Aunt is Living in 
Volokolamsk, Amalrik portrays at least two characters— the neurasthenic 
student and the poet— as sexually impotent. Major Kovalev’s missing 
proboscis in Nose! Nose? No-se! has obvious phallic overtones and sug­
gests castration. The imagery of sexual dysfunction may symbolize an 
overriding sense of mass powerlesness regarding political change. In­
deed, the prominent mood of all of Almarikfs plays is one of impotence
12and disorientation. Like the Soviet citizen, each character seeks 
gratification. Like the Soviet citizen, all characters feel powerless 
to change their fate, and people are concerned only about themselves.
In Amalrik1 s drama, people talk at one another, speak past one another, 
but rarely communicate with each other. Perhaps the most frequently 
used word in Almarik's plays is "I." "When few believe in the regime’s 
conception of the common good, egotism is the ready alternative. And 
given the surreal atmosphere of Soviet society, where lies are submitted 
as truth and where in one day a dismissed Politburo member can become a 
non-person, it is appropriate that Amalrik chooses the theater of the 
absurd to convey his message.
Amalrik is probably closer to Sakharov than to Solzhenitsyn in
11?..
his view of the role of ideology in Soviet society. Like many other
institutions, the official ideology is decaying. Even the highest
Party members pay only lip service to it. Amalrik believes that
ideology, to the Party apparatchik, “is some sort of vague backdrop,”
13nothing more. Instead, Soviet leaders have a demonological view 
of the world: rival bureaucrats and unfriendly countries are led by
evil motives. A most un-Marxist view this is, ascribing to forces of 
personality actions which ‘’objective” factors such as class should 
actually determine.
"While the Party heirarchy might simply mouth the official 
ideology, the vast majority of the masses, Amalrik argues, has little
but contempt for it. The population has become ”de-ideologized” as
1 ]_(.
the state’s propaganda barrage yields diminishing returns. In the 
play East-West: A Dialogue in Suzdal, one notices the following ex­
change :
Announcer: . . . Inspired by this appeal, the collective 
farmers of the district pledged themselves to 
harvest the wheat in time and without any 
 ^ loss . . .  ^  ^
Student ^turning the radio knobj : What a bore . . . ^
It is safe to say that Amalrik believes that this is the way most
Soviet citizens react to the official propaganda. Unlike Solzhenitsyn,
then, Amalrik does not view ideology per se, and not even Marxist
ideology, as the root of Soviet evil. Though the ideology does not
help matters any, the basic cause of Soviet tyranny is what Amalrik
sees as the Russian national psychology.
Of course, one reason why the masses have become so densensi-
tized to the Soviet ukase is that they can readily see its falseness.
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Amalrik joins Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov in cataloging the discrepancy
between myth and reality. Yes, the Soviet economy appears to be
strong, but its priorities are grossly lopsided. "Soviet rockets have
reached Venus, while in the village where I live potatoes are still 
16dug by hand.'1 True, the regime calls itself a "worker's state,”
17
but most workers are dissatisfied with their lot. For all the rap­
turous praise of "the collective,” this form of social organization
18is inimical to quality workmanship. While the media speaks of
’’proletarian solidarity,” the Soviet leaders are the butt of derisive
peasant jokes. During one of his exiles in Siberia, Amalrik noted
the following ditty song by kolkozniks and prisoners:
Once there were three bandits,
Hitler, Stalin, and Nikita.
Hitler hanged us, Stalin beat us,
Nikita made us starve. '
Amalrik also reports that prisoners often favorably compared Czarism 
to Soviet rule. Under the Czars, for instance, only political pris­
oners were shipped to Siberia. Under communism, simple drunkards are
20
sent under the guise of combatting "parasitism” or "hooliganism.” 
Certainly every country has its myths. But in few other 
countries does disbelief toward the mythology constitute a crime. In 
few other countries is all information sifted so that it will conform 
to the official creed. In no other system does one see such a de­
ification of blind obedience.
The only thing that sustains the regime is force— pure, blind, 
overwhelming, brute force. Ideals no longer inspire the regime.
Neither do they motivate the citizenry. The Soviet system is power in­
carnate, power stripped of any value besides self-preservation. One
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dominant image contained in Amalrik1s plays is that of aimless power.
In The Fourteen Lovers of IJgly Mary-Ann, a Storyteller relates the
following dream: "A car travels along the road crushing everything in
21its path— that’s power for you.” In My Aunt is living in Voloko-
/
lamsk, the student who becomes the scapegoat for anti-Semitic anger 
feels
. . .  as though some dull, impersonal force were 
pressing down on men. It’s like a blind elephant 
passing through the jungle, the crash of falling trees 
drowning out men’s voices. 2
In Involuntary Journey, Amalrik compares the operation of the security
23
organs to a huge mill which crushes its victims.
Such is the type of power the Soviet regime now wields,
Amalrik implies. The regime’s power is aimless, crushing all those in 
its path. Like the blind elephant, Soviet power cannot see the wreck­
age strewn behind. Like a car which has run amok, Soviet oppression 
cannot brake itself. It will stop only when it collides with a 
stronger force. The coercive juggernaut destroys much, and this is 
apparent to anyone who can penetrate the regime’s Panglossian boasts.
At times, though, Amalrik implies that Soviet power is not so 
monolithic as his dramatic imagery might lead one to believe. Rather, 
the Soviet heirarchy.contains many factions and interest groups. In the
Involuntary Journey, Amalrik observes that the ordinary police and the
2ksecret police often work at cross-purposes. Ordinary policemen 
were more leniait, more imbued with common sense. If Amalrik’s ob­
servation is valid, he confirms the view of many Western specialists 
in Soviet affairs who, like Gordon Skilling, use a ’’group theory” 
model to explain Soviet behavior. Bureaucratic infighting may be more
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prevalent than publicized, Amalrik implies. At one point he at­
tributes the growth of the dissident movement to this disunity within 
ruling circles.
In any event, Amalrik does not believe that this rivalry is 
capable of adjusting policies to public demands. Interest group 
competition is no self-regulating mechanism. The system is doomed, 
Amalrik believes. He loathes the regime, can find few redeeming 
qualities in it, and (unlike Solzhenitsyn) feels no sentimental ties 
to the homeland. Intolerant of free thought, slavish toward ortho­
doxy, the system stood no chance of persuading this man. When the 
Soviet leaders exiled Amalrik in 1976, they rid the system of an 
alien quality— uncompromising individualism.
Marxism and Socialism
As Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov once accepted the Marxist creed,
they now reject it from the standpoint of the betrayed. Out of their
disillusionment with the Soviet system came their rejection of the
systemfs theoretical underpinning. To these dissenters, Marxism was
"the God that failed." Such is not the case with Amalrik. Unlike the
physicist and the novelist, Amalrik was never a Marxist. If Sakharov
and Solzhenitsyn condemn Marxism from the position of the betrayed,
Amalrik indicts it from the viewpoint of the never-convinced.
While Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn were familiar with many
Marxist texts, Amalrik can make no similar claim. Fellow prisoners
often tried to entice him into debates about Marxism, but Amalrik
resisted with the reply, "I didnft believe in Marxism and knew little 
2E>about it." Amalrik shows little interest in Marxism and seems
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undecided as to which Marx he should study. Should he study the re­
gime’s Marx? The revisionists ’ s Marx? The Eurocommunists’s Marx?
The Western scholars’s Marx? The young Marx? Perhaps the later Marx? 
Marxist doctrine has been twisted to justify so many disparate
courses of action that it has lost all usefulness as a "viable
26ideology," Amalrik argues. When a philosophy becomes so elastic, re­
ferring to it to justify or explain policies is pointless. Amalrik 
may not offer an indictment of Marx here, but rather a broadside 
against those who have perverted Marxism. Having never studied the 
philosophy, Amalrik can offer no systematic or penetrating attack on 
Marxist thought. He seems unable to divorce the ideology from the 
regime which claims to rule in its name. In this regard, Amalrik ’■ 
might agree with Solzhenitsyn in closely identifying the regime’s 
atrocities with Marxism.
Like the Sakharov of 197?, Amalrik is skeptical toward the 
possibility of "socialism with a human face." Socialism with bared 
and bended knees may be likely, he claims, but not socialism with a 
human face.^ Why Amalrik takes this view is unclear. He concedes 
that the short-lived "Prague Spring" offered an example cf humane so­
cialism. Thanks to the Brezhnev Doctrine, however, Czechoslovakia soon 
reverted to socialism with bended knees. Had Soviet troops not inter­
vened, Amalrik argues, the Czech regime would have abandoned its
socialistic structure and would have embraced a "liberal-democratic"
20
ideology. Amalrik implies that, at rock bottom, existing forms of 
socialism rely predominantly on force. Without the Soviet shadow, the 
bloc countries would presumably cast off communism in favor of a more 
democratic system.
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Amalrik occasionally seems to accord Marxism a higher status
than Stalinism and, unlike Solzhenitsyn, does not view Marxism and
Stalinism as parts of a seamless ideological cloth. Amalrik defines
Stalinism in the following manner:
Marxism pulled through the needle’s eye of Leninist 
theory of the seizure of power and Stalinist practice 
of holding on to it. ^
Though he distinguishes between Marxism and Stalinism, Amalrik seems 
to see few virtues in either. The comparison for him is not one be­
tween a humane ideology and its bastardization, but rather between a 
bad ideology and a worse one.
On the tdiole, Amalrik rejects socialism on the basis of very 
little thought. He does not painstakingly compare the socialist and 
capitalist systems in the manner of Sakharov. Amalrik’s only com­
parative assessment appears when he claims that ’’within certain
limits free private enterprise” is preferable to a strictly regimented
30socialist system. In order to grow, society must cherish some 
ideals. In this sense, Amalrik shares Sakharov’s organic view of so­
ciety. Once inspired by Marxist ideals, the Soviet system has 
discarded even these values and has become moribund. As Christianity
postponed but could not prevent Rome’s fall, so can Marxism forestall
31but not avert the decay of the Soviet order.
The Reformist Illusion
Amalrik wishes to dismiss once and for all the Russian notion
32
that change can be effected by force only. In their opposition to 
the Soviet government, dissidents should not adopt terriorist tactics.
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To do so -would merely reinforce the Russian predilection for violence.
The Soviet system and the Russian people are beyond hope of reform.
The best that dissidents can do,-Amalrik claims, is to save themselves.
Russians are a cursed people, Amalrik seems to be saying.
Never -will they harbor any laudable values. Never again -will they feel
a natural tie to their land. The self-regeneration of -which Solzhenit-
33syn speaks is a hollow dream, Amalrik believes. Sakharov’s belief in
progress and liberalization is equally groundless. History, Amalrik
argues, is neither a reasoned nor progress-oriented process. This is
3^4* 4most true of Russia's history. ‘What dissenters, Westerners, and 
quasi-dissidents now see as gradual democratization is really nothing 
more than the regime’s growing ineptitude. Moreover, no overall plan 
-underlies this so-called liberalization yet "liberalization presupposes 
come kind of purposeful plan*" Again we see AmalrikTs organic con­
ception of society: nations are born, they grow, mature, decay-and, 
eventually, die. The phrase "body politic" reflects Amalriks Speng- 
lerian view of history. As the Soviet system is beset with its own 
seeds of decay, the logical result of this process will be death, fol­
lowed by anarchy.^
Traditional peasant apathy is one obstacle to reform. Amalrik 
views the Russian peasantry as the repository of ignorance, conserv­
atism, and blind obedience. Ingrained by years of servitude under the
Mongol, Czarist and Soviet yokes, these qualities stifle any hope of
37reform or revolution "from below." Nor will the middle class go
■jQ
beyond its "passive discontent" to change society. Most Russians are 
resigned to their fate and are convinced that change is impossible.
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Russians criticize* are unwilling to generalize* and are unable to
imagine living under any other kind of system.
As Amalrik believes that ideological debate precedes political
struggle* so does he claim that the current dissident ferment presages
39eventual civil conflict. If the Soviet leaders try to crush the 
dissident movement* terrorist acts will become more frequent and less 
isolated. Violence is inevitable* destruction Russia* fate.
Violence will result* not in beneficial change* but in anarchy. In 
his pessimism toward the possibility of any beneficial change* Arnal-
ko
rik is an anomaly among dissidents. Neither Sakharov nor 
Solzhenitsyn are glowing optimists* yet they both believe that the 
system may be changed for the better. Perhaps it is because of this 
pessimism and resignation that Amalrik offers no formal model of the 
ideal society. He clearly believes that any such plan would be 
utopian in the literal sense of the term— i.e.* existing nowhere.
The Peasantry
Amalrik*s disenchantment with Russia’s peasantry is born of 
personal experience. In his vilification of the peasant* Amalrik de­
parts from the populist strain found in much Russian political thought. 
'Like Solzhenitsyn* Amalrik exposes himself to the charge of elitism.
What is it about the peasantry that Amalrik dislikes?
One of the first qualities Amalrik observed during his Siberian 
sojourn was the peasants*s conservatism. Since these people own very 
little, they are even more loath to risk what they have. The last thing 
a peasant wants to do* therefore* is to jeopardize his standing by as­
serting his rights and thereby antagonizing the leadership.^ The
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fewer the possessions* the deeper the conservatism. Solzhenitsyn 
argued that he who owns little is beyond the State’s grasp. Amalrik 
counters that he who owns little is even more manipulable. For 
Solzhenitsyn* asceticism allowed for various degrees of self-denial. 
For Amalrik* asceticism seems to be an all or nothing commitment— only 
by owning nothing can one flout the state.
Tempering the peasant’s conservatism* however* is his plia­
bility. He will obey any order. Were the Soviet leaders to declare 
tomorrow that agriculture was to be organized around private land 
holdings* the peasants would quickly conform. If* on the next day* 
the Politburo announced the abolition of private plots* the peasantry
h2
would just as quickly toe the line. The peasantry is like so large
a lump of clay* easily shaped by official decree.
Clearly* Amalrik does not share the Russian intelligentsia’s
traditional love of the narod. Worse than their pliability is the
peasants’s hypocrisy* Amalrik argues. .After complaining about his
rigorous life* the peasant will show a fondness for the system and
will admit being unable to conceive of living under anything but an
) ^
authoritarian order. The peasant* like the world-weary intellec­
tual whom Amalrik also excoriates* always has to complain about 
something.
The peasantry possesses no shortage of despicable qualities 
in Involuntary Journey. Narrow-minded* filthy* lewd— these epithets 
describe the typical peasant* Amalrik believes. The historian is 
appalled by the peasant’s stupidity. In East-West: A Dialogue in 
Suzdal* Amalrik offers the following dose of provincial ’’logic*” an
12U.
example he would have us believe to be typical. A rural prison warden 
"reasons”:
If we had brothels* there’s be no adultery* all 
this lying would stop* and most important of all* 
family bonds would be strengthened. So you see* we 
provincials know a thing or two as w e l l . h h
Amalrik Ts sarcasm toward the peasantry probably stems from his ex-
posure to them while he was an exiled "parasite.” Disdain for the
peasantry underlies Amalrik’s pessimism regarding the prospects of
beneficial change.
What Amalrik conveys in his assessment. of the peasantry*
however* may be nothing more than a firsthand account of the age-old
conflict between the Intellectual and the uneducated* between the
urbanite and the rustic.^ The fact that Amalrik concedes the
peasantry a prominent role in any reform scheme is* in an ironic sense*
a-compliment to their group. In spite of himself* Amalrik often
reveals a typical Russian reverence for the peasant ideal * even if
he now criticizes its motley representatives. But Amalrik does not
save all of his scorn for the peasantry. The intelligentsia serves
as another group which arouses Amalrik’s bile.
The Intelligentsia 
Amalrik dislikes the word "intelligentsia." He believes 
the word is too vague* and prefers to talk in terms of the middle 
class. Still* it is clear as to what types of people Amalrik 
includes in this educated stratum: academics* artists* engineers* 
lawyers* doctors* and students. Amalrik*s definition of this 
class is broader than Solzhenitsyn’s and Sakharov’s. Even without
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a revolution in peasant attitudes, the middle class, were it not so 
moribund, could implement change.
The intelligentsia mirrors many of the same faults of the 
peasantry in Amalrik*s view. For instance, Soviet intellectuals 
are largely naive. They accept the reformist notion of a gradually 
improving life. They blithely talk of "thaws'* and "liberalization" 
and believe, contrary to all facts, that "things are getting better." 
What Amalrik calls the "ideology of reformism" constitutes one of 
the three major groups comprising the dissident movement.
Like the main character in Dostoevsky's Notes From Under­
ground, Amalrik distinguishes between the man of thought and the man 
of action. The cautious, contemplative, and scholarly milieu of 
the intelligent is inimical to decisive action, Amalrik believes. 
Dostoevsky's misfit refers to people "who think and therefore do
) 7
nothing." In Is Uncle Jack a Conformist?, the political activist
probably echoes Amalrik*s sentiments when he exclaims, "Intellec-
) R
tuals are impotent!" The poet in My Aunt is Living in Volokolamsk 
is the play's sole representative of the creative intelligentsia.
This lame intellect serves alternately as a mouthpiece for the 
regime and as an inarticulate fool. Neither image casts a flat­
tering reflection upon the Soviet intelligentsia. The latter class 
is paralyzed along with the peasantry, albeit for different reasons. 
Amalrik endorses the timeworn dichotomy between action and thought.
Too absorbed in "speculative thought," the Soviet intellectual 
lacks the pragmatism needed for effective reform, Amalrik argues. 
Neither is hypocrisy an exclusively peasant trait. In
126.
East-West; A Dialogue in Suzdal, a young student eager for a liaison 
with his aging mistress complains of a filthy man who happens to 
share their room. The matron, who welcomes the presence of a 
potential customer, chides the intellectual; "You're even more of a
JiQ
moralist than a reformed prostitute." Mendacity seeps from
society's every pore in Amalrik's chronicles. In My Aunt is Living
in Volokolamsk, the professor claims to be an intellectual, yet there
<0
are no books to be found either on his shelves or in his apartment.
A group so concerned with appearances over substance could never
serve as the vanguard of reform.
Even if the intelligentsia was more energetic and sincere,
it is too elitist in its attitudes (Amalrik may be his own best
example) to carry its message to the people. "The intelligentsia,"
he notes, "most of whom have barely 'come out from the people,'
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do not want to 'go to the people.'" The intellectual class comes
off very poorly in Amalrik*s plays. Intellectuals are objects of
derision. So estranged is he from the intelligentsia that he muses,
probably in a flight of hyperbole, that this class "as a whole is
an even more unpleasant phenomenon than the regime that formed 
52it."v Amalrik's intelligent is a contemptible creature— impotent, 
naive, arrogant, "full of sound and fuzy, signifying nothing."
The Dissident Task 
Amalrik does not equate the intelligentsia with the dis­
sident movement. This latter group, though more decisive and 
desirous of reform, is nevertheless beset with its own internal 
fissures. The dissident movement grew out of two developments which 
followed Stalin's death. First, the Soviet ruling circles split into
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factions favoring or opposing democratization. The jockeying for
position, which followed Stalin’s death allowed for the emergence 
of an opposition movement of sorts • This movement also had spokes- 
men within the highest Party and state echelons. Second, the 
growth of samizdat was an added impetus for the dissident movement, 
Amalrik believes. After Stalin, vigilance in cultural matters 
slackened and samizdat spread, fostering a sense of community among 
heretofore disparate and unknown persons.
Opposition to the Soviet regime has coalesced around three 
ideological axes. These are neo-Marxism/Leninism, Christianity, 
and Liberalism. Neo-Marxists, of which Roy Medvedev is an example, 
tiy to recover and implement the original Marxist ideals which 
Soviet practice has discarded. Christian ideologists, represented 
by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, wish to create a religious state, if 
not a state religion. Liberals such as Yuri Orlov and Andrei Sak­
harov embrace a reformist policy, seeking to transform Russia into 
a Western-oriented and democratic state. Amalrik concedes that 
the phrase ’’dissident movement” is misleading, given the diversity 
of thought which this term conceals. Yet Amalrik sees as the com­
mon denominator of all these dissident factions a respect for the 
rule of law and an esteem for the individual.
Nevertheless, even this is a slender reed upon which to 
rely for positive reform. For the dissident movement retains 
many of the flaws which hamstring the intelligentsia in gen­
eral— naievete, elitism, circumspection. The dissident campaign 
remains largely a middle class effort, Amalrik notes. And most 
middle class citizens are relatively satisfied with their lot.
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Moreover, the dissident movement asks people to act, to take a stand— -a 
request -which makes most ’’loyal citizens” uncomfortable. Overall, 
the movement is too tiny and disorganized to agitate for an effective 
reform of the system.
Still, Amalrik feels that for all of its -weaknesses, the dis­
sident movement is resilient, has -weathered many storms, and will 
weather many more. Ironically, the state needs a dissident movement 
-within the Soviet Union. To justify its existence, the KGB requires 
suspects. Like any interest group, ’’the KGB -wants to sho-w the party 
chiefs its importance and indispensability.” By succeeding in 
quashing all ’’subversive elements,” therefore, the KGB would doom 
itself. Just as the roles of victim and executioner are inseparable, 
so is there a dialectic relationship between the dissidents and the 
security organs.
Morals and Values 
Russia’s nihilism is one cause of her downfall. In his 
quest to recover values in a skeptical era, Amalrik resembles both 
Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. Unlike the latter dissident, Amalrik the 
moralist is also Amalrik the loner and he is willing to join no 
movement. Some commentators consider Amalrik’s 198U to be a re­
buttal to Machiavelli1 s Prince, as the dissident argues that politics
c>9
is not solely a matter of power, not only a question of the state. 
Amalrik^ satire and irony can easily overshadow the moral message 
of his fiction. But despite his self-deprecation, ’’Amalrik’s own 
.idealism cannot be doubted,” Daniel Weissbort notes
Older notions of right and wrong have now been supplanted
by the idea of "class morality"— the view that those actions which
benefit the proletariat are ethical. Since the regime arrogates
to itself the right to define "benefit/ 1 class morality proves to
be an elastic concept which will sanction any action deemed to be for
the good of the cause. Glass morality crushes the individual, for
the latter must subordinate himself to the interest of the collective
By arguing that class rights and "social justice" are paramount, as
they now do with regard to the Helsinki human rights provisions, the
Soviet rulers admit that they view man as an instrument.
Russian attitudes have reinforced'this notion of class
rights, itself a type of moral relativism. Amalrik believes that
62most Russians equate freedom with disorder. Western ideals such
& O
as self-determination and liberty are alien to the Russian mind. 
Justice is the only value that is firmly entrenched in Russian 
thought. This is the one value that the citizenry expects the state 
to revere. Yet even this reverence has a dark side. Amalrik con­
tends that the Russian view of justice is simply expressed by the 
determination that "no one will be better off than me." This is a 
negative type of justice, despising excellence and producing medio­
crity. Far from saving Russia from moral sterility, this view of 
justice "represents the most destructive aspect of Russian psychology 
Amalrik contends
t The few ideals that the masses cherish are antagonistic to 
democracy. The confidence in violent change has already been noted. 
Russians also denigrate individual initiative and have always viewed 
man as a means to an end, something to be used. Human life is
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dispensable, not inviolate. The authoritarian lifestyle, not just
Soviet oppression, is the source of Russia’s present malaise. Like
TocqueviHe, Amalrik argues that democratic institutions are less
66important than a democratic lifestyle among the citizenry. Reorg­
anizing the kolkhoz in yet another fashion is thus useless. 
Revolutionizing public attitudes, jettisoning the intellectual baggage 
left over from the past— only this will effect positive change, but 
Amalrik considers such reform unlikely.
Intellectual Freedom
If the individual cannot reform the system, he can at least 
save himself by refusing to submit to arbitrary authority. Amalrik, 
like Solzhenitsyn, distinguishes between inner and outer freedom and, 
also like Solzhenitsyn, believes the former liberty to be most im­
portant .
What, in effect, threatened the Russian writer if, 
before the first visit abroad, he had refused to col­
laborate with the KGB? The writer would not have gone 
abroad, but he would have remained an honest man. In 
refusing to collaborate he would have lost a part, 
perhaps a considerable part, of his external freedom, 
but he would have achieved greater inner freedom.
The Storyteller in The Fourteen Lovers of Ugly Mary-Ann exclaims,
One should never make the mistake of thinking one’s 
a free man in this country! One is subject to moral pres­
sure even at one’s desk, writing stories
External freedom includes the freedom to travel and to perform those
physical activities that one desires. Inner freedom is freedom of
thought, if not necessarily expression. In true individualist form,
Amalrik has lived his ideals by writing what he wants, with scant
69regard for the wishes, conventions, or rules of the governing elite.
Individualism
Refusing to obey the state, declining formal membership in
the democratic movement, Amalrik is the loner’s loner. He refused
to conform with minor regulations while in prison. Antagonizing
guards and fellow prisoners alike with his intractability, Amalrik
was an island unto himself. In Involuntary Journey he writes what
may well be a succinct description of his whole life: "I had never
believed in being ’like everybody else’ and I refused to give 
70in.” Central to Amalrik’s political thought is an intense indi­
vidualism, the belief in the need to assert one’s rights.
Even if the Soviet rulers deny that men are born with natural 
rights, the Soviet Constitution guarantees many liberties. It is
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the individualtask to hold the state to the letter of the law.
Natural rights, Amalrik believes, include the free expression of
ideas and freedom of movement. But these liberties have been
shelved in favor of "class rights” in communist states and "national
rights" in the Third World. By asserting one's rights, one reaffirms
one’s human dignity in the face of oppression.
Amalrik is no joiner. Few petitions bear his name. Few
political trials are graced with his presence. An abrasive man,
Amalrik has irritated the organized dissident movement almost as much
72as he has taunted the regime. In contrast to Sakharov and Solz­
henitsyn, Amalrik wages no campaign. Russia’s fate is foreordained, 
he believes. All that a man can do, therefore, is salvage his own 
integrity. Amalrik certainly believes, in Aristotelian fashion, 
that it is possible to be a good man in a bad state. But he does not 
join in the fashionable pastime of sneering at patriotism. Rather,
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Amalrik claims that by fostering critical discussion, he helps the re­
gime and is more of a patriot than those who blindly obey.
Rule of Law
Law, Amalrik believes, is the means by which the individual
keeps oppression at bay. It does little good to resist tyrants by
appealling to lofty values. Instead, one should quote the regimefs
73own laws back at one!s oppressors. Freedom of speeh, religion, 
and assembly— these liberties are enshrined in the Soviet Constitution. 
Make the state abide by them in practice, .Amalrik urges.
The regime should realize, Amalrik reasons, that its disdain
for strict observance of the law is not in its own interest. When
laws can be flouted, the leader must always be wary of plots against
his rule. Ever-vigilant force is all that sustains him. As long as
laws are nothing more but scraps of paper, the ruler is vulnerable 
to the next, claimant who possesses superior force. No one can feel
71
safe when a state violates its own laws.'4
What is needed, Amalrik believes, is not some "grand design" 
for Russia in the manner of Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, not new laws, 
nor stricter ones, but enforcement of existing statutes. Dissidents 
would do better to spend their time studying the present laws and 
devising ways law can be used to protect colleagues• Law is a sacred 
instrument to Amalrik. It expresses, or should express, man’s mores 
and a respect for man’s rights. To Amalrik, laws represent the ac­
cumulated wisdom of the ages, "the ethical standards that mankind
76has arrived at during its long history." Perhaps this legalistic 
pedantry will not defeat the state. But at least the dissident will
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not have given up without a fight. In the process, the state will be 
frustrated, perhaps tire of persecuting individuals, and the hypocrisy 
of its laws will be exposed to the world.
The Soviet Apocalypse 
The doomsday prophet's role is not an easy one, least of all 
when it is one's own country which is doomed. Yet what Amalrik offers 
is nothing less than a Soviet and Russian Goetterdaemerung, an 
apocalyptic and fatalistic vision of doom. Because of its internal 
contradictions, the Russian state has entered its last decades. After 
all, what Amalrik depicts is not only the demise of the Soviet order 
but the collapse of Russian society as well. Notwithstanding the title 
of his treatise, Amalrik questions whether Russia, not just the Soviet
Union, will last until 1981*. What are the seeds of Russia's decline
and fall?
Inevitably, Russia will perish in the flames of a Sino-Soviet
conflict. Any rapprochement between these countries is only tempo- 
77rary. Aside from their ideological squabbles, Russia and China have
conflicting national interests all along their 6,000 mile common
border. Russia has more sophisticated nuclear weaponry, but the
Chinese have superior manpower. The prison warden in East-West: A
Dialogue in Suzdal muses uneasily:
It would take a whole lifetime to mow down all the
Chinese with a tommy gun, there are so many of the
buggers. Those up top ought to give that a thought or 
two.?8
Any success over the Chinese would be a Pyrrhic victory only, so 
numerous are the orientals.
The Sino-Soviet rift aids the dissident movement, since fear
13U.
of the "Asian menace" pushes' Russia closer to the West. Criticism 
of Chinese communism also reflects poorly upon Soviet socialism.
In such a manner does this cause of Soviet decay feed upon itself 
and grow.79
Until the final confrontation* however* several other fac­
tors will undermine the regime. Simple biological forces dictate
80the eventual extinction of the current Soviet gerontocracy.
Nearly all of the Politburo members are in their 70’s. As they age* 
bureaucratic infighting will intensify. Nikolai Podgorny’s sudden 
demotion may be a case in point. Neither are there any heirs 
apparent who might succeed a Brezhnev or a Kosygin. When these men 
die* an unprecedented power struggle will occur and will weaken the 
already decaying order.
While the current leaders try to keep themselves in power 
they must also heed* or at least cannot ignore* cries for reform.
Yet with reform comes change and uncertainty. This is especially 
tine in the all-important area of economic policy. "In order to 
remain in power* the regime must change and evolve* but in order to
Q1
preserve itself* everything must remain unchanged." With this
tension between self-maintenance and reform cones one source of
Russia’s decline and fall.
Marxism no longer inspires the masses* so a new ideology
must be found. The likely alternative* Amalrik predicts* will be
82Russian nationalism. Only a new or different ideology will spur 
the masses on to greater labors. But this turn to Russian national­
ism will likewise alienate many non-Russian nationalities. Only
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about 53 percent of the Soviet population is ethnically Russian. Sig­
nificantly* the birthrate for non-Russian nationalities is much higher 
than it is for ethnic Russians. Rallying the populace around the 
Russian flag might only revive feelings of loca^ L nationalism in many 
other regions• Supplanting socialist ideology* Russian nationalism 
will sow the seeds of its own dissolution.
And as the system needs scientific successes for purposes of 
power and prestige* so do these same successes eat away at the foun­
dation of the regime’s authority. The more sophisticated the scientific 
advance* the starker will be the contrast between the exploiters and
Po
exploited in Soviet society. Scientific progress also needs free 
inquiry. Cultivating a scientific elite is necessary for economic 
development* but it also runs the risk of having free-thinking scien­
tists train their intellects on existing'political problems.
Scientific inquiry cannot exist in a vacuum. Rather* the critical 
spirit will seep into other facets of life and will challenge the 
Party’s claim of inf allability.
These five factors— Sino-Soviet conflict* gerontocratic rule* 
the conflict between stability and reform* between identity and 
particularism* between scientific advance and official preten­
sions— make it unclear as to whether either the Soviet rulers or 
the Russian people will survive until 198U* As the Sino-Soviet con­
flict begins to simmer* various nationalities will declare their 
independence* the Soviet satellites in East Europe will strike out 
on their own* and the resulting human costs will dwarf those incurred 
in the ’’Great Patriotic War.” What Amalrik offers is not so much a 
prediction as a prophecy* not so much a plan as a vision. More than
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Solzhenitsyn or Sakharov* Amalrik serves as a Russian Cassandra* of­
fering not analysis but a glimpse of Russia as a cursed country.
Critical Evaluation
Since he harbors no grand conception regarding Russia’s future 
or the ideal society* Amalrik presents a smaller target for criticism 
than Solzhenitsyn or Sakharov. Nevertheless* a few points must be 
discussed.
Since a prophecy does not derive its validity from thorough 
documentation* trying to disprove it by amassing facts is a bit like 
trying to hunt deer with a fishing pole. Still* Amalrik’s gloom re­
garding the Russian/Soviet system may be unwarranted. His proof of 
peasant ineptitude* for example* is largely anecdotal and smacks of 
hasty generalization. So appalled by peasant coarseness is this 
urban sophisticate that he abandons all hope of reform. But how many 
peasants did Amalrik really know? Can he be so sure that these were 
representative of the peasantry as a whole? In his quickness to con­
demn this entire class* does Amalrik not exhibit the same ugly strain 
of elitism which he condemns in the intelligentsia?
The Soviet system may be more resilient than Almarik thinks. 
Not all Politburo members are bearded ancients. A few possible 
successors to Brezhnev* such as Dmitri Ustinov and Andrei Kirilenko* 
are in their 60’s or late f?0’s. The system has weathered succession 
struggles before. Why should it be unable to do so now? Perhaps 
such a struggle might even pave the way for more cultural diversity 
and freedom* the way the post-Stalin crisis was followed by the first 
’’thaw. ”
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Granted that the regime needs a new idiom to inspire masses.
It does not follow from this* however* that the symbol must be Great 
Russian nationalism. The ruling circles are well aware of the touchy 
nationality problem* and for them it aggravate it by appealling to an 
alienating symbol is improbable. Soviet nationalism* not Russian 
chauvinism* may be the likely replacement for proletarian international­
ism. Or an emphasis on consumer values may provide another unifying 
idiom. In any case* the ucontradiction” of which Amalrik speaks may 
not be so profound. Thus does he underestimate the system’s resil­
iency.
Regarding the ’’contradiction” inherent in scientific progress* 
Amalrik may also miss the mark. All Amalrik proves is that scientists 
may try to infuse their habit of free inquiry into the political 
realm* not that they will indeed be successful in this endeavor. He 
proves only that restricting critical thought to science is difficult* 
not that it is impossible. Thus far* in a record which spans six de­
cades and impressive scientific achievements* the regime has 
successfully insulated politics from the influence of reform-minded* 
free-thinking scientists. As we noted in our discussion of Sakharov* 
the scientist’s entry into the political realm will be controlled by 
the Party and will be on the Party's terms. Anyway* scientists are 
among those whom Amalrik classified earlier as the impotent intel­
ligentsia. How then can Amalrik consistently argue that scientists* 
by force of will* may become the vanguard of reform?
Nor is it so obvious that a Sino-Soviet war is inevitable.
"Who can say what will emerge in the way of Sino-Soviet policy once
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the post-Mao leadership stabilizes. Importantly* Soviet broadsides 
have been calculated to attack Mao and not the Chinese people. Pro­
vocative rhetoric aside* it is doubtful that either country desires war 
or truly believes there could be anything resmbling a "winner” 
emerging from the rubble. Who is to say that a Sino-Soviet detente is 
impossible? World politics has seen stranger things. Former American 
Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew once stated that ”war with Soviet Rus­
sia is as certain as anything could be.” That was 30 years ago. If 
the intervening decades do not deserve the appellation "peace*” neither 
can they honestly be described as war. Mho could have forseen the 
recent Soviet-American detente 30 years ago? How can Amalrik cav­
alierly discount a Sino-Soviet rapprochement for now and forever more?
If war comes* the result may not be so apocalyptic as Amalrik 
suggests. If Russia could not win such a conflict* she could probably 
at least avoid losing it. Amalrik writes as though nations die. This 
simply does not happen* though* least of all to a nation of 2I4.O mil­
lion people* a countiy which straddles the world’s largest political 
land mass. Russia will survive* notwithstanding Amalrik’s dramatic 
notion of Armageddon.
There is one quality in the Russian national character which 
Amalrik conveniently ignores— resiliency. Amalrik himself cat­
alogs the succession of conquerors that the Russians have 
outlasted— Vikings* Mongols* Turks* Nazis. Perhaps the Russians 
will cast off the shackles of Soviet tyranny too. Perhaps only 
a conflict with China* with its attendant destruction* could prompt 
such an awakening. Great changes and surprises are not new to 
this land* and Amalrik’s confident vision of gloom may yet be tom
asunder. It was Peter the Great who characterized Russia as a 
"country in which things that just don't happen happen." Like Amal­
rik* Peter the Great embraced traditional Western values. Like 
Amalrik* Peter the Great railed against "typical Russian narrowness." 
And like Amalrik* Peter the Great underestimated the resilience of 
that vast land— Russia.
Conclusion
What we are left with- is more of a vision than an ideology* 
more a mood than a philosophy. What Andrew MacAndrew wrote of 
Dostoevsky can be applied to Amalrik as well:
It is impossible to make a philosophical system 
out of jhi0 world. It is full of contradictions* 
inconsistencies* absurdities. It is a universal
n of the human soul speaking in many clashing
He is a seer* a prophet* an exile. Living in the Netherlands* 
Amalrik still writes of that which he knows best— Russia. ' Forever 
the loner* he laments the plight of the Soviet dissident and the 
endangered ideals for which they stand. Amalrik contrasts vividly 
with most other dissidents. Pessimism* fatalism— these qualities, 
make him an anomaly within the democratic opposition. Yet through­
out Amalrik's thought runs the characteristic dissident esteem for 
morality and for the sanctity of the individual. Discord and 
unity— such is the tenor of Amalrik' s world view* such is the spirit 
of the dissident movement.
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CHAPTER V
THE DISSIDENT DIALOGUE
There are many reasons why dissident views regarding East-West 
relations deserve separate treatment. Firsts the dissidents have 
given this subject so much thought that including their opinions 
along with their critique of the Soviet system would have interrupted 
the primary focus of their dissent. Second, such a spirited debate 
surrounds the topic that it is worthy of special emphasis. This 
emphasis will reinforce our thesis that the dissident movement is 
heterogeneous. Third, the flow of argument is more accurately 
represented in a separate section. Dividing the dissident debate . 
into three different sections would interrupt the continuity of the 
discussion, would be needlessly repetitive, and would distort the 
contrapuntal quality of the dissident dialogue.
Let us therefore discuss the dissidentsTs views regarding 
East-West relations and consider the internal dissension found within 
the dissident movement.
Solzhenitsyn on East-West Relations
Though he is a newcomer to the West, Solzhenitsyn offers some 
timely insights. Looking to the West, the novelist dislikes what 
he sees. But he insists that he is not a critic of the West, only 
a critic of the Westfs shortcomings. Absorbed in the pursuit of
- 1U6 .
1U7.
material comfort and lacking the -will to defend any values , the 
Western world now crumbles before the Soviet challenge, he feels.
The West’s demise is rooted in the Enlightenment idea that "man is
p
the measure cf all things." As society become increasingly secular, 
men start to think that existence itself is the highest good.. Moral 
principles are dismissed and replaced by the notion that men have no 
ethical responsibility to any higher power. The slavish devotion to 
comfort and the attachment to worldly goods has sucked all moral 
fiber out of the West. For Solzhenitsyn, the "spirit of Munich"
survives as the West feebly capitulates to Soviet demands rather than
3
hazard its precious affluence.
Western liberals particularly attract Solzhenitsyn’s scorn.
He recalls that in 19l±7, most Western liberals indignantly denied the
existence of concentration camps in Russia.^- Solzhenitsyn reserves
special contempt for leftist dilettantes such as Jean-Paul Sartre,
who can claim with a straight face that "Marxism is the unsurpassable
philosophy of our era." In Bertrand Russell’s addage, "I’d rather be
Red than dead," Solzhenitsyn, detects a chilling lack of principle.
Russell, Solzhenitsyn suspects, would rather be anything— a slave,
an accomplice in crime— than dead.
Throughout his critique of the West, Solzhenitsyn sustains a
tone of apocalyptic gloom. This is in contrast to Amalrik, who
reserves such dark imagery for Russia and not the West. Consider these
words from Solzhenitsyn’s Warning to the West: ”1 wouldn’t be surprised
£
at the sudden and imminent fall of the West.” Similarly, in his 
Letter to the Soviet Leaders he claims that, as a moral challenge to
1U8.
the Soviet Union, "the Western world . . . has almost ceased to
£
exist.” Russia’s troubled period from March to November 1917> he
7
argues, is merely a condensed version of the West’s current plight. 
Unfortunately, one can no longer count on the West for moral leader­
ship. Russian dissidents must thus steer their own course and not
0
depend on Western assistance. 3h this respect, Solzhenitsyn crosses 
swords with Andrei Sakharov, who believes that the West must nudge 
the Soviet Union for any liberalization to occur.
Like Oswald Spengler's Decline of the West in the 1920’s, 
Solzhenitsyn’s warnings fall on a reluctant audience. Indeed, 
Solzhenitsyn’s approach, like Amalrik’s, is somewhat Spenglerian.
Both believe that history unfolds in circular patterns and that 
civilizations undergo birth and death. Yet one does not find the same 
determinism in Solzhenitsyn that one notes in Spengler and Amalrik. 
Certainly Solzhenitsyn does not believe that the West is doomed, or 
else he would not bother to sound the alarm. When he attempts to 
raise the level of Western consciousness, Solzhenitsyn dabbles in the 
Hegelian business of aufheben. ”In spite of his ignorance of the ways 
of the West, and some jarring notes in his message to it,” Solzhenitsyn
9
has succeeded in his task, Leopold Labedz notes.
Genuine detente, Solzhenitsyn believes, precludes ideological 
warfare. He is not an opponent of detente, but is a foe of a certain 
type of detente. As long as the West is vilified daily in Pravda and 
Izvestia, detente is meaningless.10 As long as the Soviet oligarchy 
verbally or materially supports so-called wars of national liberation 
in Africa, detente is meaningless. As a Roman Senator closed each
aJU9-
speech by saying that "Carthage must be destroyed," so does the Soviet
media, under the guise of detente, hurl a stream of invective at the
West. Solzhenitsyn favors detente, but a different type of detente 
11nonetheless. Under the present relaxation of tensions, the West is 
being duped. Oppression in many communist countries intensified, he 
claims, after the 1975> Helsinki agreement was signed* What appease­
ment was in 1938., Solzhenitsyn argues, detente is in 1977•
Unwittingly, the West aids Soviet tyranny by supplying the 
communists with valuable technology and food. As long as the United 
States trades with the Soviet Union, liberalization will be stalled 
and dissidents will still be persecuted. Solzhenitsyn1s argument is 
timely. Vladimir Bukovsky claims that when he was kept in a psy­
chiatric prison in Russia, he wore handcuffs upon which was inscribed, 
"made in the U.S.A." If the West stops aiding the tormentors of the
Russian people, the regime must liberalize and abandon senseless space
12
and military projects. Western resolve could make a difference, 
even if it could not "reform" Russia in the manner of Sakharov. In­
stead of worrying about nuclear war, the West should take less dramatic 
but more effective steps to meet the Soviet challenge. As it stands 
now, Solzhenitsyn argues, there will be no nuclear war, for the Soviets 
will demoralize and subdue the West long before any Armageddon is 
necessary.
Unlike Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn dismisses the whole notion
of East-West convergence. The ideological and philosophical differ-
13ences separating the two systems show no signs of being bridged.
In an age of emerging nationalism in the Third World and revived 
nationalism in developed countries, all this talk of convergence is
150.
absurd, Solzhenitsyn believes. Even if the systems could grow to re­
semble each other, this is not necessarily desirable. Nations, he
claims, are natural and beneficial entities. "Nations are the wealth
111.
of humanity," and their cultural diversity enriches the world. 
Internationalism— the belief that no major problem’ can be solved at 
the national level— is a chimera. Here again, Solzhenitsyn disagrees 
with Sakharov, who views the nation-state as an atavism. Esperanto 
will never replace national languages, Solzhenitsyn notes, and anyone 
who thinks that it'will is naive.
Nationalism wedded to the concept of sovereignty, however, 
has had some pernicious effects • Sovereignty— the idea that a state 
has the right to do anything it wants in its own internal affairs—  
has become the modern handmaiden of oppression. Because of this 
notion of the inviolability of internal affairs, the West is criti­
cized for verbally supporting Soviet dissidents (but the Soviet 
Union may make a cult heroine out of Angela Davis). Because of this 
notion, the Organization of African Unity watches Idi Amin terrorize 
his own people (but Rhodesia is^  condemned for its "intolerable 
racism"). Because of this attitude, Czechoslovakia may jail dissi­
dents with impunity (but when Francoist Spain shoots Basque 
terrorists, this is a crime against humanity and Europe recalls its
ambassadors). There exists no such thing as strictly "internal af-
15fairs," Solzhenitsyn claims. Freedom is indivisible. Once 
repression is tolerated just because it occurs within a countryTs 
own borders against its own citizens, freedom elsewhere is jeopardized. 
Why should oppression be sanctioned merely because it occurs within
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some arbitrarily drawn and historically shifting boundary? In a world
that is morally as well as economically interdependent, "internal
affairs" is a phrase which tries to mask brutality.
Thus does Solzhenitsyn detach the concept of nationalism from
the principle of absolute sovereignty. Similarly, he distinguishes
16
between patriotism and blind obedience to the state. One can love 
one’s country without being a chauvinist. He rejects the current 
version, of detente but does not sound the tocsin for a renewed Gold 
War. Many persons have aimed these groundless criticisms at Solzhe­
nitsyn, however. All he asks is that the West at least stop aiding 
Soviet tyranny. Sakharov believes the West can do more than this.
Sakharov on East-West Relations
International Relations
In the early stages of his political thought, Sakharov seems
17to favor a balance of power approach to world politics. That is to
say, he believed that a rough equivalency in power between the two
superpowers was conducive to global stability. For this reason, he
had no qualms about developing an H-bomb for Stalin, even though he
18recognized Stalin’s faults. Nuclear bipolarity would be more stable 
than a nuclear monopoly. Sakharov wanted the Soviet Union to match, 
but not necessarily overtake, the West in military might.
As his appeals for a reduction in weapons testing fell on deaf 
ears, Sakharov’s views changed. He began to criticize the "empiri­
cal-competitive’’ approach to modern diplomacy. Simply stated, this
approach dictates that each nation advance its own interest to the 
greatest extent and, likewise, cause its adversary the greatest
l£2.
1 9unpleasantness. Sakharov decries the idea that international 
diplomacy be seen as a "zero-sum game." Rather, he advocates a "dem­
ographic perspective," a view of international relations which has
20 _ .the common lot of mankind as its starting point. This perspective
demands that the world be viewed as a family rather than as so many
ideological camps. The demographic view must transcend nationalism
and embrace the principle of peaceful coexistence. In a nuclear age,
Sakharov argues, preaching the exclusivity of ideologies is "madness 
21and a crime." Problems of pollution, militarism, and economic
development are common to all parts of the globe. These ills will be
surmounted only by shaking off the particularistic pretensions of the
nation-state system.
MankindTs first priority, Sakharov believes, should be the
22avoidance of nuclear-war. After 19b£3 he became convinced that we 
no longer live in a socialist world or a capitalist world, but a 
nuclear world. In an atomic war, none of the combatants can "win" in 
a conventional sense of the word. Pyrrhic victory is the best possible 
outcome. The sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons prevents modern 
warfare from being a rational instrument of policy. Nuclear weapons 
render obsolete the Clausewitzian conception of war. War is now a form 
of universal suicide, not "a continuation of diplomacy by other means." 
At least two assumptions undergird Sakharov*s ideas regarding modern 
warfare. First, he discounts the idea of a limited nuclear war. Sak­
harov is one of many analysts who argue that once nuclear weapons of 
any size or number are deployed, the conflict will escalate. Second, 
Sakharov believes that any conflict between the superpowers will be a 
nuclear and not a conventional clash.
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The threat of nuclear holocaust is so horrible, Sakharov 
argues, that the prevention of this calamity takes precedence over all 
other problems. Most people, he believes, -would prefer anything to
nuclear war. Even the victory of an adversary is preferable to war.^
/
World government and universal disarmament are feasible because they
are so necessary, he reasons.
Regarding the Third World, Sakharov urges that arms-producing
states embargo weapon sales to developing countries. Weapons cause
wars, Sakharov believes. "Historical experience testifies to the fact
that when cannons are at hand, they will sooner or later begin to
shoot." This is a clear retreat from his 1953 view that nuclear
bipolarity helps stabilize international relations.
Aside from urging the Third World to demilitarize, Sakharov
advises the Third World to stop blaming all of its problems on other
countries. Labels of "colonialism" and "neo-colonialism" are now
used to forestall reform and self-help on the part of poor states.
Sakharov calls for the less developed nations to "restructure their
national psychologies" and to accept the responsibility for their own 
26plight. Only when such a change in thinking occurs will the gap 
between rich and poor countries be narrowed.
Convergence and Detente 
Like Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov favors detente, but prefers a 
different type of detente. In the past, he feels, detente has been 
little more than a modus vivendi between the US and the USSR. The 
relaxation of foreign tensions has been valued while any relaxation 
of domestic oppression has been avoided. But Sakharov insists that
i$k.
meaningful detente must, among other things, democratize Soviet so­
ciety. Otherwise, rapprochement will amount to little more than ,ran
27
unprincipled, antipopular plot between ruling groups.”
Detente reflects, at least in part, the Soviet need for 
sophisticated technology. Without Western computer systems, for in­
stance, the Soviets cannot launch their ’’Second Industrial Revolu­
tion." Detente is thus a signal to and an opportunity for the West 
to nudge Russia in the direction of democratic reform. What levers 
can the West use to promote this development? Sakharov endorses a
"partial boycott of scientific and cultural contacts" or embargoes on
28certain types of technology. Food embargoes, credit denial, and 
cancellation of arms negotiations are inadmissible levers, Sakharov 
arguesSince it is only the detente relationship which makes lever­
age feasible, Sakharov rejects any return to Cold War tensions. Yet 
detente must not become a process of capitulation to Soviet demands and 
must encourage democratization.
Aside from promoting human rights in the Soviet Union, detente
29should also aim at containing and avoiding local conflicts. The 
Middle East is one area, Sakharov believes, where the superpowers 
should show more restraint. Similarly, supporting so-called "wars 
of national liberation" is incompatible with detente and exemplifies 
the "empirical-competitive" approach that Sakharov condemns. Occasion­
ally, Sakharov expands detente’s aims to include the democratization of
30all socialist countries, not just his own. Sakharov shares Solz­
henitsyn's view that detente is indivisible, that the relaxation of 
tensions must not end at the Soviet border but must also induce some 
measure of toleration within Russia as well.
15?.
It is vital to think of detente in terms of the West and the
Soviet Union rather than just between the US and the USSR. If the
latter perspective is endorsed* detente will fail. Only Western
31
solidarity will enable detente to induce Soviet reform. Too often 
the Western countries have been divided with regard to Soviet policies. 
For this reason* American attempts at outright linkage between human 
rights and trade relations have failed. The Soviets have merely 
looked elsewhere for eager customers and too many concessions have thus 
been made. Western pressure on the Soviet Union is only as strong as 
its weakest link. Western unity is thus a prerequisite for effective 
detente.
In 1977 > Sakharov argues that disarmament "must have priority 
over all other problems."^2 This is a drastic shift from his 1975 
view that arms control was but one of many aims of detente. Sak­
harov grows increasingly alarmed at the growing nuclear stockpiles 
of both superpowers. For this reason he favors a continuation of the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Still* Sakharov rejects the notion 
of unilateral disarmament. Not only would such a move not be recip­
rocated by the Soviets* but it would also be very destabilizing.
Having a clear military advantage* the Soviet leaders would merely in­
crease pressure on the West in volatile areas such as the Indian 
Ocean. Thus* while Sakharov views the current arms race as 
potentially disastrous* he seems to concede that a "balance of terror" 
deters irresponsible action in many instances•
Since Sakharov endorses a quid pro quo between Western trade 
and Soviet liberalization* it is not surprising that he applauded the
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197U Jackson Amendment. To Sakharov, Jackson’s proposal was a ’’moral 
approach” consistent with ’’the ethical principles of American demo­
cracy.”^  Of course, the Kremlin eventually rejected the entire Trade 
Reform Act. Many observers have concluded from this that ultimatums 
to the Soviet Union are ineffective and counterproductive. Such has 
been the ’’lesson” of the Jackson Amendment episode. The Amendment’s 
rejection supposedly shows the futility of overt pressure as opposed 
to quiet diplomacy. Sakharov rejects this as a misreading of the 
epis ode.
Senator Jackson’s proposal sought freer emigration for all
Soviet citizens, not just Jews. "While most observers have pointed to
a recent reduction in emigration to ’’prove” the Amendment’s failure,
Sakharov notes that emigration of other ethnic groups has indeed in-
creased since 197h» Critics of the Jackson Amendment ignore other
important categories of emigration and select only the data that
support their case. If the Jackson Amendment failed, Sakharov
argues, it did not do so because it interfered with Russian internal
37affairs, but because the West lacked unity. Disheartened by
America’s demand, the Kremlin found eager and more obliging customers
in, say, 'fofest Germany and France. Had other Western states resolutely
supported the Jackson condition, Sakharov argues, the Amendment’s
success would have been assured. The ’’lesson” of the episode is not
that conditions linking trade with human rights are ineffectual, but
38
that Western unity is necessary for effective pressure.
Sakharov rejects the view that support for human rights con­
stitutes meddling in Soviet internal affairs. When the Soviet leaders
157.
signed the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights in 19U8 and the
Helsinki agreement in 1975 > they themselves removed the human rights
39issue from the sole province of internal affairs* Far from meddling 
in Russia’s domestic politics, the Jackson Amendment asked only that 
the Soviets honor in practice -what they had already agreed to in 
principle. Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn concur in their view that the 
phrase "internal affairs" is usually a facade for oppression.
The West must make the violation of human rights "a political 
problem for the leaders of the culprit countries.’’^ 0 Predictably, 
therefore, Sakharov is enthusiastic about President Jimmy Garter’s 
verbal support for human rights• Even if such action constitutes 
interference in internal affairs, Sakharov believes Garter’s policy 
is noble. Andrei Amalrik also shares Sakharov’s enthusiasm for 
Garter’s stand. 'When American Communist Party leader Gus Hall visits 
Leonid Brezhnev, no one complains. Wien the Soviet press seethes with 
indignation over the unspeakable cruelties inflicted upon Angela 
Davis, there is no crisis. When American imperialism and capitalism 
is denounced in Pravda as racist, the world takes this in stride. But 
let the American President issue a statement deploring the suppression 
of dissent, and listen to the barrage of criticism.
v
The double standard is as insidious as it is hypocritical. 
Soviet criticism of America’s domestic politics is somehow permis­
sible. But any American statement bordering on criticism of police 
state actions is thought to be naive, evangelical, moralistic,, and 
dangerous! Incredibly, the Soviet leaders assume an indignant pose 
toward Carter’s remarks and, in the next breath, reserve for themselves
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the right to criticize America1s domestic policies. Carl Linden* a 
Servlet Affairs specialist at George Washington University* notes that 
the Soviet rulers have "always felt free about attacking the founda­
tions of Western democracy* so Carter's opening moves have really been 
a matter of playing the Soviet's own game."
Not all dissidents share Sakharov's view. The historian Roy 
Medvedev* for instance* disagrees. Like Solzhenitsyn* Medvedev 
claims that Russia's fate will ultimately be decided by Russians* not 
by outside pressure. Western public opinion is too faddish and tran­
sient to rely upon in pressing for liberalization.^ In the long run* 
Medvedev argues* detente will spur democratization. By offering em­
barrassing ultimatums* the West jeopardizes the very detente 
relationship which makes liberalization possible. Medvedev expected 
the Soviet rulers to reject the Jackson Amendment. Continued Western 
pressure will only cause a reversion to a Cold War-type of situation 
and will reinforce the seige mentality which Sakharov dislikes.
Medvedev believes that Sakharov's open support for the Jackson 
Amendment was a "tactically wrong" step. Such action will only in­
furiate the Soviet rulers and cause them to tighten the screws at home. 
Instead* Medvedev notes that a new Soviet Constitution is being drafted 
and that the authors "cannot avoid" making the right of free emigra­
tion a part of the new document • American economic pressure* Medvedev 
notes* did not moderate Cuban radicalism. Given this fact* Medvedev 
argues* the idea that witholding credits and technology will induce 
Soviet reform is pure fantasy. Overt pressure will only hinder* not
) "3
advance* the goal of democratization.
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Andrei Amalrik comes to Sakharov’s defense against Medvedev.
The West can induce same change within the Soviet Union* Amalrik be­
lieves* even if he disagrees with Sakharov over the extent of that 
change. In any event* Amalrick refuses to accord Roy Medvedev the 
status of "dissident." "In reality*" Amalrik notes* "everything 
that Medvedev says meets almost completely the official Soviet 
views."
Ad hominem arguments are not the only weapons Amalrik uses to 
impale Medvedev’s view. Medvedev calls Sakharov’s support of the 
Jackson Amendment unwise because this action antagonizes the regime 
and prompts the Soviet leaders to tighten the screws. Taken to its 
logical conclusion* however* Medvedev's argument militates against 
any expression of dissent. No doubt the dissidents antagonize the 
Party. Should the movement thus disband* lest it hurt Brezhnev's 
feelings and forestall reform? Medvedev's "logic" really calls for 
silencing all dissidents* and Amalrik refuses to join Medvedev's leap 
of faith regarding voluntary reform.
Aside from Western pressure* Sakharov sees hope for world 
peace in the process of convergence between East and West. Because of 
common needs for industrialization and modernization* a new managerial 
class has emerged within the respective societies. As ideological 
fervor gives way to a preoccupation with technical problems* the So­
viet and American societies will grow to resemble each other. In both 
systems* the new elites will demand more consumer goods* forcing 
society to demilitarize. With education* the technical class will spurn 
the Party slogans and demand reform. As the systems' converge* radi­
calism subsides* democratic values spread* consumer demand prevails*
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and world peace is promoted. Such, at least, is Sakharov’s theory.
"When he speaks of the ’’inevitable process of rapprochement between the 
two systems,” Sakharov implies that even without the dissident move­
ment, democratization is inevitable.^ Since they face similar prob­
lems, the capitalist and socialist systems must freely borrow
) 7
’’positive elements” from each other. In this respect, convergence 
represents a new synthesis between East and West. Sakharov’s ana­
lytical style thus retains some aspects of Hegelian thought. Detente 
and convergence represent two roads to the same goal. To Sakharov, 
convergence is an inexorable process leading to liberalization. But 
through Western pressure and internal dissent, democratization may 
progress long before convergence reaches fruition.
Western Leftism
Too often Western! intellectuals exhibit what Sakharov calls
} P,
’’Leftist-liberal faddishness.” Both Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn are 
critical of Western leftism, but the latter dissident is much more 
bitter. This faddishness displays itself when Western liberals apply 
one set of values to socialist systems and an entirely different set of 
values to capitalist systems. The human rights issue is one example. 
Western leftists, Sakharov believes, are much too gullible in accepting 
at face value the claims of socialist states. Any information con­
flicting with their preconceptions is dismissed as reactionary.
Illustrative of Western liberals1 s hypocrisy is the issue of 
America’s intervention in Vietnam, Sakharov argues. Sakharov has long 
been consistent in his opposition to America’s hole in Vietnam. Yet
161,
Sakharov notes that many Western liberals -who condemned America1 s in­
volvement as immoral "did not notice" reprehensible acts committed by
li9
the Viet Cong against other Vietnamese. Mass executions of civil­
ians in Hue, systematic terror against villagers suspected of 
collaboration— these atrocities were committed by the "progressive 
forces" while the left’s moralistic critique fell to a hush.
The Chilean Pinochet regime is routinely condemned in the 
world press, in the United Nations, and by nearly every government.
But no condemnation is heard regarding Cambodia, * where the Khmer Rouge
$0 n
"liberators" have killed approximately 1.2 million people. Compare 
this to the groundswell of outrage when President Nixon ordered an 
invasion of Cambodia in 1970* If Western liberals are truly concerned 
about human rights, Sakharov asks, what explains the selectivity of 
their outrage?
Sakharov does not argue that atrocity justifies atrocity. 
Rather, he is trying to introduce some perspective and a measure of 
consistency to the human rights issue. The left generally exhibits 
neither perspective (unless it be their own narrow one) nor consis­
tency, he believes. How simple the left’s approach is! Here is 
the left and here is the right. On one side we have our good dic­
tatorships, on the other side the intolerable tyrannies. On one side 
we have our "progressive elements," on the other side the "reac­
tionary forces." Leftist tyranny is written off as a growing pain of 
those regimes combatting "neo-colonialism." Rightist oppression must 
be fought, however. .Sakharov certainly does not pillory all Western 
liberals on this score, but he nevertheless sees shallowness as a 
prominent trait.
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What causes this "leftist-liberal faddishness"? Sakharov 
offers four suggestions. First, much of the Western left is made up 
of young radicals. The ardor for revolution per se seems to override 
a systematic concern for human rights. To young leftists, the latter 
seems to be an unexciting task. Second, faddishness is compounded 
by a reluctance on the part of older people to appear to be old- 
fashioned. Novelty starts to take precedence over consistency.
Modem societies exalt youth and denigrate agedness. What is fash­
ionable is more tempting than what is principled. A third reason for 
Western gullibility is found in the distorted information received 
from communist states.
Finally, Sakharov notes that "often it is not the more logical
idea that takes precedence but ephemeral notions that are more ex-
51travagant and easier to grasp." Tet this view contradicts 
Sakharov’s earlier justification for intellectual freedom, i.e., the 
argument that such liberty is needed in order to destroy mass myths 
in the "marketplace of ideas." The race for credibility is not al­
ways given to the logical or true, but to the plausible and the 
inaccurate. Such a view lands a roundhouse blow to Sakharov’s con­
fidence that enlightened ideas will prevail. In such a way does 
Sakharov unwittingly demolish one of the liberal assumptions under­
lying his proposals.
Amalrik on East-West Relations
Amalrik shares Solzhenitsyn’s concern over the West’s demise 
but, unlike the novelist, Amalrik does not see the West, in almost 
certain decline. He speaks of the West’s "faltering self-confidence,"
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and views the current preoccupation with human rights as a moral boost
for the West. Dissidents defend those values which have always been
the Westfs moral foundation. Supporting the democratic opposition in
52
the Soviet Union is thus in the West's best interest. Soviet dis­
sent helps to humanize communism elsewhere, inspiring groups such as 
Euro communists to act independently of Moscow.
-Americans reflect much of the naivete of the reformist
ideologists as well. Amalrik argues that the United States sees Russia
as a status quo power, not a revolutionary force. With increased
trade, tourism, and Western influences, Russians will become "just
like us," Americans believe. American opinions regarding the Soviet
Union derive from hopes and not realism, Amalrik argues. He urges
Americans to recognize the Soviet Union as an aggressive state which
will never be "just like us."
But a new Gold War is not the answer. Rather, the West
should seek detente, but a different type of detente. Amalrik!s
ideal would differ from the current relaxation of tensions. Genuine 
✓detente requires Soviet democratization. Just how much democrat­
ization Amalrik would require is unclear, but toleration of dissent 
is surely one condition. Without an affinity of values between the 
two systems, detente will be meaningless. Western diplomats should 
watch for the Soviets to respect basic human rights. Otherwise 
detente will degenerate into a cynical modus vivendi and will not be
much different from the Cold War. Amalrik admits that he is
!
skeptical toward the possibility of any cultural affinity. Neverthe­
less, he argues, rapprochement should still be the goal.
16U,
Lacking in Amalrik’s discussion is Sakharov’s urgent tone.
The historian clearly does not share Sakharov’s worry over nuclear 
war. Amalrik also favors more aggressive Western pressure in order 
to induce Soviet respect for human rights• Here Amalrik differs with 
Solzhenitsyn and Roy Medvedev, both of whom argue that Western pres­
sure on Russia would be ineffectual, if not counterproductive. Western 
leverage includes withholding from Russia credits, technology, and
55food. Amalrik thus ventures beyond Sakharov’s linkage, which em­
braces technology embargoes but which rejects credit and food cut-offs 
on humanitarian grounds. It is also important to note that while 
Sakharov believes that Western pressure can speed Russia on her path 
toward the New Enlightenment, Amalrik has no such ambition. The best 
that any linkage can do is to make Russia more peaceable toward the 
West, a bit more tolerant as a society. But Amalrik denies that - *
Western pressure can rebuild Russian society in the image of some
grand and new system.
The Dissident Debate
That the dissident movement is heterogeneous can be easily 
seen from the dialogue between Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. Respec­
tively, they are leaders among the creative and scientific
intelligentsia. In his horror over Solzhenitsyn’s vision of Russia’s 
future, Sakharov joined many Western liberals. Though he acknowledged 
Solzhenitsyn’s unequalled status as a writer, Sakharov had many 
objections to Solzhenitsyn’s political views.
Specifically, Sakharov claims that by exaggerating the role 
of ideology, Solzhenitsyn misanalyzes the Soviet system. Even if
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the rulers renounced ideology, Sakharov argues, no genuine reform will 
be forthcoming without a corresponding diffusion of governmental power. 
Concentration of authority, not Marxism, is the root evil of the Soviet 
system. As long as men function in a climate of conformity, it is use­
less to discard ideology. To Sakharov, the major Russian problem is
56the ’’barrack-square” mentality cultivated by authoritarian regimes.
Thus does Sakharov readily endorse the model of Western-style parlia­
mentary democracy for Russia. Ideology is not the main problem, for 
most Soviet citizens privately scoff at it.
Solzhenitsyn retorts that ideology is the root problem. If no 
one believes in this dogma, yet all submit to it, this shows the
57frightening power of communist ideology. Russia’s political history
has been characterized by concentrated political power, and people
lived quite well. Soviet cruelties dwarf the calamities of past
centuries not because of authoritarianism, but because of the callous
ideology. More than any other people, Russians have suffered at the
hands of this tyranny. Thus, it is only just that the Russians gain
some respite by turning inward and focusing on their own problems.
Sakharov counters that all nationalities, not merely the 
58Russians, have suffered. Solzhenitsyn’s lament for the Russians is 
akin to national chauvinism. Crimean Tatars, Ukrainian nationalists, 
the Baltic peoples— these groups have suffered too, yet they are ex­
cluded from Solzhenitsyn's scheme. In turn, Solzhenitsyn reminds 
Sakharov that he favors granting self-determination to all nationali­
ties. (Yet this contradicts one of his earlier objections to 
democracy. Refuting Sakharov’s call for liberal freedoms, Solzhenitsyn
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talks ominously of war between various nationalities. Later, answer­
ing Sakharov’s charge of Great Russian nationalism, Solzhenitsyn notes 
that he favors full self-determination for all nationalities! Ob­
viously, Solzhenitsyn cannot have it both ways.) He is no Great 
Russian nationalist, he insists. "Whenever Russians stop hating each 
other and speak of a spiritual rebirth, they are criticized for being 
Great Russian chauvinists. Again Solzhenitsyn distinguishes between 
nationalism and chauvinism, between patriotism and lemming-like 
obedience.
Sakharov also takes dead aim at his colleague's plan for the
Russian Northeast. Developing this inhospitable wilderness, he argues,
is impossible without using that which Solzhenitsyn hates— technology
and Western capital. Economic autarky, Solzhenitsyn’s goal, is in-
59compatible with the aim of Northeast development. However much 
virtue Solzhenitsyn sees in it, manual labor will never do the job.
And how will Solzhenitsyn lure able-bodied people to this austere 
taiga, at bayonet point? Is this not just another harebrained virgin 
land scheme? Citing the worst excesses of insustrial1zation, Solzhe­
nitsyn proceeds to unfairly condemn all progress, all development, all 
technology, all economic growth. The clock cannot be turned back, 
however. If Solzhenitsyn is serious about developing the Northeast, 
Sakharov argues, he must abandon his antiquated and misplaced bias 
against all that is modern.
National introspection is not a desirable policy either, Sak­
harov claims. No major problem, such as disarmament, pollution, or 
development, is solvable at the national level. An international
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approach is necessary and world government'is one solution. Contrasted 
to Solzhenitsyn’ s parochialism is Sakharov’s internationalism. If the 
famous author is in the Russophile tradition, the noted physicist is 
closer to the 19th century Westernizer mold.
Convergence, not isolation, is Sakharov's alternative. Un­
like Solzhenitsyn, he is optimistic regarding the West’s ability and 
willingness to use leverage and induce Soviet Liberalization, But 
Sakharov finds Solzhenitsyn’s cavalier acceptance of authoritarianism
frightening. He accuses Solzhenitsyn of "patriarchal religious ro- 
60manticism." What Solzhenitsyn offers is not an escape from ideology, 
but rather one more utopian myth— the chimera of spiritual and material 
salvation bases on primitive methods and aims. One more myth is the 
last thing that this century needs. Solzhenitsyn offers an unper­
suasive response to the charge of patriarchy. He simply claims that 
he advocates no return to the past since "it’s clear to any normal 
person that one can only move forward." These criticisms, Solzhenitsyn 
asserts, come from hack journalists who are used to writing only about 
women’s fashions. But Solzhenitsyn has a few criticisms of Sakharov’s 
proposals as well.
Since Sakharov's is a global vision, he must compromise or at 
least work with every group and ideology, Solzhenitsyn argues. In­
tolerance toward those beliefs deemed to be "Fascist, racist,
62militaristic and demagogic" is incompatible with global reform. At 
once Sakharov supports peaceful coexistence. Without breaking stride, 
he announces his refusal to work with extremist ideologies. Solz­
henitsyn asks what will happen if, in Sakharov’s brave new world, these 
ideologies reappear. Will the offendors be "liquidated"? Will the 
ideas be censored? If they are not censored, is there not the risk
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that the ideas will gain more adherents? If they are censored, has 
Sakharov not trampled upon his own cherished ideal of intellectual 
freedom?
And as for "leftist-liberal faddishness," Solzhenitsyn argues, 
Sakharov is a prime example! In his 1968 volume, Sakharov condemns 
the internal policies of rightist regimes in Indonesia and Greece, 
yet presents the "excesses" of his own country in a most indulgent
63light. When he urges UW intervention to protect and support "pro­
gressive elements" in other lands, Sakharov only paves the way for 
more bloodshed, Solzhenitsyn argues.
Russia will only be changed by Russians, Solzhenitsyn em­
phasizes, and Sakharov will be no more successful than Peter the 
Great in transplanting Western traditions in Russia. Multiparty 
systems entail pettiness and squalor, Solzhenitsyn parries, and Sak­
harov is merely mouthing his own weary brand of democracy. The whole 
notion of party and the factious temperament it introduces into 
society is the problem, not the answer. Democracy is inimical 
to the Russian tradition. Western assistance is nice, Solzhenitsyn 
concedes, but it is also a fair-weather friend. The West is too pre­
occupied with its own problems to make a sustained press for Soviet 
reform.
Sakharov is thus chasing a mirage, Solzhenitsyn argues. When 
Western public opinion tires of the dissident campaign and moves on 
to dabble in another "cause," Sakharov will have wasted much time 
that could have been spent on internal reform. Solving Russia’s 
problems is a difficult enough task. Solving the world’s problems 
gives Sakharov material for another book, but the idea that Russia
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or Sakharov can accomplish this is a flight of fancy.
Stylistically, Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn vastly differ. 
Solzhenitsyn is the impassioned Cassandra, the raging Lear. Sak­
harov is the moderate and occasionally pedantic Polonius. In 
apocalyptic terms, Solzhenitsyn warns of an East-West conflict. 
Sakharov counters with his optimistic assessment of convergence as 
the new ordering principle. One man represents the suppressed 
anger of the masses; the other voices the suppressed reasoning of
6Uthe intelligentsia. The dispute between them is remarkably free 
of acrimony.
The same carrnot be said for the Amalrik-Medvedev dispute.
But Roy Medvedev is not the sole recipient of Amalrik’s criticism.
For instance, Amalrik views Solzhenitsyn as yet another ideologue.
Solzhenitsyn may claim to oppose all ideologies, but what he himself
offers is no different. Amalrik considers Solzhenitsyn *s neo-Russo-
philism to be nothing more than "nationalism with a human face."
Solzhenitsyn1 literature, Amalrik argues, "contains the rudiments of
a ’complete world philosophy’ and will scarcely be tolerant of other 
6<
ideologies." In his eagerness to replace Marxism with a different 
unifying belief, ‘Solzhenitsyn becomes what he hates— an ideologue.
There is little doubt that when Amalrik refers to naive 
persons who accept the notion of "reformism," he has Andrei Sakharov 
in mind. Contrary to the physicist's hopes, the systems of East and 
West are not converging. Amalrik unfairly misrepresents and belittles 
the convergence argument by referring to those who believe that 
"foreign tourists, jazz records, and miniskirts will help to create
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a ’humane socialism.’” The socialist and capitalist systems will 
not grow to resemble each other. Things are not getting better in the 
Soviet Union. Grandiose reform schemes are not practical. Of all 
this dissidents, Amalrik is the most fervent nay-sayer. In question­
ing the likelihood of progress, coexistence, and intellectual freedom 
within the Soviet Union, Amalrik rejects much of Sakharov’s liberalism.
On many political issues, therefore, these three dissidents 
are poles apart. Their debate (and it is a debate, not an argument) is 
emblematic of much of the dissonance within the dissident movement.
But this should not overshadow much common ground shared by these 
thinkers. All three men agree on the need for change within the 
Soviet Union. Moreover, all three advocate an evolutionary rather 
than revolutionary path for such change. None of the three endorse 
Marxism, though their reasons for this differ. Human values form the 
foundation of their political perspectives• The substantive dispute 
among these men reveals an entire philosophical spectrum, a spectrum 
which corrects any mistaken notion of a monolithic dissident movement.
i7i.
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CHAPTER VI
EPILOGUE
He who establishes a dictatorship and 
does not kill Brutus , or he who founds a 
republic and does not kill the sons of 
Brutus, will only reign a short time.
Machiavelli Discourses
A man can be destroyed but not defeated.
Hemingway The Old Man and the Sea
That there is much dissonance within the dissident movement
should not be surprising. One can hardly expect dissidents to endorse
freedom of discussion in principle and then avoid practicing it among
themselves. Contrast this with certain West European communist parties
which, by a vote of 1,700 to zero, claim to renounce the doctrine of
1proletarian dictatorship. Democracy is endorsed without a single 
dissenting vote among 1,700 delegates. These delegates now endorse 
democracy as unanimously as they swore allegiance to proletarian dic­
tatorship a mere year ago. The tension between internal party 
guidlines and party platforms, between democratic centralism and demo­
cratic values, accounts for much of the skepticism toward Eurocommunism. 
But this same tension can only revive confidence regarding the dissi­
dents^ fidelity to ideals.
Dissidents practice among themselves what they preach in their 
samizdat. Since truthfulness to oneself is a prominent dissident theme, 
one must almost require that there be disagreement within the movement
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itself. Additionally, we are examining intelligent, free-spirited and 
oftentimes temperamental men. Within any group such as this there are 
bound to be differences of opinion. By being truthful to their own 
ideals and by tolerating dissent within the movement, dissidents may 
weaken their own campaign by a lack of consensus as to aims and methods. 
Herein lies what may be the supreme irony of the dissident task: to be
true to dissident ideals, the movement must be hamstrung by doctrinal 
debate.
If dissidents formed a more disciplined group, if they enforced 
more conformity on their colleagues, they might have a better chance of 
effecting change. In the process of this change, however, original 
dissident values such as toleration and critical discussion would have 
been betrayed. In a sense, an emasculated political movement may be the 
price that dissidents pay for fidelity to their ideals. Anyway, the 
dissidents lack the formality which effective reform needs. To speak 
of a dissident "movement" can be misleading, since the term embraces 
disparate groups such as the Helsinki Monitoring Committee, Amnesty 
International, Ukrainian nationalists, and the Committee for Human 
Rights. Various splinter groups comprise the movement and there is no 
such thing as formal membership.
Yet the three dissidents discussed herein are united on many 
points • All oppose the Soviet regime and condemn Stalin, even if they 
cannot agree on whether the vozhd deserves the suffix "ism." All re­
ject Marxism, even if they differ in what they embrace in its place. 
Individual liberty forms the cornerstone of their appeal. Whether 
they rely upon Soviet, natural or international law, the dissidents
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argue that the indivudual must not submit to "the collective." All 
three dissidents deplore nihilism, even if they disagree over what 
values men are to hold. All three desire a reform of Soviet society, 
even if they disagree as to its likelihood.
It is important to reiterate that what we have examined is but 
one small slice of a broad movement. For instance, all three dissi­
dents discussed herein are reformists, not revolutionaries. This is. 
not a point of consensus within the entire movement, however. Certain 
nationalist and fascist groups sanction violence as a means to resist 
or change the state.
We have sought neither a "representative dissident" nor a 
synthesis of dissident thought. The first is a futile search; the 
second a presumptuous and equally fruitless task. But the fact that 
we have examined so tiny a slice of the dissident movement only supports 
our main thesis. For if there is substantial disagreement among these 
three dissidents, there is probably even more within the movement as a 
whole. Given such a dialogue within the movement’s moderate wing, one 
can easily imagine the doctrinal discord within more extreme Maoist and 
neo-Leninist groups.
If any central truth emerges from the dissident dialogue, per­
haps it is the message that ideas are indomitable. Pariahs to their 
countrymen, misfits to many in the West, the dissidents speak to who­
ever will listen. Men may be lobotomized, exiled, or killed. Ideas 
are not so easily obliterated, though. Soviet leaders hope against hope 
that this is not the case. They have thus expunged the word arkhipelag
from the Russian language. Geographers must now use some euphemism
2
regarding a "group of small, far-flung islands."
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Of course, the Soviet leaders have also denounced "bourgeois" 
terns such as "individualism" and "toleration." Yet these concepts 
live. More than any of their predecessors, the current Soviet leader­
ship tries to sustain at least the appearance of legality in its 
actions. The newest Constitution accords many liberties (even if it 
conditions them all on obedience to the state).. In their rhetoric,
* the leaders appeal to democratic ideals. "The pretense of democracy," 
writes Robert Strauz-Hupe, "is the compliment which tyranny pays to 
freedom." It is also the compliment which the regime pays to the 
dissidents.
During World War II a Soviet counter-intelligence agent, Zoya 
Kosmodemyanskaya, was captured by the Nazis and publicly executed.
Now a folk heroine in the Soviet pantheon, the woman died with words 
that could well be the dissidents Ts motto and solace: "There are many 
of us."
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